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http://www.archive.org/details/memoiroflastyear01earl 



^ MEM OIR 



OF 



THE LASl^ YEAR 



OP THE 



WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE, 



IN THE 

COKEEDERATE STATES OE AMEKICA, 

CONTAINING 

AN ACCOUNT OF THE OPERATIONS OF HIS COMMANDS 
fN THE YEARS 1864 AND 1865. 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, 

OF THE PROVISIONAL ARMY OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES. 



DEDICATED 

®o t\t fKtmors of tf)t J^crou jBtaJb, inljo ffll f i^ttm^ for liiftt^, Bisfjt & Justits. 



,i;^^-L: 7/^ 




DEO VlNDICEr 



PUBLISHED BY CHARLES W. BUTTON, 

1867. 



A- 



rj 



intote b'X" the i^xjblisher,. 



The author of this work, having generously placed it at the disposal of the 
Memorial Associations of Virginia, — engaged in the pious task of collecting the re- 
mains of the Southern soldiers who fell on Virginia battle-fields, with the view of 
enclosing and marking their graves, — it is published at the lowest possible cost, 
for the purpose of raising funds for this praise-worthy object. All the profits 
arising from the sale of the work will be sacredly appropriated to the end in view- 
In a letter to the publisher Gen. Early says : "Perhaps I might have made some- 
thing by a sale of the work ; but I wanted to keep clear of a!l suspicion of writ- 
iiig a book for money." He adds: "You can judge whether it is worthy of 
republication. One thing is certain — it contains the truth." x\nd nobody who 
knows Jubal A. Early as we know him, will -q^uestion his veracity. 

Apart from the intrinsic merits of the work, — as a valuable contribution to tho 
history of the late war — revealing facts connected with a campaign that has not 
been understood even by our own people,— -it is hoped that the laudable object of 
those who have incurred the expense of republishing it, will secure for this pro- 
duction of a gallant and meritorious officer an extended sale. 






^v 



P H E F A C E . 



Under a solemn sense of duty to my unhappy country, and 
to the brave soldiers who fought under me, as well as to my- 
self, the following pages have been written. 

When the question of practical secession from the United 
States arose, as a citizen of the State of Virginia, and a 
member of the Convention called by the authority of the Leg- 
islature of that State, I opposed secession with all the ability I 
possessed, with the hope that the horrors of civil war might be 
averted, and that a returning sense of duty and justice on the 
part of the masses of the ISTorthern States, would induce them 
to respect the rights of the people of the South. "While some 
N'orthern politicians and editors, who subsequently took rank 
among the most unscrupulous and vindictive of our enemies, 
and now hold me to be a traitor and rebel, were openly and 
sedulously justifying and encouraging secession, I was la- 
boring honestly and earnestly to preserve the Union. 

As a member of the Virginia Convention, I voted against 
the ordinance of secession on its passage by that body, with 
the hope that, even then, the collision of arms might be avoided, 
and some satisfactory adjustment arrived at. The adoption of 
that ordinance wrung from me bitter tears of grief; but I at 
once recognized my duty to abide the decision of my native 
State, and to defend her soil against invasion. Any scruples 
which I may have entertained as to the right of secession, 
were soon dispelled by the mad, wicked, and unconstitutional 
measures of the authorities at Washington, and the frenzied 
clamour of the people of the i^orth for war upon their former 
brethren of the South. I then, and ever since have, regarded 
Abraham Lincoln, his counsellors and supporters, as the real 



IV PREFACE. 

traitors Avho had overthrown the constitution and government 
of the United States, and estahlished in lieu thereof an odious 
despotism ; and tliis opinion I entered on the journal of the 
Convention when I signed the ordinance of secession. I 
recognized the right of resistance and revolution as exercised 
hy our fathers in 1776, and, without cavil as to the name by 
which it was called, I entered the military service of my State, 
willingly, cheerfully, and zealously. 

When the State of Virginia became one of the Confederate 
States, and her troops were turned over to the Confederate 
(xovernment, I embraced the cause of the "Whole Confederacy 
with equal ardour, and continued in the service, with the de- 
termination to devote all the energy and talent I possessed to 
the common defence. I fought through the entire war, without 
once regretting the course 1 had pursued; with an abiding 
faith in the justice of our cause ; and I never saw the moment 
when I w^ould have been willing to consent to any compromise 
or settlement short of the absolute independence of my 
country. 

It was my fortune to participate in most of the great military 
operations in which the army in Virginia was engaged, both 
before and after General Lee assumed the command. In the 
last year of this momentous struggle, I commanded, at diifer- 
ent times, a division and two corps of General Lee's Army, in 
the campaign from the Rapidan to James River, and, subse- 
quently, a separate force which marched into Mar3dand, 
threatened Washington City, and then went through an event- 
ful campaign in the Valley of Virginia. I'To detailed reports 
of the operations of these different commands were made 
before the close of the war, and the campaign in Maryland 
and the Valley of Virginia has been the subject of much com- 
ment and misapprehension. I have now^ wantten a narrative of 
the operations of all my commands during the closing year of 
the war, and lay it before the w^orld as a contribution to the 
history of our great struggle for independence. Li giving that 
narrative, I have made such statements of the positions and 
strength of the opposing forces in Virginia, and such reference 
to their general operations, as were necessary to enable the 



PREFACE. V 

reader to understand it ; but I do not pretend to detail the 
operations of other commanders. 

I have not found it necessary to be guilty of the injustice of 
attempting to pull down the reputation of any of my fellow 
officers, in order to build up my own. My operations and my 
campaign stand on their own merits, whatever they may be. 
'Nov, in anything I may have found it necessary to say in regard 
to the conduct of my troops, do I wish to be understood as, in 
w^ay, decrying the soldiers who constituted the rank and file of 
my commands. I believe that the world has never produced a 
body of men superior, in courage, patriotism, and endurance, 
to the private soldiers of the Confederate armies. I have 
repeatedly seen those soldiers submit, with cheerfulness, to 
privations and hardships which would appear to be almost 
incredible ; and the wild cheers of our brave men, (which were 
so different from the studied hurrahs of the Yankees,) when 
their thin lines sent back opposing hosts of Federal troops, 
staggering, reeling, and flying, have often thrilled every fibre 
in my heart. I have seen, with my own eyes, ragged, bare- 
footed, and hungry Confederate soldiers perform deeds, which, 
if performed in days of yore by mailed warriours in glittering 
armour, would have inspired the harp of the minstrel and the 
pen of the poet. 

I do not aspire to the character of a historian, but, having 
been a witness of and participator in great events, I have given 
a statement of what I saw and did, for the use of the future 
historian. Without breaking the thread of my narrative, as it 
proceeds, I have given, in notes, comments on some of the 
errors and inconsistencies committed by the commander of the 
Federal army. General Grant, and the Federal Secretary of 
War, Mr. Stanton, in their reports made since the close of the 
war; also some instances of cruelty and barbarity committed 
by the Federal commanders, which were brought to my im- 
mediate attention, as well as some other matters of interest. 

As was to have been expected, our enemies have flooded the 
press with sketches and histories, in which all the appliances of 
a meretricious literature have been made use of, to glorify 
their own cause and its supporters, and to blacken ours. But 



VI P E E F A C E . 

some Southern writers also, wlio preferred the pen to the sword 
or musket, have not been able to resist the temptation to rush 
into print; and, accordingly, carping criticisms have been 
written by the light of after events, and even histories of the 
war attempted by persons, who imagined that the distinctness 
of their vision was enhanced b}^ distance from the scene of 
conflict, and an exemption from the disturbing elements of 
whistling bullets and bursting shells. Perhaps other waiters 
of the same class may follow, and various speculations be 
indulged in, as to the causes of our disasters. As for myself, I 
have not undertaken to speculate as to the causes of our failure, 
as I have seen abundant reason for it in the tremendous odds 
brought against us. Having had some means of judging, I 
will, however, say that, in my opinion, both President Davis 
and General Lee, in their respective spheres, did all for the 
success of our cause which it was possible for mortal men to 
do ; and it is a great privilege and comfort for me so to believe, 
and to have been able to bring with me into exile a profound 
love and veneration for those great men. 

In regard to my own services, all I have to say is, that I 
have the consciousness of having done my duty to my country, 
to the very best of my ability, and, whatever may be my fate, 
I would not exchange that consciousness for untold millions. 
I have come into exile rather than submit to the yoke of the 
oppressors of my country ; but I have never thought of attrib- 
uting aught of blame or censure to those true men who, after 
having nobly done their duty in the dreadful struggle through 
which we passed, now, that it has gone against us, remain to 
share the misfortunes of their people, and to aid and comfort 
them in their trials ; on the contrary, I appreciate and honour 
their motives. I have not sought refuge in another land from 
insensibility to the wrongs and suiferings of my own country; 
but I feel deeply and continually for them, and could my Ijfe 
secure the redemption of that country, as it has been often 
risked, so now it would be as freely given for that object. 

There were men born and nurtured in the Southern States, 
and some of them in my own State, who took sides with our 
enemies, and aided in desolating and humiliating the land of 



PREFACE 



their own birth, and of the graves of their ancestors. Some 
of them rose to high positions in the United States Army, and 
others to high civil positions. I envy them not their dearly 
bought prosperity. I had rather be the humblest private sol- 
dier'who fought in the ranks of the Confederate Army, and 
now, maimed and disabled, hobbles on his crutches from house 
to house, to receive his daily t)read from the hands of the 
grateful women for whose homes he fought, than the highest 
of those renegades and traitors. Let them enjoy the advant- 
ages of their present positions as best they may ! for the deep 
and bitter execrations of an entire people now attend them, 
and an immortality of infamy awaits them. As for all tlie 
enemies who have overrun or aided in overrunning my country, 
there is a wide and impassable gulf between us, in which I see 
the blood of slaughtered friends, comrades, and countrymen, 
which all the waters in the firmament above and the seas 
beneath cannot wash away. Those enemies have undertaken 
to render our cause odious and infamous ; and among othei- 
atrocities committed by them in the effort to do so, an humble 
subordinate, poor Wirz, has been selected as a victim to a 
fiendish spirit, and basely murdered under an executive edict, 
founded on the sentence of a vindictive and illegal tribunal. 
Let them continue this system ! they are but erecting monu- 
ments t(^ their own eternal dishonour, and furnishing finger 
posts to guide the historian in his researches. They may 
employ the infamous Holt, with his "Bureau of Military Jus- 
tice," to sacrifice other victims on the altars of their hatred, 
und'provost marshals, and agents of the "Freedman's Bureau," 
may riot in all the license of petty tyranny, but our enemies 
can no more control the verdict of impartial history, than they 
can escape that doom which awaits them at the final judgment. 
During the war, slavery was used, as a catchword to arouse 
the passions of a fanatical mob, and to some extent the preju- 
dices of the civilized world were excited against us ; but the 
war was not made on our part for slavery. High dignitaries 
in both church and state in Old England, and puritans in Xew 
England, had participated in the profits of a trade, by which 
the ignorant and barbarous natives of Africa were brought 



VIII P E E F A G E . 

from tliat couutiy, and sold into slavery in the American Col- 
onies. Tlie generation in the Southern State.s which defended 
their country in the late war, found amongst them, in a civi- 
lized and christianized condition, 4,000,000 of the descendants 
of those degraded Africans. The Almighty Creator of the 
Universe had stamped them, indelibly, with a different colour 
and an inferior physical and mental organization. He had not 
done this from mere caprice or whim, but forTwise purposes. 
An amalgamation of the races was in contravention of His 
designs, or He would not have made them so different. This 
immense number of people could not have been transported 
back to the wilds from which their ancestors were taken, or if 
they could have been, it would have resulted in their relapse 
into l^arbarism. Reason, common sense, true humanity to the 
black, as Avell as the safety of the white race, required that the 
inferior race should be kept in a state of subordination. The 
condition of domestic slavery, as it existed in the South, had 
not only resulted in a great improvement in the moral and 
physical condition of the negro race, but h-ad furnished a class 
of labourers as happy and contented as any in the world, if not 
more so. Their hibour had not only developed the immense 
resources of the immediate country in. which they were located, 
but was the main source of the great prosperity of the United 
States, and furnished the means for the employment of mil- 
lions of the working classes in other countries. ISTevertheless, 
the struggle made by the people of the South was not for the 
institution of slavery, but for the inestimable right of self- 
government, against the domination of a fanatical faction at 
the Xorth ; and slavery was the mere occasion of the develop- 
ment of the antascouism between the two sections. That ris:ht 
of self-government ]ias been lost, and slavery violently abol- 
ished. Four millions of blacks have thus been thrown on 
their own resources, to starve, to die, and to relapse into bar- 
barism ; and inconceivable miseries have bee]i entailed on the 
white race. 

The civilized world will find, too late, that its philanthropy 
has been all false, and its religion all wrong on this subject; 
and the people of the United States will find that, under the 



P R E F A C E . IX 

pretence of "saving tlie life of the nation, and uphoiding the 
old flag," they have surrendered their own liberties into the 
hands of that worst of all tyrants, a body of senseless fanatics. 
When the passions and infatuations of the day shall have 
been dissipated by time, and all the results of the late war 
shall have passed into irrevocable history, the future chroni- 
cler of that history will have a most important duty to per- 
form, and posterity, while poring over its pages, will be lost 
ill wonder at the follies and crimes committed in this gen- 
eration. 

My narrative is now given to the public, and the sole merit I 
claim for it is that of truthfulness. In writing it, I have 
received material aid from an accurate diary kept by Lieu- 
tenant William W. Old, aide to Major General Edward Jobn- 
so)i, who was wuth me during tlic cam[>aigii in Maryland and 
the Shenandoah Valley until the 12th of August, 1864, and the 
copious notes of Captain J. Kotchkiss, who acted as Topo- 
graphical Engineer for the 2nd Corps and the Army of the 
Valley District, and recorded tlie events of each day, from the 
opening of the campaign on the Ivapidan in May, 1864, until 
the affair at Waynesboro' in March, 1865. 

J. A. EARLY. 

XOVEMBER, 1866. 



PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION. 



This work was written under an imperative sense of duty, 
as a matter of historical evidence; and, for reasons which will 
be understood, I determined from fhe beginning not to make 
it a source of personal protit. The tirst edition was published in 
Canada at my OAvn expense for gratuitous distribution, and was 
iiecessarily limited. Some errors and inaccuracies which una- 
voidably crept into that edition, — the greater part being mere 
typographical mistakes, — have been corrected, though these 
corrections make no material change in any of the statements 
of facts contained in my narrative ; and this edition is pub- 
lished for the benefit of the Ladies' Memorial Associations of 
Virginia, which have undertaken the work of collecting the 
remains and marking the graves of the Confederate dead, who 
fell on the battle-fields of that State. Let it not be supposed 
that this appropriation has been made because these Associa- 
tions are in my own dearly loved State. I^o ! the feelings 
which have dictated it are not confined to her limits, but 
embrace the whole South, from the Potomac to the Rio 
Grande. Our enemies are in the habit of referring scoffiugly 
to Virginia as the " sacred soil ; " and in the hearts of all her 
true sons and daughters, her soil is, and from time immemorial 
has been held sacred; as well because of the associations 
connected with her history, as because it is the land of theii- 
birth, and wdth that soil mingle the ashes of their ancestors. 
This sentiment all true men everywhere must appreciate and 
honour. But the soil of Virginia is now, and henceforth will 
be, held sacred in the hearts of all true Southern men and 
women, because she has been baptized in the blood and has 
received into her bosom the remains of thousands upon thou- 



3JU PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION. 

sands of the truest and noblest sons of the entire Confederacy. 
It is from this consideration tliat I have made fhe appro]3ria- 
tion designated. 

"When the duty assumed by the ladies of Virginia shall have 
been fulfilled, it will carry consolation to the hearts of many 
mourning mothers and widows in the savannahs of the South, 
as well as upon the far distant ]:)laiiis of Texas, whose hearts 
will yearn with gratitude towards their noble sisters of tlie 
grand old State — grand oven in her misfortunes. 

J. A. EARLY. 

Toronto, Fehraarii 1st, 1867. 



CAMPAIGN m VIRGINIA, 

FROM THE 

EAPIDAN TO JAMES RIYER 



INTRODITCTION. 

On tlie 3rd of May, 1864, the XDOsitions of the Confederate 
Army under General Lee, and the Federal Army under Lieu- 
tenant-Genera 1 Grant, in Virginia, were as follows : General 
Lee held the southern bank of the Eapidan River, in Orange 
county, with his right resting near the mouth of Mine Run, 
and his left extending to Liberty Mills on the road from 
Gordonsville (via Madison Court House) to the Shenandoah 
Valley ; while the crossings of the river oil the right, and the 
roads on the left were watched by cavalry. Swell's corps was 
on the right, Hill's on the left, and two divisions of Long- 
street's corps were encamped in the rear, near Gordonsville. 
Grant's army (composed of the Army of the Potomac under 
Meade, and the 9th corps under Burnside,) occupied the north 
banks of the Rapidan and Robertson rivers; the main body 
being encamped in Culpeper county, and on the Rappahan- 
nock River. 

I am satisfied that General Lee's army did not exceed 
50,000 effective men of all arms. The report of the Federal 
Secretary of War, Stanton, shows that the "available force 
present for duty. May 1st, 1864," in Grant's army, was 141,166, 
to-wit : In the Army of the Potomac 120,386, and in the 9th 
corps 20,780. The draft in the United States was being ener- 
getically enforced, and volunteering had been greatly stimu- 
lated by high bounties. The ISrorth-Western States had ten- 



14 INTRODUCTION. 

dered large bodies of troops to serve one hundred days, in 
order to relieve other troops on garrison and local duty, and 
this enabled Grant to put in the field a large number of troops 
which had been employed on that kind of duty. It was known 
that he w^as receiving heavy reinforcements up to the very time 
of his movement on the 4th of May, and afterwards ; so that 
the statement of his force on the 1st of May, by Stanton, does 
not cover the whole force with which he commenced the cam- 
paign. Moreover, Secretary Stanton's report shows that there 
were, in the Department of Washington and the Middle 
Department, 47,751 available men for duty, the chief part of 
which, he says, was called to the front after the campaign 
began, " in order to repair the losses of the Army of tlic Poto- 
mac;" and Grant says that, at Spotsylvania Court House, 
" the 13th, 14th, 15tli, 16th, 17th, and 18th [of May,] were con- 
sumed in manceuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforce- 
ments from "Washington."' His army, therefore, must have 
numbered very nearly, if not quite, 200,000 men, before a 
junction was effected with Butler. 

On the 4th of May, it was discovered that Grant's Army 
was moving towards Germanna Ford on the Rapidan, which 
was ten or twelve miles from our right. This movement had 
begun on the night of the 3rd, and the enemy succeeded in 
seizing the ford, and effecting a crossing, as the river was 
guarded at that point by only a small cavalry picket. The 
direct road from Germanna Ford to Richmond passes by Spot- 
sylvania Court House, and when Grant had efiected his cross- 
ing, he was nearer to Richmond than General Lee was. From 
Orange Court House, near which were General Lee's head- 
quarters, there are two nearly parallel roads running east- 
wardly to Fredericksburg — the one which is nearest to the 
river being called " The old Stone Pike," and the other "The 
Plank Road." The road from Germanna Ford to Spotsylva- 
nia Court House, crosses the old Stone Pike at the " Old Wil- 
derness Tavern," and two or three miles further on, it crosses 
the Plank Road. 

As soon as it was ascertained that Grant's movement was a 
serious one, preparations were made to meet him, and the 



I N T R D U C T I O N . 15 

troops of General Lee's Army were put in motion — Ewell's 
corps moving on tlie old Stone Pike, and Hill's corps on the 
Plank Road ; into which latter road Longstreet's force also 
came, from his camp near Gordonsville. 

Ewell's corps, to which my division belonged, crossed ]\Iiiie 
Run, and encamped at Locust Grove, four miles beyond, uii 
the afternoon of the 4th. "When the rest of the corps inoved, 
my division and Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division ^\'ere 
left to watch, the fords of the Rapidan, until relieved by 
cavalry. As soon as this was done, I moved to the position 
occupied by the rest of the corps, carrying Ramseur with mc. 

Ewell's corps contained three divisions of infantry, to-wit : 
Johnson's, Rodes', and my own (Early's). At this time, 
one of my brigades (Hoke's) was absent, having been with 
Hoke in N^orth Carolina ; and I had only three present, to wit : 
Hays', Pegram's, and Gordon's. One of Rodes' brigades (R. 
D. Johnston's) was at Hanover Junction. I had about 4,000 
muskets for duty ; Johnson about the same number ; and 
Rodes (including Johnston's brigade) about 6,000. 



BATTLES OF THE AVIEDEKXESS. 

UPEKATIONfS OF KARLY'S iJlAaSION. 

Oil tlie moniing of tlie oth, Ewell's corps was ]>ut in motion, 
iny division ]>rino'ing" nj* liie roai". A short distance from tlie 
Old A¥ii den u:'r.s Tavern, and just in advance iji' tlie place where 
a I'oad diverges to the left from tiie oid Stone Pike to the Ger- 
mannaFord road, the enemy, in heavy force, was eneonntered, 
and Jones' brigade, of .Johnson's division, and. Battle's brigade, 
of Jvodes' division, were driven i)ack in some confusion. My 
division was ordered nj*, and foi-nie*] across tlie pike; (xordon's 
brigade being on the right of tiie roa<J. Tliis i»r{ga<k', as soon 
us it was brought into line, was ordered f»r\\ard, and ad- 
\'anced, through a dense [line thicket, in gaihint style. In 
conjunction Avitli i)aniers, i)oks\ and Kaniseui-'s bj-igades. of 
Rodes' division, it drove the enemy back with heavy loss, cap- 
turing several hnndred prisoners, and gaining a commanding 
])Osition on the right. Johnson, at tlie same time, was heavily 
engaged in his front: his division being on tlie left of tlie pike, 
and extending across the road to tlie Oermanna Ford road, 
which lias been mentioned. After the enemy had been re- 
pulsed, Hays' brigade v/as sent to Johnson's left, in order to 
participate in a forward movement; and it did move forward, 
some half-a-milc or so, encountering the enemy in force; but, 
from some mistake, not meeting with the exjiected co-opera- 
tion, except from one regiment of Jones' brigade (the 25th. 
Va.), the most of which was captured, it was drawn back to 
Johnson's line, and took position on his left. 

Fegram's brigade was subsequently sent to take position on 
Hays' left; and, just Ijefore night, a verj- heavy attack A\'as 
made on its front, which was repulsed with severe loss to the 
enemy. In this aflaii-, General Pegram received a severe 
wound in the leg, which disabled liim for the iield for some 
months. 

During the afternoon there was heavy skirmishing along the 



BATTLES OF THE -WILDERNESS. 17 

wliole line, several attempts having been made by the enemy, 
without success, to regain the position from which he had been 
driven ; and the fighting extended to General Lee's right, on 
the Plank Road. Gordon occupied the position which he had 
gained, on the right, until after dark, when he was withdrawn 
to the extreme left, and his place occupied by part of Rodes' 
division. 

The troops encountered, in the beginning of the fight, con- 
sisted of the 5th corps, under Warren ; but other troops were 
brought to his assistance. At the close of the day, Ewell's 
corps had captured over a thousand prisoners, besides inflict- 
ing on the enemy very heavy losses in killed and wounded. 
Two pieces of artillery had been abandoned by the enemy, 
just in front of the point at which Johnson's right and Rodes' 
left joined, and were subsequently secured by our troops. 

After the withdrawal of Gordon's brigade from the right, 
the whole of my division w^as on the left of the road diverging 
from the pike, in extension of Johnson's line. All my bri- 
gades had behaved handsomely; and Gordon's advance, at the 
time of the confusion, in the beginning of the fight, Avas made 
with great energy and dispatch, and was just in time to pre- 
vent a serious disaster. 

Early on the morning of the 6th, the fighting was resumed, 
and a very heavy attack was made on the front occupied by 
Pegram's brigade (now under the command of Colonel Hoft- 
man, of the 81st Virginia Regiment) ; but it was handsomely 
repulsed, as were several subsequent attacks at the same point. 

These attacks were so persistent, that two regiments of 
Johnson's division were moved to the rear of Pegram's bri- 
gade, for the purpose of supporting it ; and, Avhen an oft'er was 
made to relieve it, under the apprehension that its ammuni- 
tion might be exhausted, the men of that gallant brigade 
begged that they might be allowed to retain their position, 
stating that they Avere getting along very Avell indeed, and 
wanted no help. 

During the moridng, the fact Avas communicated to General 
Ewell, by our cavalry scouts, that a column of the enemy's 



18 BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. 

infantry was moving between our left and the river, with the 
apparent purpose of turning our left flank ; and information 
was also received that Burnside's corps had crossed the river, 
and v\'as in rear of the enemy's right. I received directions to 
watch this column, and take steps to prevent its getting to our 
rear ; and Johnston's brigade, of Rodes' division, which had 
just arrived from Hanover Junction, was sent to me for that 
purpose. This brigade, with some artillerj', was put in posi- 
tion, some distance to my left, so as to command some bye- 
roads coming in from the river. In the meantime General 
Gordon had sent out a scouting party on foot, whicli discov 
ered what was supposed to be the enemy's right flank resting 
in the woods, in front of my division ; and, during my absence 
while posting Johnston's brigade, lie reported tlie fact to 
General Ewell, and suggested the propriety of attacking tliis 
flank of the enemy with Ills brigade, which was not engaged. 
(Jii ray return, tlie subject was mentioned to me hj General 
Ewell, and I stated to him the danger and risk of making the 
attack under the circumstances, as a column Avas threatening 
our left flank, and Burnside's corps was in rear of the enemy's 
flank on which the attack was sus-a-ested. General Ewell con- 
curred with me in this opinion, and the impolicy of the attempt 
at that time was ob^dous, as we had no reserves, and, if it 
failed, and the enemy showed any enterprise, a serious disaster 
would befall, not only our corps, but General Lee's whole army. 
In the afternoon, when the column threatening our left liad 
been withdrawn, and it had been ascertained that Burnside had 
gone to Grant's left, on account of the heavy flghting on that 
flank, at my suggestion, General Ewell ordered the movement 
which Gordon had proposed. I determined to make it with 
Gordon's brigade supported by Johnston's, and to follow it up, 
if successful, with the rest of my division. Gordon's brigade 
was accordino'lv formed in line near the edo;e of the woods in 
which the enemy's right rested, and Johnston's in the rear, 
with orders to follow Gordon and obey his orders. I posted 
my Adjutant General, Major John W. Daniel, with a courier, 
in a position to be communicated with by Gordon, so as to 
inform me of the success attending the movement, and enable 



BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS- 19 

me to put in the other brigades at the right time. As soon as 
Gordon started, which was a very short time before sunset, I 
rode to my line and threw forward Pegram's brigade in a posi- 
tion to move when required. In the meantime Gordon had 
become engaged, and, while Pegram's brigade was being- 
formed in line, I saw some of Gordon's men coming back in 
confusion, and Colonel Evans, of the 31st Georgia Regiment, 
endeavoring to rally them. Colonel Evans informed me that 
his regiment, which was on Gordon's right, had struck the 
enemy's breastworks and had given way. I immediately 
ordered Pegram's brigade forward, and directed Colonel 
Evans to guide it. Its advance was through a dense thicket of 
underbrush, but it crossed the road running through John- 
son's line, and struck the enemy's works, and one of the regi- 
ments, the 13th Virginia, under Colonel Terrill, got posses- 
sion of part of the line, when Colonel HoiFman ordered the 
brigade to retire, as it was getting dark, and there was much 
confusion produced by the difliculties of the advance. Gordon 
had struck the enemy's right iiank behind breastworks, and a 
part of his brigade was thrown into disorder. In going- 
through the woods, Johnston had obliqued too much and 
passed to Gordon's left, getting in rear of the enemy. Major 
Daniel, not hearing from Gordon, had endeavored to get to 
him, when, finding the condition of things, he attempted to 
lead one of Pegram's regiments to his assistance, and was shot 
down while behaving with great gallantry, receiving a vv^ound 
in the leg which has permanently disabled him. IlTotwith- 
standing the confusion in part of his brigade, Gordon succeeded 
in throwing the enemy's right flank into great confusion, cap- 
turing two brigadier generals (Seymour and Shaler), and several 
hundred prisoners, all of the 6th Corps, under Sedgwick. The 
advance of Pegram's brigade, and the demonstration of John- 
ston's brigade in the rear, where it encountered a part of the 
enemy's force and captured some prisoners, contributed ma- 
terially to the result. It was fortunate, however, that darkness 
came to close this affair, as the enemy, if he had been able to 
discover the disorder on our side, might have brought up fresh 
troops and availed himself of our condition. As it wa«. 



2t)- BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. 

doubtless, the lateness of the hour caused hhn to be surprised, 
and the approaching darkness increased the confusion in his 
ranks, as he could not see the strength of the attacking force, 
and probably imagined it to be much more formidable, than it 
really was. All of the brigades engaged in the attack were 
drawn back, and formed on a new line in front of the old one, 
and obliquely to it. 

At light on the morning of the 7th, an advance was made, 
which disclosed the fact that the enemy had given up his line 
of works in front of my whole line, and a good portion of 
Johnson's. Between the lines, a large number of his dead had 
been left, and, at his breastworks, a large number of muskets 
and knapsacks had been abandoned, and there was every in- 
dication of great confusion. It was not till then, that we 
ascertained the full extent of the success attending the move- 
ment of the evening before. The enemy had entirely aban- 
doned the left side of the road, across which Johnson's line 
extended, and my division and a part of his were thrown for- 
ward, occupying a part of the abandoned works on the right 
of the road, and leaving all those on the left in our rear. This 
rendered our line straight, the left having been previously 
thrown back, making a curve. 

Daring this day there was some skirmishing, but no serious 
fighting in my front. The loss in my division during the 
fighting in the Wilderness was comparatively light. 

On the morning of the 8th, it vv^as discovered that the enemy 
was leaving our front and moving towards Spotsylvania Court 
House. General Lee's army was also put in motion ; Ewell's 
corps moving along the line occupied by our troops on the day 
before, until it reached the Plank Road, where it struck across 
to Shady Grove, which is on the road from Orange Court 
House to Spotsylvania Court House. 

On reaching the Plank Road, I received through General A. 
P. Hill, who was sick and unable to remain on duty, an order 
from General Lee, transferring Hays' brigade from my division 
to Johnson's, in order that it might be consolidated with 
another Louisiana brigade in that division, whose Brigadier- 



BATTLES OP THE WILDEBNESS. 21 

General had been killed at the Wilderness, and Johnston's 
brigade from Rodes' division to mine; and assigning me to 
the temporary command of Hill's corps, which was still in 
position across the Plank Road, and was to bring up the rear. 
I accordingly turned over the command of my division to 
Gordon, the senior Brigadier left with it, and assumed com- 
mand of Hill's corps. * 

*In his official report, Grant says: "Early on the 5th, the advance corps, the 5th, Major- 
General G. K. "Warren commanding, inet and engaged the enemy outside his entrenchments 
near Mine Run;" and further on he says: "On the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances 
showed that the enemy had fallen behind his entrenched lines, with pickets to the front 
covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was evident to iny mind that the two days 
fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, 
notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he could wait an attack behind his 
works." In mentioning his movement toward Spotsylvania Court House, he says : " But the 
enemy having become aware of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to 
reach there first." If these statements were true, the only legitimate inference is thatGen- 
eral Lee had an entrenched line on, or near Mine Run, previously established ; that the 
battle commenced immediately in front of the works on this line; and that, after the two 
days fighting, he had fallen behind them to wait an attack. Whereas the fact is, that the 
only entrenched line on, or near, Mine Run, was that made, on its west bank, when Meade 
crossed the river at the end of November, 1S63, and which was used for that occasion only. 
The fighting in the Wilderness began eight or ten miles east of that line, and at no time 
during that fighting was it used for any purpose. The " entrenched lines " occupied by our 
army on the morning of the 7th, were slight temporary works thrown up, on, or in front of 
the battle-field, though it is probable that, at some points, the line may not have been so far 
to the front, as our troops had advanced; as, in takmg it, regard was necessarily had to the 
conformation 'of the ground. On our left, as will be seen aboTe, the line was advanced in 
front of Grant's own line of the previous day. 

Grant says Genera 1 Lee had the advantage of position. As the latter had to move from his 
lines on the Rapidan and attack Grant in the Wilderness, how happened it that he was 
enabled to get the advantage of position, after the two days fighting. He also says that Gen- 
eral Lee was enabled to reach Spotsylvania Court House, first, because he had the shorter 
line. The iact is, that, as the two armies lay in their positions at the Wilderness, their lines 
were parallel to the road to Spotsylvania Court House. Grant had the possession of the 
direct road to that place, and he had the start. General Lee had to move on the circuitous 
route by Shady Grove, and he was enabled to arrive at the Court House first with part of his 
infantry, because his cavalry held Grant's advance in check for nearly an entire day. 



BATTLES AKOUKD SPOTSYLVAI^IA COURT HOUSE. 

OPERATIONS OF HILL'S CORPS. 

Hill's Corps was composed of Heth's, Wilcox's, and Ma- 
hone's (formerly Anderson's) divisions of infantry, and three 
battalions of artillery under Colonel Walker. When I took 
command of it, the infantry numbered about 13,000 muskets 
for duty. 

General Lee's orders to me, were to move by Todd's tavern 
along the Brock Road to Spotsylvania Court House, as soon as 
our front was clear of the enemy. In order to get into that 
road, it was necessary to reopen an old one leading from Hill's 
rio-ht, by which I was enabled to take a cross road leading into 
the road from Shady Grove to Todd's tavern. The waggon 
trains and all the artillery, except one battalion, was sent 
around by Shady Grove. About a mile from the road from 
Shady Grove to Todd's tavern, the enemy's cavalry videttes 
were encountered, and Mahone's division was thrown forward 
to develope the enemy's force and position. Mahone encoun- 
tered a force of infantry, which had moved up from Todd's 
tavern towards Shady Grove, and had quite a brisk engage- 
ment v/ith it, causing it to fall back rapidly towards the former 
place. At the same time. General Hampton, who had com- 
municated with me, after I left the Plank Road, moved with 
his cavalry on my right and struck the enemy on the flank and 
rear ; but on account of want of knowledge of the country on 
our part, and the approach of darkness, the enemy was enabled 
to make his escape. This affair developed the fact that the 
enemy was in possession of Todd's tavern and the Brock Road, 
and a continuation of my march would have led through his 
entire army. We bivouacked for the night, at the place from 
which Mahone had driven the enemy, and a force was thrown 
out towards Todd's tavern, which was about a mile distant. 

Very early next morning, (the 9tb,) I received an order frorc 



BATTLES OF SPOTSYLVANIA C. H. 23 

General Lee, through Hampton, to move on the Shady Grove 
road towards Spotsylvania Court House, which I did, crossing 
a small river called the Po, twice. After reaching the rear of 
the position occupied by the other two corps, I was ordered to 
Spotsylvania Court House, to take position on the right, and 
cover the road from that place to Fredericksburg. 'No enemy 
appeared in my front on this day, except at a distance on the 
Fredericksburg Eoad. 

Early on the morning of the 10th, I Vv'^as ordered to, move 
one of my divisions back, to cover the crossing of the Po on 
the Shady Grove road; and to move with another division, to 
the rear and left, by the way of Spotsylvania Old Court House, 
and drive back a column of the enemy which had crossed the 
Po and taken possession of the Shady Grove road, thus threat- 
ening our rear and endangering our trains, which were on the 
road leading by the Okl Court House to Louisa Court House. 

Our line was then north of the Po, with its left, Field's 
division of Longstreet's corps, resting on that stream, just 
above the crossing of the Shady Grove road. The whole of 
the enemy's force was also north of the Po, prior to this move- 
ment of his. Mahone's division was sent to occupy the banks 
of the Po on Field's left, while, with Heth's division and a bat- 
talion of artillery, I moved to the rear, crossing the Po on the 
Louisa Court House Road, and then following that road until 
we reached one coming in from Waite's Shop on the Shady 
Grove Road. After moving about a mile on this road, we met 
Hampton gradually falling back before the enemy, who had 
pushed out a column of infantry considerably to the rear of 
our line. This column, was, in turn, forced back to the posi- 
tion on the Shady Grove Road, which was occupied by what 
was reported to be Hancock's corps. Following up and cross- 
ing a small stream just below a mill pond, we succeeded in 
reaching "Waite's Shop, from whence an attack v/as made on 
the enemy, and the entire force which had crossed the Po was 
driven back with a loss of one piece of artillery, which fell 
into our hands, and a considerable number in killed and 
wounded. This relieved us from a very threatening danger, 
as the position the enemy had attained would have enabled 



24 BATTLES OF SPOTSYLVANIA C. H. 

him to completely enfilade Field's position, and get possession 
of tlie line of our communications to tlie rear, within a very 
short distance of which he was, when met by the force which 
drove him back. In this afiair, Heth's division behaved very 
handsomely, all of the brigades, (Cook's, Davis', Kirkland's, 
and Walker's,) being engaged in the attack. General H. H. 
Walker had the misfortune to receive a severe wound in the 
foot, which rendered amputation necessary, but, otherwise, our 
loss was slight. As soon as the road was cleared, Mahone's 
division crossed the Po, but it was not practicable to pursue 
the affair further, as the north bank of the stream at this point 
was covered by a heavily entrenched line, with a number of 
batteries, and night was approaching. 

On the morning of the 11th, Heth was moved back to iSpot- 
sylvania Court House, and Mahone was left to occupy the 
position on the Shady Grove Road, from which the enemy had 
been driven.* 

My line on the right had been connected with Swell's right, 
and covered the Fredericksburg road, as also the road leading 
from Spotsylvania Court House across the 'Nj into the road 
from Fredericksburg to Hanover Junction. Wilcox was on 
my left uniting withEwell, and Heth joined him. The enemy 
had extended his lines across the Fredericksburg Road, but 
there was no fighting on this front on the 10th or 11th, except 
some artillery firing. 

On the afternoon of the 11th, the enemy was demonstrating 
to our left, up the Po, as if to get possession of Shady Grove 
and the road from thence to Louisa Court House. General 
Hampton reported a colum of infantry moving up the Po, and 
I was ordered by General Lee to take possession of Shady 
Grove, by light next morning, and hold it against the enemy. 
To aid in that purpose, two brigades of Wilcox's division. 



* It will be seen that, af'tei- this affair, I liekl, for a time, both of General Lee's flanks, 
which was rather an anomaly, but it could not l:)e avoided, as we had no reserves, and the 
two other corps, l:)eing immediately in front of the enemy, in line of battle, and almost con- 
stantly engaged, could not be moved without great risk. It was absolutely necessary to 
occupy the position held on the left by Mahone, to avoid a renewal of the danger from 
which we had escaped. 



BATTLES OF SPOTSYLVANIA C. H. 25 

{Thomas' aud Scales') were moved from the right, and Mahone 
Avas ordered to move before light to Shady Grove ; but during 
the night it was discovered that the movement to our left was 
a feint, and that there was a real movement of the enemy 
towards our right. 

Before daybreak on the morning of the 12th, Wilcox's bri- 
gades were returned to him, and at dawn, Mahone's division 
was moved to the right, leaving Wright's brigade of that divi- 
sion to cover the crossing of the Po on Field's left. On this 
morning, the enemy made a very heavy attack on Ewell's front, 
and lir(.)ke the line where it was occupied by Johnson's division. 
A portion of the attacking force swept along Johnson's line to 
Wilcox's left, and was checked by a prompt movement on the 
part of Brigadier-General Lane, who was on that flank. As 
seon as the firing was heard, General Wilcox sent Thomas' 
and Scales' brigades to Lane's assistance, and they arrived just 
as Lane's brigade had repulsed this body of the enemy, and 
they pursued it for a short distance. As soon as Mahone's 
division arrived from the left, Perrin's and Harris' brigades of 
that division, and subse((uently, McGowan's l)rigade of Wil- 
cox's division, were sent to General Ewell's assistance, and 
were carried into action under his orders. Prigadier-General 
PerriiL was killed, and Brigadier-General McGowan severeh' 
wounded, while gallantly leading their respective brigades 
into action; and all the brigades sent to Ewell's assistance 
suffered severely. 

Subsequently, on the same day, under orders from General 
Lee, Lane's brigade of Wilcox's division, and Mahone's own 
brigade (under Colonel Weisiger), were thrown to the front, 
for the purpose of moving to the left, and attacking the flank 
of the column of the enemy which had broken Ewell's line, to 
I'elieve the pressure on him, and, if possible, recover the part 
of the line which had been lost. liane's brigade commenced 
tlie movement and had not proceeded far, when it encountered 
and attacked, in a piece of woods in front of my line, the 9th 
corps, under Burnside, moving up to attack a salient on my 
front. Lane captured over three hundred prisoners, and three 



26 BATTLES OF SPOTSYLVANIA C. H. 

battle flags, and Ms attack on the enemy's flank, taking bim 
l)y surprise, no donbt, contributed materially to bis repulse. 
Mabone's brigade did not become seriously engaged. Tbc 
attacking column wbicb Lane encountered, got up to within a 
very short distance of a salient defended by Walker's brigade 
of Ileth's division, under Colonel Mayo, -before it Avas discov- 
ered, as there was a pine thicket in front, under cover of which 
the advance was made. A heavy Are of musketry from 
Walker's brigade and Thomas' which was on its left, and a 
Are of artillery from a considerable number of guns on Heth's 
line, were opened with tremendous eft'ect upon the attacking 
column, and it was driven back with heavy loss, leaving its 
dead in front of our works. This afl:air took place under the 
e3'e of General Lee himself. Li the afternoon, another attempt 
was made to carry out the contemplated flank movement, with 
Mahone's briii-ade, and Cook's brigade of Heth's divisioii, to be 
followed up by the other troops under my command; but it 
was discovered that the enemy had one or more intrenched 
lines in our front, to the lire from which our flanking column 
would liave been exposed. Moreover, the ground betAveen the 
lines was very rough, being full of rugged ravines and covered 
with thick pines and other growth: and it was thought advis- 
al)le to desist from tlie attempt. The two brigades which were 
lo have commenced the movement, were then thrown to the 
front on both sides of the Fredericksburg road, and, passing 
over two lines of breastworks, defended by a strong force of 
skirmishers, developed the existence of a third and much 
stronger line in rear, which Avould have aflbrded an almost in- 
.su[>erable obstacle to the proposed flaidv movement. This 
rU)sed the operations of the corps under my command on the 
memorable l-2th of May. 

I^etween that day and the 19th, there was no serious attack 
on my front, but much manceuvring by the enemy. General 
Mahone made two or three reconnoissances to the front, whicli 
disclosed the fact that the enemy was gradually moving to our 
right. In making one of them, he encountered a body of the 
enemy M'hich had got possession of Gayle's house, on the left 
< if the road leading from our right towards the Fredericksburg 



BATTLES OF SPOTSYLVANIA 0. H. 27 

and Hanover Junction road, at which a portion of our cavahy, 
under Brigadier General Chambliss, had been previoush- 
posted, and drove it back across the jSTv-* Another reconnois- 
sance, handsomely made by Brigadier-General Wright, who 
had been brought from the left, ascertained that a heavy force 
of the enemy was between the Xy and the Po, in front of my 
right, which was held by Malione, and was along the road 
towards Hanover Junction, To meet this movement of the 
enemy, Field's division was brought from the left and placed 
on my right. 

On the 19th, General Ewell made a movement against the 
enemy's right, and to create a diversion in his favour, Thomas' 
brigade was thrown forward, and drove the enemy into his 
works in front of the salient, against which Burnside's attack 
had been made on the 12th, while the whole corps was held in 
readiness to co-operate with Ewell, should his attack prove 
successful; but, as he was compelled to retire, Thomas v^^as 
mthdrawn. 

Subsequently, the enemy retired from Heth's and Wilcox's 
fronts ; and, on the afternoon of the 21st, Wilcox was sent out 
on the road leading from Mahone's front across the Ny, with 
two of his brigades to feel the enemy, and found him still in 
force behind entrenched lines, and had a brisk engagement 
with that force. 

While AVilcox was absent, an order was received by me, 
from General Lee, to turn over to General Hill the command 
of his corps, as he had reported for duty. I did so at once, 
and thus terminated my connection with this corps, which 1 
had commanded during all the trying scenes around Spotsyl- 
vania Court House. The officers and men of the corps had 
all behaved well, and contributed, in no little degree, to the 
result by which Grant was compelled to wait six days for rein- 



*The Mattapoiiy River, which, bj' its junction \vith the Panmiikey, forms Yorlc Kiver, is 
formed by the confluence of four streams, called respectively, the "Mat," "Ta," "Po," and 
" Ny." The Ny is north and east of Spotsylvania Court House, and behind it the enemy did 
most of his mauoeuvriug in my front. It unites with the Po, a few miles to the east and soutb. 
of Spotsylvania Court House, and both streams are difficult to cross, except where ther« av^- 
bridges. 



28 OPERATIONS AT HANOVER JUNCTION. 

forcemeuts from W^ashington, before he coiiid reBaiiie the 
offensive, or make another of his flank movements to get be- 
tween General Lee's army and Richmond. 



HANOVER JUNCTION. 

* 

OPERATIONS OF EARLY'S DIVISION. 

The movement of the enemy to get between our army and 
Richmond had been discovered, and on the afternoon of the 
2l8t, Ewell's corps was put in motion towards Hanover Junc- 
tion.* After turning over to General Hill, the command of 
his corps, I rode in the direction taken by Ewell's corps, and 
overtook it, a short time before day on the morning of the 
22nd. Hoke's brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Lewis, this 
day joined us from Petersburg, and an order was issued, trans- 
ferring Gordon's brigade, now under the command of Briga- 
dier-General Evans, to Johnson's division, which was placed 
under the command of General Gordon, who had been made 
a Major General. This left me in command of three brigades, 
to wit: Pegram's, Hoke's, and Johnston's, all of which were 
very much reduced in strength. My Adjutant General, Major 
Daniel, had been disabled for life by a wound received at the 
Wilderness, and my Inspector General, Major Samuel Hale, 
had been mortally wounded at Spotsylvania Court House, on 
the 12th, while serving with the division and acting with great 
gallantry during the disorder which ensued after Ewell's line 
was broken. Both were serious losses to me. 

On this day, (the 22nd), we moved to Hanover Junction, 
and, next day my division was posted on the extreme right, 
covering a ferry two or three miles below the railroad bridge 



* Hanover Junction is about 22 miles from Richmond, and is at the intersection of the 
Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad with the Central railroad from Richmond 
west, via Gordonsville and Staunton. It is on the direct road from both Spotsylvania Court 
House and Fredericksburg to Richmond. The North Anna River is north of the Junction 
about two miles, and the South Anna about three miles south of it. These two streams unite 
south of east, and a few miles from the Junction, .and form th« Pamunkey River. 



BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR. 29 

iieross tlie North Anua. While at Hanover Junction mj 
division was not engaged. At one time it was moved towards 
our left, for the purpose of supporting a part of the line on 
which an attack was expected, and moved back again without 
being required. It was, subsequently, placed temporarily od 
the left of the corps, relieving Rodes' division and a part of 
Field's while the line was being remodelled, and then took 
position on the right again. 

During the night of the 26th, the enemy again withdrew 
from our front.* 



BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR. 

OPERATIONS OF EWELL'S CORPS. 

On the 27th, the enemy having withdrawn to the north 
bank of the JSTorth Anna, and commenced another flank move- 
ment by moving down the north bank of the Pamunkey, 
Ewell's corps, now under my command, by reason of General 
Ewell's sickness, was moved across the South Anna over the 
bridge of the Central railroad, and by a place called " Merry 
Oaks," leaving Ashland on the Richmond, Fredericksburg and 
Potomac railroad to the right, and bivouacked for the night at 
Hughes' cross road, the intersection of the road from Ashland 
to Atlee's station on the Central railroad with the road from 



*At Hanover Junction General Lee was joined by Pickett's division of Lougstreet's corps, 
and Breckenridge with two small brigades of infantry, and a battalion of artillery. These, 
with Hoke's brigade, were the first and only reinforcements received by General Lee since 
the opening of the campaign. Yet, Grant's immense army, notwithstanding the advantage 
gained by it on the 12th of May, had been so crippled, that it was compelled to wait six days 
at Spotsylvania Court House for remforcements from Washington, before it could resume 
The offensive. Breckenridge's infantry numbered less than 3,000 muskets ; yet. Grant puts it 
15,000, and he makes an absurd attempt to cast the whole blame for the failure of the cam- 
paign, so far, on Butler; to immolate whom, he makes a digression in his account of the 
operations at Hanover Junction, and says: "The army sent to operate against Richmond 
having hermetically sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundreds, the enemy was enabled to bring 
the most, if not all the reinforcements brought from the South by Beauregard against the 
Army of the Potomac." He therefore determined to try another flank movement, and to get 
more reinforooments fram tho 'army at Bermuda Hundreds. 



30 BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUE. 

the Merry Oaks to Richmond. ISText morning I moved by 
Atlee's station to Hundley's corner, at the intersection of the 
road from Hanover Town, (the point at which Grant crossed 
the Pamunkey,) by Pole Green Church, to Richmond, with the 
road from Atlee's station, by Old Church in Hanover County, 
to the White House, on the Pamunkey. This is the point 
from which General Jackson commenced his famous attack on 
McClellan's flank and rear, in 1862, and it was very important 
that it should be occupied, as it intercepted Grant's direct 
march towards Richmond. All these movements were made 
under orders from General Lee. 

My troops were placed in position, covering the road by 
Pole Green Church, and also the road to Old Church, with my 
right resting near Beaver Dam Creek, a small stream running 
towards Mechanicsville and into the Chickahominy, Brigadier 
General Ramseur of Rodes' division, was this day assigned to 
the command of my division. Ewell's corps, the 2nd of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, now numbered less than 9,000 
muskets for duty, its loss, on the 12th of May, having been 
very heavy. 

On the 29tli, the enemy having crossed the Tottopotomoy, 
(a creek running just north of Pole Green Church, and east- 
ward to the Pamunkey,) appeared in my front on both roads, 
and there was some skirmishing, but no heavy fighting. 

On the afternoon of the 30th, in accordance with orders from 
General Lee, I moved to the right across Beaver Dam, to the 
road from Old Church to Mechanicsville, and thence along 
that road towards Old Church, until we reached Bethesda 
Church. At this point the enemy was encountered, and his 
troops which occupied the road, were driven by Rodes' divi- 
sion towards the road from Hundley's corner, which unites 
with the road from Mechanicsville, east of Bethesda Church. 
Pegram's brigade, under the command of Colonel Edward 
Willis of the 12tli Georgia regiment, was sent forward, with 
one of Rodes' brigades on its right, to feel the enemy, and 
ascertain its strength ; but, meeting with a heavy force behind 
breastworks, it was compelled to retire, with the loss of some 



BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR. 31 

valuable officers and men, and among them Avere Colonel 
Willis, mortally wounded, and Colonel Terrell of the 13tli Vir- 
ginia regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel Watkins of the 52nd 
Virginia rea'iment, killed. This movement showed that the 
enemy was moving to our right flank, and at night, I withdrew 
a short distance on the Mechanicsville road, covering it with 
my force. When I made the movement from Hundley's 
corner, my position at that ])lace was occupied by a part of 
Longstreet's corps, under Anderson. 

On the next morning my troops were placed in position on 
the east side of Beaver Dam across the road to Mechanicsville, 
but Rodes was subsecjuently moved to the west side of the 
creek. 

Grant's movement to our right, towards Cold Harbour, was 
continued on the 31st, and the 1st of June, and corresponding 
movements were made by General Lee to meet him, ni}^ com- 
mand retaining its position with a heav}^ force in its front. 

On the 2nd, all the troops on my left, except Heth's division 
of Hill's corps, had moved to the right, and, in the afternoon 
of that day, Rodes' division moved forward, along the road 
from Hundley's corner towards Old Church, and drove the 
enemy from his intrenchments, now occupied Avith heavy skir- 
mish lines, and forced back his left towards Bethesda Church, 
where there was a heavy force. Gordon swung round so as to 
keep pace with Rodes, and Heth co-operated, following Rodes 
and taking position on liis left flank. In this movement thei-e 
Avas some heavy tighting and several hundl-ed prisoners were 
taken by us. Brigadier-General Holes, a gallant ofHcer of 
Rodes' division, was killed, Imt otherwise our loss was not 
severe. 

On tlie next day (the ord), when Grant made an attack at 
Cold Harbour in which he suffered very heavily, there were 
repeated attacks on Rodes' and Heth's fronts, those on Cook's 
brigade, of Heth's division, being especially heavy, but all oi" 
them were repulsed. There was also heavy skirmishing on 
Gordon's front. During the day, Heth's left was threatened 
by the enemy's cavalry, but it was kept off by Walker's brig- 



32 BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR. 

ude under Colonel Fry, wliich covered that flank, and also re- 
pulsed an effort of tlie enemy's infantry to get to our rear. As 
it was necessary tliat Ileth's division should join its corps on 
the right, and my iiank in this position was very much ex- 
] )08ed, I withdrew at the close of the day to the line previously 
occupied, and next morning Ileth moved to the right. 

My right now connected with the left of Longstreet's corps 
under General Anderson. The enemy subsequently evacua- 
ted his position at Bethesda Church and his lines in my front, 
and, having no opposing force to keep my troops in their lines, 
I made two efforts to attack the enemy on his right flank and 
rear. The flrst was made on the 6th, when I crossed the Mata- 
daquean, (a small stream, running through wide swamps in 
the enemy's rear), and got in rear of his right flank, driving in 
his skirmishers until we came to a swamp, which could he 
crossed only on a narrow causeway defended by an intrenched 
line with artillery. General Anderson was to have co-ope- 
rated with me, by moving down the other side of the Matada- 
"{uean, but the division sent for that purpose did not reach the 
position from which I started until near night, and I was 
therefore compelled to retire ns my iiosition was too ranch ex- 
posed. 

On the next day (the 7th). a i-econn<:>issance made in front of 
Anders(.)n"H line, showed that the greater part of it was uncov- 
ered, and, in accordance mth instructions from General Lee, 
I moved in front of, and Ijetween it and the Matadaqueaii, 
until my progress was arrested by a ravine and swamp which 
prevented any further advance, but a number of pieces of ar- 
tillery were opened upon the enemy's position in flank and 
reverse, so as to favour a movement from Anderson's front, 
which had been ordered but was not made: and at night 1 re- 
tired from this |»osition to the rear of our lines. 

iSince the flghting at the Wilderness, Grant had made it an 
invariable practice to cover his front, flank, and rear, with a 
perfect network of intrenchments, and all his movements were 
made under cover of such works. !t was therefore very difli- 
<;ult to get at him. 



BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR. 33 

» 

On the lltli, my command was moved to the rear of Hill's 
line, near Gaines' Mill; and, on the 12tli, I received orders to 
move, with the 2nd Corps, to the Shenandoah Valley, to meet 
Hunter. This, therefore, closed my connection with the cam- 
paign from the Eapidan to James Eiver. 

When I moved, on the morning of the 13th., Grant had al- 
ready put his army in motion to join Butler, on James Eiver, 
ii position which he could have reached, from his camps on 
the north of tlie Eapidan, by railroad and transports, without 
tlie loss of a man. In attempting to force his w^ay by land, he 
had already lost, in killed and wounded, more men than were 
in General Lee's entire army; and he was compelled to give 
up, in despair, the attempt to reacli Eichmond in that way.* 



*(irant, in describing his movement from Spots3'lvimia Court House to Hanover Junction, 
says : "But the enemy again having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main 
roads, was enabled to reach the North-Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it." 
And when he speaks of his final determination to join Butler, he says : "After the Battle of 
till' Wilderness it was evident that the enenij- deemed it of the first importance to run no 
risk with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or, 
feebly on the offensive, immediateh' in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he 
could retire behind them. Withiiut a greater sacrifice of life than T was willing to make, 
all could not bi'. accomplished that 1 designed north of Kichmond.' 

3Ir. Secretary Stanton, with a keenness of stragetic accumen which is altogether unpar- 
alled, says: " Forty-three days of desperate fighting or marcdiing, by day and night, forced 
back the rebel army from the Eapidan to their intrenchment? around Kichmond, and car- 
ried the Army of the Potomac to the south side of James River. The strength of the enemy's 
force when the campaign opened, or the extent of his loss, is not known to this Department. 
Any inequality between Lee's army and the Army of the Potomac, was fully compensated by 
the ad'iantage of position." 

We are left in the dark whether it \vas the desperate figiuing or the desperate niarchinp; 
which did all this; but, however tliat may be, it was a wonderful achievement, especially 
when it is considered that the Army of tlu^ Potomac might have been carried to tiie south 
side of James Piiver by transports, and Ijce's army tliereby forced back to the intrencli- 
nients around Richmond, witbont the "Forty-three days of desperate fighting or marching, 
liy day and by night," and without the loss nf men sustained by Grant. There are some 
w ho think Stanton is slyly making fun of tiiant ; but, it ho is not. and is in dead eai-nesl, tliH 
((uestion naturally arises, in tlie mind (w' one nut a?^ gifted as the Federal Secretary of W.'ir; 
How happened it that, if Fee uas being constantly nncfed l.iack, I'cr I'orty-tbrce days, o\er a 
distance of more than eigiity miles, he always bad the sborrer line, ;md possewsieu (,if the 
niain roads, and got tiie advantage of position, and bad tiiM<^ to fortify it ? 

1 happen to know that General Lee always had the greatest anxiety to strike at Gi-aiu in 
the open field ; and 1 should like to know wlievi it was that tlie latter operated on the defer- 
sive, or offensive either, except behind, or ininieiiiateiy in ii-om of, far Ijetter intrenchmenls 
ihan General Lee's army, with its limited means, was able to make. An inspection of the 
battle-fields, from the Kapidan to the James, will show that Grant's army did a vast de,il 
more digging than General Lee's. 

The truth is, that the one commander was a great captain, and perfect uiaster of his art, 
while the other had none of the requisites of a great captain, but merely possessed the most 
6rdiaary brute courage, add had the control of lualimited numt'Cfs and rueaas. Yet, it is 



34 NOTE ON THE EEPORTS OF GRANT AND STANTON. 

(■1,'iimed that Grant fights and writes better tlian Alexander, and Hannibal, and Ciesar, and 
Napoleon, and all the rest ; and when, in the exercise of his great powers of composition, he 
turns the batteries of his rhetoric on Butler, I say, in his own elassic language, "Go in I" 
You can't him a lick amiss. I cannot, however, but be amused at the effort to make Butlor 
the scape-goat; and cannot help thinking that Grant ought to have known, beforehand, that 
lie (Butler) was unfit to make war. except on defenceless women and children, and that the 
trophies valued by him were not those won at the cannon's moutli. 

Grant, in his report, has enunciated the leading principles of his strategy, and he is cer- 
tainly entitled to the credit of having practised them, if not to the merit of oi-iginality. They 
were: ''First, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of 
the enemy;" and, Second, to hammer continuously against tJie armed force of the enemy, 
and his resources, until, by mere attrition, if by nothing else, tiiere should be nothing left 
to him but an equal submission, with the loyal section of our common country, to the con- 
stitution and laws of the land." (.\las ! what has become of the constitution and laws '!) This 
latter principle was more concisely and forcibly expressed by Mr. Lincoln, when he de- 
clared his purpose to " Ivcep apegging." The plain English of the M'hole idea was to con- 
tinue raising troops, and to oppose them, in overwhelming numbers, to the Confederate 
Army, ttntil the latter should wear itself out whipping them, when a newly-recruited army 
might '-go in and win." And, this was actually what took place in regard to General Leo's 
army. 

<;rant luiving established his fame as a writer, as v\'ell as ligliter, 1 presume he will gi\o 
the world the benefit of his ideas, and publish a work on strategy, whicli T would suggest 
ought to be called " The Inneoln-Grant or Pegging-Hammer .\rt of AVar." 

He has made some observations, in liis report, about the adv.Sintages of interior lines of 
communication, supposed to be possessed by the Confederate commantlers, which are more 
specious than sound. The Mississippi River divided the Confederacy int<i two parts, ami 
the immense naval power of the enemj'' enabled him to render conimmiication across that 
river, after the loss of New Orleans and Jleniphis. always difficult, and finally to get entire 
possession of it. On the eastern sule of it, the railroad comnnmications were barelj^ sufli- 
cient for the transportation of suppli*.s, and the transportation of troops over them was 
always tedious and difficult. The Ohio KJver, in the West, and tlie Potomac, in the East, 
with the mountains of Western Virginia, rendered it impossible for an invading army to 
marcli into the enemy's country, except at one or two fords on the Potomac, Just east of the 
Blue Kidge, and tvvu oi- three fords above Harper's Ferry. The possession of the seas and 
the blockade of our ports, as well as the possession of the Mississippi, the Ohio and Poto- 
mac Rivers, with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the railroads through Penn.sylvania, 
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky and Tennessee, enabled the enemy to transport troops, 
from the most remote points, with more ease and rapidity than tliey could be transported 
over the railroads under the control o( the Confederate Government, all of which were in 
bad condition. The enemy- tlierefore, in fact, had all the advantages of interior lines; that 
is rapidity of communication and concentration, with the advantage, also, of unrestricted 
communication with all the world, which liis naval power gave him. 



CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND 

AND 

THE YALLEY OF YIEGINIA, 



INTRODUCTION. 



The Valley of Virginia, in its largest sense, embraces all 
that country lying between the Blue Ridge and Alleghany 
Mountains, which unite at its south-w^estern end. 

The Shenandoah Valley, which is a part of the Valley of 
Virginia, embraces the Counties of Augusta, Rockingham, 
Shenandoah, Page, Warren, Clarke, Frederick, Jefferson, and 
Berkeley. This valley is bounded on the north by the Poto- 
mac, on the south by the County of Rockbridge, on the east 
by the Blue Ridge, and on the west by the Great North Moun- 
tain and its ranges. 

The Shenandoah River is composed of two branches, called, 
respectively, the "North Fork" and the "South Fork," which 
unite near Front Royal in Warren County. The North Fork 
rises in the Great North Mountain, and runs eastwardly to 
within a short distance of New Market in Shenandoah County, 
and thence north-east by Mount Jackson to Strasburg, where 
it turns east to Front Royal. The South Fork is formed by 
the union of North River, Middle River, and South River. 
North River and Middle River, running from the west, unite 
near Port Republic in Rockingham County. South River rises 
in the south-eastern part of Augusta, and runs by Waynes- 
boro', along the western base of the Blue Ridge, to Port Re- 
public, where it unites with the stream formed by the junction 
of the North and Middle rivers. From Port Republic, the 



36 INTRODUCTION. 

South Fork of the Shenandoah runs nortli-east, through the 
eastern horder of Rockingham and the county of Page, td 
Front Ro^^al in AYarren county. 

The Korth Fork and South Fork are separated by the Mas- 
sanutten Mountain, which is connected with no other momi- 
tain, but terminates abrupt!}' at both ends. Its northern end 
is washed at its base, just })elo\N- Strasburg, by tlie jSTorth Fork. 
Its southern end terminates near the road between Harrison- 
burg iind Conrad's Store ou the Soutli Fork, at which latter 
place the road through Swift Run Gap in the Blue liidge 
crosses that stream. Two valleys are thus formed, the one on 
the jSTorth Fork being called "The Main Yalley," and the 
other on the Soutli Fork, and embracing the County of Page 
and part of the (Vunty of Warren, being usually known by 
the name of "The Luray Valley.'' The Luray Valley unites 
with the ]\Iain Valley at l»oth ends of the mountain. There is 
a good road across Massanutten Mountain, from one valley to 
the other, and through a gap near ISTew Market. South of this 
gap there is no road across the mountain, and north of it 
the roads ai-e very rugged and not practicable for the march of 
a large army with its trains. At the northern or lower end of 
Massanutten Alountain, and bet^veen two branches of it, is a 
valley called " Powell's Fort Valley " or more commonly " The 
Fort." This valley is accessible only by the very rugged roads 
over the mountain which have been mentioned, and through 
a ravine at its lower end. From its isolated position, it was 
not the theatre of military operations of any consequence, but 
merely furnished a refuge for deserters, stragglers, and fugi- 
tives from the battle-fields. 

From Front Royal the Shenandoah River runs along tlie 
^vestern base of the Blue Ridge to Harper's I'erry, where it 
unites with the Potomac, which here bursts through the moun- 
tains. The mountain in extension of the range of the Blue 
Ridge from this point through Maryland and Pemisylvania is 
called "South Mountain." 

Strictly speaking, the County of Berkeley and the greatei- 
part of Frederick are not in the Valley of the Shenandoah. 
Tlie Opequon, rising south-west of Winchester, and crossing 



INTRODUCTION. 37 

the Valle^y Pike four or five miles south of that place, turns to 
the north and empties into the Potomac some distance above 
its junction mth the Shenandoah; the greater part of Frede- 
rick and nearly the whole of Berkeley being on the western 
side of the Opequon. 

Little iSTorth Mountain, called in the lower valley " Is'orth 
Mountain," runs north-east, through the western portions of 
Shenandoah, Frederick, and Berkeley Counties, to the Poto- 
mac. At its northern end, where it is called I^orth Mountain, 
it separates the waters of the Opequon from those of Back 
Greek. 

Cedar Creek rises in Shenandoah County, west of Little 
l-Torth Mountain, and running north-east along its western 
base, passes through that mountain, four or five miles from 
Strasburg, and, then making a circuit, empties into the l!Torth 
Fork of the Shenandoah, about two miles below Strasburg. 

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad crosses the Potomac at 
Harper's Ferry, and passing through Martinsburg in Berkeley 
County, crosses Back Creek near its mouth, runs up the Poto- 
mac, crossing the South Branch of that river near its mouth, 
and then the ^N'orth Branch to Cumberland in Maryland. 
From this place it runs into Virginia again and, passing 
through i^orth "Western Virginia, strikes the Ohio river by 
two stems terminating at Wheeling and Parkersburg, re- 
spectively. 

There is a railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, 
called "The Winchester and Potomac Eailroad," and also one 
from Manassas Junction on the Orange and Alexandria Rail- 
road, through Manassas Gap in the Blue Ridge, by Front 
Royal and Strasburg, to Mount Jackson, called " The Manas- 
sas Gap Railroad; " but both of these roads were torn up and 
rendered unserviceable in the year 1862, under the orders of 
General Jackson. 

From Staunton in Augusta County, there is a fine macadam- 
ized road called " The Valley Pike," running through Mount 
Sidney, Mount Crawford, Harrisonburg, 2Tew Market, Mount 
Jackson, Edinburg, AVoodstock, Strasburg, Middletown, Kew- 



38 INTRODUCTION, 

town, Bartonsville, and Kernstown to Winchester in Frederick 
County, and crossing Middle River seven miles from Staunton, 
aSTorth River at Mount Crawford eigliteen miles from Staunton, 
the JSTorth Fork of the Shenandoah at Mount Jackson, Cedar 
Creek between Strasburg and Middletown, and the Opequon 
at Bartonsville, four or five miles from Winchester. There is 
also another road west of the Yalley Pike, connecting these 
several villages, called the "Back Road," and, in some places, 
another road between the Valley Pike and the Back Road, 
which is called the "Middle Road." 

From Winchester there is a macadamized road, via Mar- 
tinsburg, to Williamsport on the Potomac in Maryland, and 
another, via Berryville in Clarke County, and Charlestown in 
Jeif'erson County, to Harper's Ferry. There is also a good 
pike from Winchester to Front Royal, which crosses both forks 
of the Shenandoah just above their junction; and from Front 
Royal there are good roads up the Luray Valley, and by the 
way of Conrad's Store and Port Republic, to Harrisonburg 
and Staunton. 

From Staunton, south, there are good roads passing through 
Lexington, in Rockbridge County, and Buchanan, in Bote- 
tourt County, to several points on the Virginia and Tennessee 
Railroad ; and others direct from Staunton and Lexington to 
Lynchburg. 

The Central Railroad, from Richmond, passes through the 
Blue Ridge, with a tunnel at Rockfish Gap, and runs through 
Waynesboro and Staunton, westwardly to Jackson's River, 
which is one of the head-streams of James River. 

This description of the country is given in order to render 
the following narrative intelligible without too much repetition. 

In the spring of 1864, before the opening of the campaign, 
the lower Shenandoah Valley was held by the Federal troops, 
under Major-General Sigel, with his head-quarters at Win- 
chester, while the upx^er Valley was held by Brigadier-General 
Lnboden, of the Confederate Army, with one brigade of 
cavalry, or mounted infantry, and a battery of artillery. 
When the campaign opened, Sigel moved up the Valley, and 



INTEODUCTIOX. :!9 

Major-Geueral Breckenridge moved from South- Western A'ii- 
ginia, with two brigades of infantry and a battalion of artil- 
lery, to meet him, Breckenridge, having united his forces 
with Imboden's, met and defeated Sigel, at ISew Market, on 
the 15th day of May, driving him back towards "Winchester. 
Breckenridge then crossed the Blue Ridge, and joined Gen- 
eral Lee, at Hanover Junction, with his two brigades of in- 
fantrj^ and the battalion of artillerj-. Subsequently, the Fede- 
ral General Hunter organized another and larger force than 
Sigel's, and moved up the Valley; and, on the 5th day of 
June, defeated Brigadier-General William E. Jones, at Pied- 
mont, between Port Republic and Staunton — Jones' force 
being composed of a very small body of infantry, and a cavalry 
force which had been brought from South- Western Virginia, 
after Breckenridge's departure from the Valle}'. Jones was 
killed, and the remnant of his force, under Brigadier-General 
Vaughan, fell back to Waynesboro. Hunter's force then 
united with another column Avhich had moved from Lewis- 
burg, in Western A'irginia, under the Federal General Crook. 
As soon as information was received of Jones' defeat and 
death, Breckenridge wa8_^seDt back to the Valley, -^^'ith the 
force he had brought with him. 



.MAJICll TO LYNCHBURG, AXT) PURSUIT OF 
TIUiS^TER. 

On the 12tli of June, while the 2nd Corps (Ewell's) of the 
Army of Kortliern Virginia was lying near Gaines' Mill, in 
rear of Hill's line at Cold Harbour, I received verbal orders 
from General Lee to hold the corps, with two of the battalions 
of artillery attached to it, in readiness to move to the Shenan- 
doah Valley. ISTelson's and Rraxton's battalions were selected, 
and Brigadier-General Long was ordered to accompany me as 
Chief of Artillery. After dark, on the same day, written in- 
structions were given me by General Lee, by which I was 
directed to move, with the force designated, at o o'clock next 
morning, for the Valley, by way of Louisa C. H. and Char- 
lottesville, and through Brown's or Swift Run Gap in the Blue 
Ridge, as I might iind most advisable; to strike Hunter's 
force in the rear, and, if possible, destroy it ; then to move 
down the Valle}', cross the Potomac near Leesburg in Loudon 
County, or at or above Harper's Ferry, as 1 might find most 
practicable, and threaten Washington City. I was further 
directed to communicate with (jJeneral Breckenridge, who 
Avould co-operate with me in the attack <;»n Hunter, and tlie ex- 
pedition into Maryland. 

At this time the railroad and telegraph lines between Char- 
lottesville and Lynchburg had been cut by a cavalry force from 
Hunter's army; and those between Richmond and Charlottes- 
ville had been cut by Sheridan's cavalry, from Grant's army ; 
so that there was no conmiunication with Breckenridge. 
Hunter was supposed to be at Staunton with his whole f<3rce, 
and Breckenridge was supposed to be at A\"aynesboro, or Rock- 
hsh Gap. If such had been the case, the route designated by 
General Lee would have carried me into the Valley in Hun- 
ter's rear. 

The 2nd Corps now numbered a little over 8,000 muskets 



■March to lynchbUkg. 41 

for duty. It had been on active and arduous service in the 
field for forty days, and had been engaged in all the great 
battles from the "Wilderness to Cold Harbour, sustaining very 
heavy losses at Spotsylvania C. II. where it lost nearly an 
entire division, including its commander, Major-General John- 
son, who was made prisoner. Of the Brigadier-Generals with 
it at the commencement of the campaign, only one remained 
iu command of his brigade. Two (Gordon and Ramseur) had 
been made Major-Generals ; one (G. H. Steuart) had been cap- 
tured; four (Pegram, Hays, J. A. Walker, and R. D. John- 
ston) had been severely wounded; and four (Stafford, J. M. 
Jones, Daniel, and Doles) had been killed in action. Constant 
exposure to the weather, a limited supply of provisions, and 
two weeks' service in the swamps north of the Chickahominy 
had told on the health of the men. Divisions were not 
stronger than brigades ought to have been, nor brigades than 
regiments. 

On the morning of the 13th, at 2 o'lclock, we commenced 
the march ; and, on the 16th, arrived at the Rivanna River, 
near Charlottesville, having marched over eighty miles in four 
days.* 

From Louisa C. II. I had sent a dispatch to Gordonsville, to 
be forwarded, by telegraph, to Breckenridge ; and, on my ar- 
rival at Charlottesville, on the 16th, to which place I rode in 
advance of the troops, I received a telegram from him, dated 
at Lynchburg, informing me that Hunter was then in Bedford 
county, about twenty miles from that place, and moving on it. 

The railroad and telegraph between Charlottesville and- 
Lynchburg had been, fortunately, but slightly injured by the 



*0a the loth, we passed over the ground, near Trevillian's depot, on which Hainpton iiud 
Sheridan had tought. on tlie 11th and 12th. Hampton liad ih'feati'd Sheridan, and was then 
in pursuit of him. Grant ehnnis. in liis report, lliat. on tlie llth, Sh^-ridan drove onr cavalry 
- from the tield, in (•omplete rout ;'' and says, when he. ai.!\;iijeed towai-iis Gordonsville, on 
the I'Jtli. "he found the enemy reinforced by infantiy. l.ieliind well-eonstrueted ritle-pits, 
aliout five miles from the latter place, and too strong u.i successfully assault." 

This is as thoroughly a fancy sketch as can well be manufactured. There was not an in- 
fantry soldier in arms nearer the scene of action than with General Lee's army, near Cold 
Harbour; and the "well-constructed rifle-pits" were notliing more than rails put up in the 
manner in which cavalry were accustomed to arrange them to prevent a charge. Sheridan 
mistook some of Hampton's cavalry, dismounted and fighting on foot, for infantry; and the 
statement was made to cover his defeat. 
T 



42 MARCH TO LYNCHBURG. 

enemy's cavalry, and liad been repaired. The distance be- 
tween tlie two places was sixty miles, and there were no trains 
at Charlottesville, except one which belonged to the Central 
road, and was about starting for Waynesboro. I ordered this 
to be detained, and immediately directed, by telegram, all the 
trains of the two roads to be sent to me with all dispatch, for 
the purpose of transporting my troops to Lynchburg. The 
trains were not in readiness to take the troops on board until 
sunrise on the morning of the 17th, and then only enough 
were furnished to transport about half my infantry. Eam- 
seur's division, one brigade of Gordon's di^dsion, and part of 
another were put on the trains, as soon they were ready, and 
started for Lynchburg. Rodes' division, and the residue of 
Gordon's, were ordered to move along the railroad, to meet 
the trains on their return. The artillery and wagon trains 
had been started on the ordinary roads at daylight. 

1 accompanied Kamseur's division, going on tlie front train, 
but the road and rolling stock were in such bad condition that 
I did not reach Lynchburg until about one o'clock in the after- 
noon, and the other trains were much later. I found Genera^ 
Breckenridge in bed, suifering from an injury received by the 
fall of a horse killed under him in action near Cold Harbour, 
lie had moved from Rockfish Gap to Lynchburg by a forced 
march, as soon as Hunter's movement towards that place was 
discovered. When I showed him my instructions, he very 
readily and cordially offered to co-operate with me, and serve 
under my command. 

Hunter's advance trom Staunton had been impeded by u 
brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier-General McCausland, 
which had been managed with great skill, and kept m his 
front all the way, and he was reported to be then advancing 
on the old stone turnpike from Liberty, in Bedford County, 
by l^ew T^oudon, and watched by Imboden witli a small force 
of cavalry. 

As General Breckenridge was unable to go out, at his re- 
(juest. General D. H. Hill, who happened to be in town, had 
made arrangements for the defence of the city, with such 



OPERATIONS AT LYNCHBURG. 48 

troops us were at hand. Brigadier-General Hays, wlio was an 
invalid from a wound received at Spotsylvania Court House, 
had tendered his services and also aided in making arrange- 
ments for the defence. I rode out -with General Hill to ex- 
amine the line selected by him, and make a reconnoissance of 
the country in front. Slight works had been hastily thrown 
up on College Hill, covering the turnpike and Forest roads 
from Liberty, which were manned by Breckenridge's infantry 
and the dismounted cavalry of the command which had been 
with Jones at Piedmont. The reserves, invalids from the hos- 
pitals, and the cadets from the Military Institute at Lexington, 
occupied other parts of the line. An inspection satisfied me 
that, while this arrangement was the best which could be made 
under the circumstances which General Hill found himself, 
yet it would leave the town exposed to the fire of the enemy's 
artillery, should he advance to the attack, and I therefore de- 
termined to meet the enemy with my troops in front. 

We found Imboden about four miles out on the turnpike, 
near an old Quaker church, to which position he had been 
gradually forced back by the enemy's infantry. My troops, as 
they arrived, had been ordered in front of the works to 
bivouac, and I immediately sent orders for them to move out 
on this road, and two brigades of Ramseur's division arrived, 
just in time to be thrown across the road, at a redoubt about 
two miles from the city, as Imboden's command was driven 
back by vastly superior numbers. These brigades, with two 
pieces of artillery in the redoubt, arrested the progress of the 
enemy, and Ramseur's other brigade, and the part of Gordon's 
division which had arrived, took position on the same line. 
The enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery on us, but, as night 
soon came on, he went into camp on our front.* 

* Hunter's delay in advancing from Staunton had been most remarliable, and ean be ae- 
ooimted for only by the fact, that indulgence in petty acts of malignity and outrage upon 
private citizens was more congenial to his nature than bold operations in the field. He had 
defeated Jones' small force at Piedmont about ten miles from Staunton, on the 5th, and 
united with Crook on the 8th, yet he did not arrive in front of Lynchburg until near night 
on the 17th. The route from Staunton to Lynchburg by which he moved, which was by 
Lexington, Buchanan, the Peaks of Otter, and Liberty, is about one hundred miles in dis- 
tance. It is true McCauslaud had delayed his progress by keeping constantly in bis front, 
btit au energetic advance would have brushed away McCausIand's small forbe, acid Lynclj- 



44 OPEBATIONS AT LYNCHBURG. 

On my arrival at Lynchburg, orders had been given for the 
immediate return of the trains for the rest of my infantry, 
and I expected it to arrive by the morning of the 18th, but it 
did not s:et to Lvnchburg until late in the afternoon of that 
day. Hunter's force was considerably larger than mine would 
have been, had it all been up, and as it was of the utmost con- 
sequence to the army at Richmond that he should not get into 
Lynchburg, I did not feel justified in attacking him until I 
could do so with a fair prospect of success. I contented my- 
self therefore with acting ou the defensive on the 18th, throw- 
ing Breckenridge's infantry and a part of his artillery on the 
front line, while that adopted by General Hill was occupied by 
the dismounted cavalry and the irregular troops. During the 
day, there was artillery firing and skirmishing along the line, 
and, in the afternoon, an attack was made on our line, to the 
right of the turnpike, which was handsomely repulsed with 
considerable loss to the enemy. A demonstration of the 
enemy's cavalry on the Forest road, was checked by part of 
Breckenridge's infantry under AVharton, and McCausland's 
cavalry. * 

On the arrival of the cars from Richmond this day, Major- 
Generals 'Elzey and Ransom reported for duty, the former to 
command the infantry and dismounted cavalry of Brecken- 
ridge's command, and the latter to command the cavalry-. 
The mounted cavalry consisted of the remnants of several bri- 
gades divided into two commands, one under Imboden, and 
the other under McCausland. It was badly mounted and 
armed, and its efficiency much impaired by the defeat at Pied- 
mont, and the arduous service it had recently gone through. 

As soon as the remainder of my infantry arrived by the 
railroad, though none of my artillery had gotten up, arrange- 
ments were made for attacking Hunter at daylight on the 19th, 
but, sometime after midnight, it was discovered that he was 
moving, though it was not known whether he was retreating, 
or moving so as to attack Lynchburg on the south where it 

burg, with all its manufacturing establishments and stores, would have fallen before assis- 
tance arrived. A subsequent jjassage over the greater part of the same route showed how 
Hunter liad been employed. 



PURSUIT OF HUNTER. 45 

was vulnerable, or to attempt to join Grant on the south side 
of James River. Pursuit could not, therefore, he made at 
once, as a mistake, if either of the last two objects had been 
contemplated, would have been fatal. At li.s:ht, however, the 
pursuit commenced, the 2nd Corps moving; along the turnpike, 
over which it was discovered Hunter was retreating, and 
Elzey's command on the right, along the Forest road, while 
Ransom was ordered to move on the right of Elzey, with Mc- 
Causland's cavalry, and endeavor to strike the enemy at 
Liberty or the Peaks of Otter. Imboden, who was on the 
road from Lynchburg to Campbell Court House, to watch a 
body of the enemy's cavalry, which had moved in |that direc- 
tion the day before, was to have moved on the left towards 
Liberty, but orders did not reach him in time. The enemy's 
rear was overtaken at Liberty, twenty-five miles from Lynch- 
burg, just before night, and driven through that place, after a 
brisk skirmish, by Ramseur's division. The days march on 
the old turnpike, which was very rough, had been terrible. 
McCausland had taken the wrong road and did not reach Lib- 
erty until after the' enemy had been driven through the town. 

It was here ascertained that Hunter had not retreated on 
the route by the Peaks of Otter, over which he had advanced, 
but had taken the road to Buford's depot, at the foot of the 
Blue Ridge, which would enable him to go either by Salem, 
Fincastle, or Buchanan. Ransom was, therefore, ordered to 
take the route, next day, by the Peaks of Otter, and endeavour 
to intercept the enemy should he move by Buchanan or Fin- 
castle. The pursuit was resumed early on the morning of the 
20th, and on our arrival in sight of Buford's, the enemy's rear 
guard was seen going into the mountain on the road towards 
Salem. As this left the road to Buchanan open, my aide, 
Lieutenant Pitzer, was sent across the mountain to that place, 
with orders to Ransom to move for Salem. Lieutenant Pitzer 
was also instructed to ride all night and send directions, by 
courier from Fincastle, and telegraph from Salem, to have the 
road through the mountains to Lewisburg and South- Western 
Virginia blockaded. The enemy was pursued into the moun- 
tains at Buford's Gap, but he had taken possession of the crest 



40 PURSUIT OF HUNTER. 

of the Blue Ridge, and put batteries in position commanding a 
gorge, tlirougli wliicli the road passes, where it was impossible 
for a regiment to move in line. I had endeavored to ascertain 
if there was not another way across the mountain by which I 
could get around the enemy, but all the men, except the old 
ones, had gotten out of the way, and the latter, as well as the 
women and children, were in such a state of distress and 
alarm, that no reliable information could be obtained from 
them. We tried to throw forces up the sides of the moun- 
tains to get at the enemy, but they were so rugged that night 
came on before anything could be accomplished, and we had 
to desist, though not until a very late hour in the night. 

By a mistake of the messenger, who was sent with orders to 
Greneral Eodes, who was to be in the lead next morning, there 
was some delay in his movement on the 21st, but the pursuit 
was resumed very shortly after sun-rise. At the Big Lick, it 
was ascertained that the enemy had turned off from Salem 
towards Lewisburg on a road which passes through the moun- 
tains at a narrow pass called the " Hanging Rock," and my 
column was immediately turned towards that point, but on 
arriving there it was ascertained that the enemy's rear guard 
had passed through the gorge. AlcCausland had struck his 
column at this point and captured ten pieces of artillery, some 
waggons, and a number of prisoners ; but, the enemy having 
brought up a heavy force, McCausland was compelled to fall 
back, carrying off, however, the prisoners, and a part of the 
artillery, and disabling the rest so that it could not be removed. 
As the enemy had got into the mountains, where nothing use- 
fnl could be accomplished by pursuit, I did not deem it proper 
to continue it farther. A great part of my command had had 
nothing to eat for the last two days, except a little bacon which 
was obtained at Liberty. The cooking utensils were in the 
trains, and the effort to have bread baked at Lynchburg had 
failed. I!^either the waggon trains, nor the artillery of the 
2nd Corps, were up, and I knew that the country, through 
which Hunter's route led for forty or fifty miles, was, for the 
most part, a desolate mountain region; and that his troops 
were taking everything in the way of provisions and forage 



PURSUIT OF HUNTEE. 47 

whicli they could lay their hands on. My field oflicers, except 
those of Breckenridge's command, were on foot, as their 
horses could not he transported on the trains from Charlottes- 
ville. I had seen our soldiers endure a great deal, but there 
was a limit to the endurance even of Confederate soldiers. A 
stern chase of infantry is a very difficult one, and Hunter's 
men were marching for their lives, his disabled being carried 
in his provision train which was now empty. My cavalry was 
not strong enough to accomplish anything of importance, and 
a further pursuit could only have resulted in disaster to my 
command from want of provisions and forage. 

I was glad to see Hunter take the route to Lewisburg, as 1 
knew he could not stop short of the Kanawha Eiver, and he 
was, therefore, disposed of for some time. Had he moved to 
South- Western Virginia he would have done us incalculable 
mischief, as there was no troops of any consequence in that 
quarter, but plenty of supplies at that time. I should, there- 
fore, have been compelled to follow him.* 

My command had marched sixty miles, in the three days 
pursuit, over very rough roads, and that part of it from the 
Army of Northern Virginia had had no rest since leaving 
Gaines' Mill. I determined, therefore, to rest on the 22nd, so 
as to enable the waggons and artillery to get up, and prepare 
the men for the long march before them. Imboden had come 
Lip, following on the road through Salem after the enemy, and 
the cavalry was sent through Fincastle, to watch the enemy 

* Grunt, ill his report says: "General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give bat- 
lie, retired from before tlie place" (Lynohburg). This is a little remarkable, as it appearis 
that this expedition had been long contemplated and was one of the prominent features of 
the eanipaign of 1804. Slieridan, with his cavalry, was to have united with Hunter at Lynoh- 
l)urg, and the two together were to have destroyed General Lee's communications and 
depots of supplies, and then have joined Grant. Can it be believed that Hunter set out on so 
Important an expedition with an insutficieut supply of ammunition? He had fought only 
the battle of Piedmont, with a part of his force, and it was not a very severe one, as Jones' 
force was a sinall one and composed mostly of cavalry. Crook's column not being there 
was not engaged. Had Sheridan defeated Hampton at Treviilian's, he would have reached 
Lynchbitrg after destroying the railroad on the way, and I could not have reached there in 
time to do any good. But Hampton defeated Sheridan, and the latter saw "infantry" "too 
strong to successfully assault." Ilad Hunter moved on Lynchburg, with energy, that plai/e 
would have lallen before it was possible for me to get there. But he tarried on the way for 
purposes M'hicli will hereafter appear, and when he reached there, his heart failed him and 
he was afraid to fight aai inferior force, and then there was discovered, "A want of ammuni- 
tion to give battle." 



48 MARCH DOWN THE VALLEY. 

and annoy liim as he passed through the mountains towards 
Lewisburg, and also ascertain whether he would endeavor to 
get into the Valley towards Lexington or Staunton. 



MARCH DOWK THE VALLEY, AND OPERATIONS 
m THE LOWER VALLEY AND MARYLAND. 

At Lynchburg, I had received a telegram from General 
Lee, directing me, after .disposing of Hunter, either to return 
to his army or carry out the original plan, as I might deem 
most expedient under the circumstances in which I found my- 
self. After the pursuit had ceased, I received another dispatch 
from him, submitting it to my judgment whether the condition 
of my troops would permit the expedition across the Potomac 
to be carried out, and I determined to take the responsibility 
of continuing it. On the 23rd, the march was resumed and 
we reached Buchanan that night, where we struck again the 
route over which Hunter had advanced.* Ransom's cavalry 
moved by Clifton Forge, through the western part of Rock- 
bridge, to keep a lookout for Hunter and ascertain if he should 
attempt to get into the Valley again. 

*The"sceiies on Hunter's route from Lynchburg had been truly heart-rending. Houses 
had been burned, and helpless women and children left without shelter. The country had 
'nefii stripped of provisions and many families left without a morsel to eat. Furniture and 
bedding had been cut to pieces, and old meia and women and children robbed of all the 
clothing they had except that on their backs. Ladies trunks had been rifled and their 
dresses torn to pieces in mere wantonness. Even the negro girls had lost their little finery. 
We now had renewed evidences of the outrages committed by Hunter's orders in burning 
and plundering private houses. We saw the ruins of a number of houses to which the 
ri^irc'h had been applied by his orders. At Lexington he had burned the Military Institute. 
with all of its contents, including its library and scientific apparatus ; and Washington Col- 
lege had been plundered and the statue of Washington stolen. The residence of Ex-Gover- 
nor Letcher at that place had been burned by orders, and but a few minutes given Mrs. 
Letcher and her family to leave tlie house. In the same county a most excelloint christian 
gentleman, a Blr. Creigh, had been hung, lieeause, on a former occasion, he had killed a 
straggling and marauding Federal soldier while in the act of insulting and outraging the 
ladies of Ids familj'. These are but some of the outrages committed by Hunter or his 
ordi'rs, and 1 will not insult the memori,' of the ancient barbarians ot the Xorth by calling 
them "acts of Vandalism." If those old barbarians were savage and cruel, theyat least had 
the manliness and daring of rude soldiers, with occasional traits of magnanimity. Hunter's 
deeds were those of a malignant and cowardly fanatic, who was better qualified to make war 
upon lielpless women and children than upon armed soldiers. The time consumed in the 
perpetration of those deeds, was the salvation of Lynchburg, with its stores, foundries, and 
factories, which were so necessary to our army at Richmond. 



MARCft DOWN THE VALLEY. 4D 

On tlie 26th, I reached Staunton in advance of the troops, 
and the latter came up next day, which was spent in reducing 
transportation and getting provisions from "Waynesboro, to 
which point they had been sent over the raih^oad. Some of 
the guns and a number of the horses belonging to the artillery 
were now unfit for service, and the best of each were selected, 
and about a battalion taken from Breckenridge's artillery, 
under Lt. Col. King, to accompany us, in addition to the two 
battalions brought with the 2nd Corps. The rest were left 
liehind with a portion of the officers and men in charge of 
tliem. The dismounted cavalry had been permitted to send 
for their horses which had been recruiting, and Col. Bradley 
T. Johnson, who had joined me at this place with a battalion 
of Maryland Cavalry, was assigned to the command of Jones' 
Ijrigade, Avith the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, that 
brigade having been reorganized and the two Maryland bat- 
talions attached to it. General Breckenridge had accompanied 
us from Lynchburg, and, to give him a command commensu- 
rate with his proper one, and at the same time enable me to 
<-ontrol the cavalry more readily, Gordon's divison of infantry 
was assigned to his command in addition to the one under 
Elzey, and Kansom, in charge of the cavalry, was ordered to 
report to me directly. Major-General Elzey was relieved from 
duty at his own request, and the division under him was left 
under the temporary command of Brigadier-General Vaughan. 

Tlie official reports at this place showed about two thousand 
mounted men for duty in the cavalry, which was composed of 
tour small brigades, to wit : Imboden's, McCausland's, Jack- 
son's, and Jones' (now Johnson's). Yaughan's had not been 
mounted but the horses had been sent for from South-western 
Virginia. The official reports of tlie infantry showed 10,000 
muskets for duty, including Yaughan's dismounted cavalry. 
Nearly, if not quite half of the company officers and men 
were barefooted or nearly so, and a dispatch had been sent 
irom Salem by courier, and Lynchburg by telegraph, to Rich- 
mond, requesting shoes to be sent to Staunton, but they had 
not arrived. 

Another telegram was received here from General Lee, stat- 



50 MARCH DOWN THE VALLEY. 

mg tliat the circumstances under which my original orders 
were given had changed, and again submitting it to my jadg- 
]nent, in the altered state of things, whether the movemeiit 
down the Valley and across the Potomac should be made. 
The accession to my command from Breckenridge's forces had 
not been as great as General Lee supposed it would be, on 
account of the disorganization consequent on Jones' defeat at 
Piedmont, and the subsequent rapid movement to Lynchburg 
from Rockfish Gap, but I determined to carry out the original 
design at all hazards, and telegraphed to General Lee my pur- 
pose to continue the movement. 

The march w^as resumed on the 28th with five days' rations 
in the waggons and two days in haversacks, empty waggons 
being left to bring the shoes when they arrived. Lnboden was 
sent through Brock's Gap in the Great j^orth Mountain to the 
N'alley of the South Branch of the Potomac, with his brigade 
of cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, to destroy the rail- 
road bridge over that stream and all the bridges on the Balti- 
more and Ohio railroad from that point to Martinsburg. The 
telegrajjh line was repaired to ISTew Market as we marched 
down the Valley, and communications kept up with that point 
hy signal stations. On the 2nd of July we reached Winches- 
ter,* and I here received a dispatch from General Lee, direct- 
ing me to remain in the lower Valley until everything was in 
readiness to cross the Potomac, and to destroy the Baltimore 
and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal as far 
as possible. This was in accordance with my previous deter- 
mination, and its policy was'' obvious. My provisions were 
nearly exhausted and if I had moved through lioudon, it would 
have been necessary for me to halt and thresh wheat and have 
it ground, as neither bread nor Hour could be otherwise ob- 

* On this day we passed through Xewtowii where several houses, incUxding tiiat of a Metli- 
odist minister, liad been liurued by Hunter's orders, because a part of Mosby's command 
luid artacl-ced a train of supplies for Sigel's force, at this place. The original order was to 
liurn tlie whole town, but the officer sent to execute it had revolted at the cruel mandate of 
liifi superior, and another had been sent who but partially executed it,a{ter having forced the 
people to take an oath of allegiance to the United States to save their houses. Mosby's Viai- 
talion, thotigh called "guerillas" by the enemy, was a regular organization in the Confede- 
rate Army, and was merely serving on detached duty under General Lee's orders. Tlie attack 
on the train was an act of legitimate warfare, and the order to burn Newtown, and the burn- 
ing of the houses mentioned were m_ost wanton, cruel, unjustifiable, and cowardly. 



OPEEATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 51 

taiaed ; wliich would have caused mucli greater delay than was 
required on the other route, where we could take provisions 
from the enemy. Moreover unless the Baltimore and Ohio 
railroad was torn up, the enemy would have been able to move 
troops from the West over that road to Washington. 

On the night of the 2nd, McCausland was sent across IsTorth 
Mountain, to move down Back Creek, and burn the railroad 
bridge at its mouth, and then to move by JSTorth Mountain 
depot to Hainesville, on the road from Martinsburg to Wil- 
liamsport; and, early on the morning of the 3rd, Bradley 
Johnson was sent by Smithfield and Leetown, to cross the rail- 
road at Kearneysville, east of Martinsburg, and unite with 
" McCausland at Hainesville, so as to cut off the retreat of Sigel, 
who was at Martinsburg with a considerable force. Brecken- 
ridge moved, on the same morning, direct for Martinsburg, 
with his command preceded by Gilmor's battalion of cavalry, 
while I moved, with Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions, over the 
route taken by Johnson, to Leetown. On the approach of 
Breckenridge, Sigel, after very slight skirmishing, evacuated 
Martinsburg, leaving behind considerable stores, which fell 
into our hands. McCausland burned the bridge over Back 
Creek, captured the guard at ISTorth Mountain depot, and suc- 
ceeded in reaching Hainesville; but Johnson encountered a 
force at Leetown, under Mulligan, which, after hard fighting, 
he drove across the railroad, when, Sigel, having united with 
Mulligan, Johnson's command was forced back, just before 
night, on Rodes' and Ramsear's divisions, which had arrived 
at Leetown, after a march of twenty-four miles. It was too 
late, and these divisions were too much exhausted, to go after 
the enemy; and, during the night, Sigel retreated across the 
Potomac, at Shepherdstown, to Maryland Heights. 

On the 4th, Shepherdstown was occupied by a part of Ran- 
som's cavalry. Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions moved to 
Harper's Ferry, and the enemy was driven from Bolivar 
Heights, and the Village of Bolivar, to an inner line of works 
under the cover of the guns from Maryland Heights. Breck- 
enridge, after burning the railroad bridges at Martinsburg, 
and across the Opequon, moved to Duffield's depot, tive miles 



:,2 OPEKATIONB IN jWARYLANI). 

from Harper's Perry, destroying the road as lie moved. Dur- 
ing tlie night of the 4th, the enemy evacuated Harper's Ferry, 
burning the raih'oad and pontoon l)ridges across the Potomac. 

It was not possible to occupy the town of Harper's Ferr}', 
except with skirmishers, as it was thoroughly commanded by 
the heavy guns on Maryland Heights ; and the 5th was spent 
by Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions in demonstrating at that 
place. In the afternoon, Breckenridge's command crossed the 
river at Shepherdstown, and Gordon's division was advanced 
over the Antietam, towards Maryland Heights. At night, con- 
siderable stores, which had been abandoned at Harper's Ferry, 
were secured; and, before day, liodes' and Ramseur's divisions 
moved to Shepherdstown, and crossed the Potomac early on 
the 6th, Lewis' brigade, of Ramseur's division, being left to 
occupy Harper's Ferry with skirmishers. 

On this day (the 6th) Gordon's division advanced towards 
Maryland Heights, and drove the enemy into his works. 
Working parties were employed in destroying the aqueduct of 
the canal over the Antietam, and the locks and canal boats. 

On the 7th, Rodes moved through Rohersville, on the road 
to Crampton's Gap in South Mountain, and skirmished with a 
small force of the enemy, while Breckenridge demonstrated 
against Maryland Heights, with Gordon's division, supported 
by his other division, now under Brigadier-General Echols, 
who had reported for duty. 

While these operations were going on, McCausland had 
occupied Hagerstown, and levied a contribution of |20,000, 
and Boonsboro' had been occupied by Johnson's cavalry. On 
the 6th I received a letter from General Lee, by special courier, 
informing me that, on the 12th, an effort would be made to 
release the prisoners at Point Lookout, and directing me to 
take steps to unite them with my command, if the attempt was 
successful; but I was not informed of the manner in which- 
the attempt would be made — General Lee stating that he was 
not, himself, advised of the particulars. 

My desire had been to manoeuvre the enemy out of Mary- 
land Heights, so as to enable me to move directlv from Har- 



OPEEATIONS IN MAEYLAND. 53 

per's Ferry for Wasliiugton ; but he had taken" refuge in his 
strongly-fortified works, and, as they could not be approached 
without great difficulty, and an attempt to carry them by as- 
sault would have resulted in greater loss than the advantage 
to be gained would justify, I determined to move through 
the gaps of South Mountain to the north of the Heights. On 
the 7th, the greater portion of the cavalry was sent across the 
mountain in the direction of Frederick; and, that night, the 
expected shoes having arrived and been distributed, orders 
were given for a general move next morning; and an officer 
(Lieut.-Col. Goodwin, of a Louisiana Regiment,) was ordered 
back to "Winchester, with a small guard, to collect the strag- 
glers at that place, and prevent them from following. 

Imboden had reached the railroad, at the South Branch of 
the Potomac, and partially destroyed the bridge, but had not 
succeeded in dislodging the guard from the block-house at that 
place. lie had been taken sick, and very little had been ac- 
complished by the expedition ; and his brigade, now under 
the command of Colonel George H. Smith, had returned. 

Early on the morning of the 8th, the whole force moved; 
liodes, through Crampton's Gap, to Jefferson ; Breckenridge, 
through Fox's Gap; and Ramseur, with the trains, through 
Boonsboro' Gap, followed by Lewis' brigade, which had started 
from Harper's Ferry the night before, after burning the trestle- 
work on the railroad, and the stores which had not been 
brought oft". Breckenridge and Ramseur encamped near Mid- 
dletoTvm, and Rodes near Jefferson. Ransom had occupied 
Catoctan Mountain, between Middletown and Frederick, with 
his cavalry, and had skirmished heavily with a body of the 
enemy at the latter place. ISIcCausland was ordered to move 
to the right, in the afternoon, and the next day cut the tele- 
graph and railroad between Maryland Heights and "Washing- 
ton and Baltimore — cross the Monocacy, and, if possible, oc- 
cupy the railroad bridge over that stream, at the Junction near 
Frederick. 

Early on the 9th, Johnson with his brigade of cavalry, and a 
battery of horse artillery, moved to the north of Frederick, 



54 BATTLE OP MONOCACY. 

with orders to strike the raih'oads from Baltimore to Harris- 
burg and Philadelphia, burn the bridges over the Gunpowder, 
also to cut the railroad between Washington and Baltimore, 
and threaten the latter place; and then to move towards Point 
Lookout for the purpose of releasing the prisoners, if we 
should succeed in getting into Washington. The other troopa 
also moved forward towards Monocacy Junction, and Kam- 
seur's division passed through Frederick, driving a force of 
skirmishers before it. 



BATTLE OF MONOCACY. 

The enemy in considerable force under General Lew Wal- 
lace, was found strongly posted on the eastern bank of the 
Monocacy near the Junction, with an earthwork and two block 
houses commanding both the railroad bridge and the bridge 
on the Georgetown- pike. Ramseur's division was deployed in 
front of the enemy, after driving his skirmishers across the 
river, and several batteries were put in position, when a sharp 
artillery fire opened from both sides. Rodes' division had 
come up from Jefi'erson and was placed on Ramseur's left, cov- 
ering the roads from Baltimore and the crossings of the Mo- 
nocacy above the Junction. Breckenridge's command, with 
the trains, was in the rear between Frederick and the Junction, 
while the residue of the cavalry was watching a force of the 
enemy's cavalry which had followed from Maryland Heights. 
The enemy's position was too strong, aiid the difiiculties of 
crossing the Monocacy under fire too great, to attack in front 
without greater loss than I was willing to incur. I therefore 
made an examination in person to find a point at which the 
river could be crossed, so as to take the enemy in flank. 
While I was engaged in making this examination to my right, 
I discovered McCausland in the act of crossing the river with 
his brigade. As soon as he crossed he dismounted his men, 
and advanced rapidly against the enemy's left flank, which he 



BATTLE OP MONOCACY. 55 

threw into confusion, and lie came very near capturing a bat- 
tery of artillery, but the enemy concentrated on him, and he 
was gradually forced l)ack obstinately contesting the ground. 
McCausland's movement which was very brilliantly executed, 
solved the problem for me, and, as soon as I discovered it, 
orders were sent to Breckenridge to move up rapidly with Gor- 
don's division to McCausland's assistance, and to follow up his 
attack. This division crossed at the same place, and Gordon 
was ordered to move forward and strike the enemy on his left 
Hank, and drive him from the positions commanding the cross- 
ings in E-amseur's front, so as to enable the latter to cross. 
This movement was executed under the personal superinten- 
dence of General Breckenridge, and, while Eamseur skir- 
mished with the enemy in front, the attack Avas made by Gor- 
don in gallant style, and, with the aid of several pieces of 
King's artillery which had been crossed over, and ]^elson's 
artillery from the opposite side, he threw the enemy into great 
confusion and forced him from his position. liamseur imme- 
diately crossed on the railroad bridge and pursued the enemy's 
flying forces, and Rodes crossed on the left and joined in the 
pursuit. Echols' division which had been left to guard the 
trains, was ordered up during the engagement, but was not 
needed. The pursuit was soon discontinued, as Wallace's entire 
force had taken the road towards Baltimore, and I did not 
want prisoners. Wallace's force I estimated at 8,000 or 10,000 
men, and it was ascertained that one division of the 6tli Corps 
(Rickett's) from Grant's army, was in the fight. Between 600 
and 700 unwounded prisoners fell into our hands, and the 
enemy's loss in killed and wounded was very heavy. Our loss 
in killed and wounded was about 700, and among them were 
Brigadier-General Evans wounded, and Colonel Lamar of the 
61st Georgia regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Tavener, of the 
17th Virginia Cavalry, and Lieutenant Hobson, of ^Js'elsou's 
artillery, killed. The action closed about sunset, and we had 
)iiarched about fourteen miles before it commenced. All the 
troops and trains were crossed over the Monocacy that night, 
so as to resume the march early next day. iSuch of our 
wounded as could not be moved in ambulances or other^visc. 



.-,6 OPEEATIOKS IN FEONT OF WASHINGTOK. 

were sent to tlie hospitals at Frederick under charge of com- 
petent medical officers, and our dead were buried. During 
the operations at Monocacy, a contribution of 1200,000 in 
money, was levied on the city of Frederick, and some needed 
supplies were obtained. 



OPERATIOZS^S IN YliONT OF A^^ASHIN^GTOjS^ AXD 
KECROSSDn-G the POTOMAC. 

On the 10th, the march was resumed at daylight, and we 
bivouacked four miles from Rockville, on the Georgetown 
pike, having marched twenty miles. Ramseur's division 
which had remained behind for a short time to protect a work- 
ing party engaged in destroying the raih'oad bridge, was de- 
tained for a time in driving ofi' the party of cavahy which had 
been following from Maryland Heights, and did not get up 
until one o'clock at night. McCausknd, moving in front oj) 
this day, drove a body of the enemy's cavalry before him, and 
had quite a' In-isk engagement at Rockville, where he en- 
camped after defeating and driving off the enemy. 

We moved at dayliglit on the 11th; McCausland inoving on 
the Georgetown pike, while the infantry, preceded by Im- 
Ixxlen's cavalry under Colonel tSmith, turned to the left at 
Roclvville, so as to reach the 7th street pike wliicli runs by 
Silver Spring into AVashington. Jackson's cavalry moved oi) 
the left flank. The previous day had been very warm, and 
the roads were exceedingly dusty, as there had been no rain 
for several weeks. The heat during the night had been very 
oppressive, and but little rest had been obtained. This day 
was an exceedingly hot one, and there was no air stirring. 
While marching, the men were enveloped in a suffocating 
cloud of dust, and many of them fell by the way from exhaus- 
tion. Our progress was therefore very much impeded, but I 
pushed on. as rapidly as possible, hoping to get into the fortifi- 



OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF AVASHINGTON. 57 

cations around Washington before they could be manned. 
Smith drove a small body of cavalry before him into the works 
on the 7th street pike, and dismounted his men and deployed 
them as skirmishers. I rode ahead of the infantry, and arrived 
in sight of Fort Stevens on this road a short time after noon, 
when I discovered that the works were but feebly manned. 

Rodes, whose division was in front, was immediately ordered 
to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, throw out skirmish- 
ers, and move into the works if he could. My whole column 
was then moving by ilank, which was the only practicable 
mode of marching on the road we were on, and before Rodes' 
division could be brought up, we saw a cloud of dust in the 
rear of the works towards Washington, and soon a column of 
the enemy tiled into them on the right and left, and skirmish- 
ers were thrown out in front, while an artillery tire was opened 
on us from a number of batteries. This defeated our hopes of 
getting possession of the works by surprise, and it became 
necessary to reconnoitre. 

Rodes' skirmishers were thrown to the front, driving those 
of the enemy to the cover of the works, and we proceeded to 
examine the fortitications in order to ascertain if it was prac- 
ticable to carry them by assault. They were found to be ex- 
ceedingly strong, and consisted of what appeared to be en- 
closed forts for heavy artillery, with a tier of lower works in 
front of each pierced for an immense number of guns, the 
whole being connected by curtains with ditches in front, and 
strengthened by palisades and abattis. The timber had been 
felled within cannon range all around and left on the ground, 
making a formidable obstacle, and every possible approach 
was raked by artillery. On the right was Rock Creek, run- 
ning through a deep ravine which had been rendered impas- 
sable by the felling of the timber on each side, and beyond 
were the works on the G-eorgetown pike which had been re- 
ported to be the strongest of all. On the left, as far as the eye 
could reach, the works appeared to be of the same impregnable 
character. The position was naturally strong for defence, and 
the examination showed, what might have been expected, that 
every appliance of science and unlimited means had been used 
H 



58 OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON. 

to render tlie fortifications around Washington as strong as 
possible. This reconnoissauce consnmed the balance of tlie 
day. 

The rapid marching which had broken down a number of 
the men who were barefooted or weakened by previous expo- 
sure, and had been left in the Valley and directed to be col- 
lected at Winchester, and the losses in killed and wounded at 
Harper's Ferry, Maryland Heights, and Monocacy, had re- 
duced my infantry to about 8,000 muskets. Of those remain- 
iuo;, a verv lara-e number were o-reatlv exhausted bv the last 
two days marching, some having fallen by sunstroke, and I 
was satisfied, when we arrived in. front of the fortifications, 
that not more tJian one-third of my force could have been 
carried into action. I had about forty pieces of field artillery, 
of which the largest Avere 12 pounder ^^apoleons, besides a few 
pieces of horse artillery with the cavalry. McCausland re- 
ported the works on the Georgetown pike too strongly manned 
for him to assault. We could not move to the right or the 
left without its being discoA'^ered from a signal station on the 
top of the " Soldier's Home,'' AA^hich OA^erlooked the country, 
and the enemy would have been enabled to moA^e in his Avorks 
to meet us. Under the circumstances, to have rnshed my men 
blindly against the fortifications, Avithout understanding flu- 
state of things, AA^ould have been Avorse than folly. If we had 
any friends in Washington, none of them came out to give us 
information, and this satisfied me that the place Avas not un- 
defended. I kncAv that troops had arrived from Grrant's army. 
for prisoners had been captured from Rickett's division of the 
(!th Corps at ]SIonocacy. From Sharpsburg I had sent a. mes- 
sage to Mosby, by one of his men. requesting liirn to c;ross the 
Potomac below Harper's Ferrv. cnt the railroad and telcirraith. 
and endeavour to find out the condition of things in Washing- 
ton, Ijut he had not crossed the river and I had receiA^ed no in- 
fi)rmation from him. A northern paper, AAdiich Avas obtained, 
gave the information that Hunter, after moAii]g i,i]» the Ohio 
River in steamboats, AA'as passing over the Baltimore and Ohio 
railroad, and I kncAV that he Avould be at Harper's Ferry soon, 
as Imboden had done very little damage to the road Avest of 



OPERATIONS IN FEONT OF WASHINGTON. 59 

Martinsburg. After dark on tlie 11th, I liekl a consultation 
with Major-Grenerals Breckenridge, Rodes, Gordon and Ram- 
seur, in which I stated to them the danger of remaining where 
we were, and the necessity of doing something immediately, 
as the probability was that the passes of the South Mountain 
and the fords of the upper Potomac Avould soon be closed 
against us. After interchanging views with them, being very 
reluctant to abandon the project of capturing Washington, 
I determined to make an assault on the enemy's works at day- 
light next morning, unless some information should be re- 
ceived before that time showing its impractibility, and so 
informed those officers. During the night a dispatch was re- 
ceived from Gren. Bradley Johnson from near Baltimore, in- 
forming me that he had received information, from a reliable 
source, that two corps had arrived from Gen. Grant's army, 
and that his whole army was probably in motion. This caused 
me to delay the attack until I could examine the works again, 
and, as soon as it was light enough to see, I rode to the front 
and found the parapets lined with troops. I had, therefore, 
reluctantly, to give up all hopes of capturing Washington, 
after I had arrived in sight of the dome of the Capitol, and 
given the Federal authorities a terrible fright. 

Grant in his report says, in regard to the condition of things 
when I moved towards Washington : " The garrisons of Balti- 
more and Washington were at this time made up of heavy 
artillery regiments, hundred days men, and detachments from 
the invalid corps." And, in regard to the force of Wallace at 
Monocacy, he says: "His force was not sufficient to ensure 
success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it 
resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy aud 
thereby served to enable Gen. Wright to reach Wasliiugton 
with two divisions of the 6th Corps, and the advance of tlio 
19th Corps, before him." Stanton says in his report: " Here 
(at Washington) they (we) were met by troops from the Army 
of the Potomac, consisting of the 0th Corps under General 
Wright, a part of the 8th Corps under General Gihifiore, and 
a part of the 19th Corps, just arrived from ISTew Orleans under 
General Emory." Taking Grant's statement of the troops 



60 0PEEATI0N8 IN FEONT OF WASHINC4T0^\ 

which liad arrived from liis army as the most reliable, they 
were sufficient to hold the works against my troops, at least 
until others could arrive. But, in addition to those which had 
already arrived, there were the detachments from the invalid 
corps, called, I believe, the " Veteran Keserves " (of which I 
Avas informed there were about 5,000), the heavy artillery regi- 
ments, the hundred days' men, and, I suppose, the part of the 
8th Corps mentioned by Stanton. To all these may be added 
the local troops, or militia, and the government employees. 
Some of the northern papers stated that, between Saturday 
and Monday, I could have entered the city ; but on Saturday 
I was fighting at Monocacy, thirty-five miles from Washington, 
a force which I could not leave in my rear : and, after dispos- 
ing of that force and moving as rapidly as it was possible for 
me to move, I did not arrive in front of the fortifications until 
after noon on Monday, and then my troops were exhausted, 
and it required time to bring them up into line. I had then 
made a march, over the circuitous route by Charlottesville, 
Lynchburg, and Salem, down the Valley, and through the 
passes of the South Mountain, which, notwithstanding the 
delays in dealing with Hunter's, Sigel's, and Wallace's forces, 
is, for its length and rapidity, I believe, without a parallel in 
this or any other modern war — the unopposed marauding ex- 
cursion of the freebooter Sherman through Georgia, not ex- 
cepted. My small force had been thrown up to the very walls 
of the Federal Capital, north of a river which couFd not be 
forded at any point within 40 miles, and with a heavy force 
and the South Mountain in my rear — the passes through which 
mountain could be held by a small number of troops. A 
glance at the map, when it is recollected that the Potomac is a 
wide river, and navigable to Washington for the largest vessels, 
will cause the intelligent reader to wonder, not why I failed to 
take Washington, but why I had the audacity to approach it 
as I did, with the small force under my command. It was 
supposed by some, who were not informed of the facts, that I 
delayed in the lower Valley longer than was necessary ; but, 
an examination of the foregoing narrative will show that not 
one moment was spent in idleness, but that every one was em- 



EECROSSING THE POTOMAC. 61 

ployed ill making some arrangement, or removing some diffi- 
culty in my way, wliicli it was necessary to make or remove, 
so as to enable me to advance with a prospect of success. I 
could not move across the Potomac and through the passes of 
the South Mountain, with any safety, until Sigel was driven 
from, or safely housed in, the fortifications at Maryland Heights. 

After abandoning the idea of capturing "Washington, I de- 
termined to remain in front of the fortifications during the 
12th, and retire at night, as I was satisfied that to remain longer 
would cause the loss of my entire force. 

Johnson had burned the bridges over the Gunpowder, on the 
Harrisburg and Philadelphia roads, threatened Baltimore, and 
started for Point Lookout, but I sent an order for him to re- 
turn. The attempt to release the prisoners of which I was in- 
formed by General Lee, was not made, as the enemy had 
received notice of it in some way. Major Plarry Gilmor, who 
burned the bridge over the Gunpowder on the Philadelphia 
road, captured Major-General Franklin on a train at that 
point, but he was permitted to escape, either by the careless- 
ness or exhaustion of the guard placed over him, before I was 
informed of the capture. 

On the afternoon of the 12th, a heavy reconnoitering force 
was sent out by the enemy, which, after severe skirmishing, 
was driven back by Rodes' division with but slight loss to us. 
About dark we commenced retiring and did so without moles- 
tation.* Passing through Rockville and Poolsville, we crossed 
the Potomac at White's Pord, above Leesburg in Loudon 
County, on the morning of the 14th, bringing off the prisoners 
captured at Monocaey and everything else in safety. There 
was some skirmishing in the rear between our cavalry and that 
of the enemy which was following, and, on the afternoon of 

* Grant says : " On the 12th, a reconnoissanee was thrown out hi front of Fort Stevens to 
ascertain the enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in wliich we lost 280 
in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss was probably greater. He commenced retiring 
during the night." In regard to the same affair, Stanton says : " By these troops (Wright's, 
Gihnore's, and Emory's) the enemy was driven back from Washington and retreated hastily 
to Virginia, pursued by our forces under General Wright." Grant's statement is correct, 
with the exception of the estimate he places on our loss. Comment on Stanton's is unnec- 
eessary when it is compared with that of Grant. 



62 OPEEATIONS IN THE VALLEY. 

the 14tli, tliere was some artillery firing by the enemy, across 
the river, at our cavalry which was watching the fords. Besides 
the money levied in Hagerstown and Frederick, wdiich was 
subsequently very useful in obtaining supplies, we brought off 
quite a large number of beef cattle, and the cavalry obtained a 
number of horses, some being also procured for the artillery.* 



RETITRJN" TO THE VALLEY, AND OPERATIONS 

THERE. 

We rested, on the 14th and 15th, near Leesburg, and, on 
the morning of the 16th, resumed the march to the Valley, 
through Snicker's Gap in the Blue Ridge. Hunter had arrived 
at Harper's Ferry, and united with Sigel, and the whole force 
had moved from that place, under Crook, to Hillsboro', in Lou- 
don, and a body of cavalry from it made a dash on our train, 
as we were moving towards the Valley, and succeeded in setting 
fire to a few waggons, but was soon driven off" by troops from 
Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions, and one piece of artillery was 
captured from the enemy. 

* On the night of the 12th, the house of Postmaster-General Blair near Silver Spring was 
burned, and it was assumed by the enemy that it was burned by my orders. The fact is, 
that I had nothing to do with it, and do not yet know how the burning occurred. Though I 
believed that retaliation was fully justified by the previous acts of tlie enemy, yet I did not 
wish to incur the risk of any license on the part of my troops, and it was obviously impolitic 
to set the house on fire when we were retiring, as it amounted to notice of our movement. 
Some of my officers thought the burning was done by some person in the neighborhood, 
who took advantage of our presence to commit the act witli impunity. It may have been 
occasioned by a shell from the enemy's guns, some of which went in that direction late in 
the day, or it may have been the act of some of my men; and a number of them had abund- 
ant provocation for the act, in the sight of their own devastated homes as they marched 
down the Valley on Hunter's track. In retaliation for the burning of this house, two Fede- 
ral gunboats with a body of soldiers on board were sent up the Rappahannock River, on 
wliich there was not a Confederate soldier, to burn the house of the widow of the brother of 
the Hon. James A. Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, and she and her little children 
were turned out of doors, and the house with all its contents consigned to the flames. A 
card was left, signed by Butler or his order, stating that the house was burned in retaliation 
for the burning of the Hon. Montgomery Blair's house. This retaliation upon a widowed 
lady and her orphan children, by a combined militar3'' and naval expedition, was wortliy of 
tlie agent selected, and the cause in which he was engaged. But, though it was very eon- 
genial to his nature, I do not regard Butler as alone responsible for this act. The odium of 
it should attach to his superiors Lincoln and Grant, he being the favorite of the former, and 
the subordinate of the latter, and at that time, serving under his immediate orders. 



OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY. 63 

On the morning of the 17th, we crossed the Shenandoah, at 
Snicker's or Castleman's Feny, and took position near Berrj- 
ville — Breckenridge covering the ford at the ferry, and the 
river above and below, and Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions 
the roads from Harper's Ferr}'. 

( )n the 18tli, the enemy, having moved through Snicker's 
Gap, appeared on the banks of the Shenandoah, and there was 
some skirmishiDg. In the afternoon, a heavy cohimn of his 
infantry made a dash at Parker's Ford, one mile below the 
ferry, and crossed over, after driving back the picket of one 
hundred men at that point. Breckenridge moved Gordon's 
and Echols' divisions to the front, and held the enemy in check, 
while Rodes' division was brought up from the left, and at- 
tacked and drove him across the river, with heavy loss, and in 
great confusion. 

On the 19th, the enemy's main body still occupied the east- 
ern bank of the Shenandoah, and smaller columns moved up 
and down the river, to efiect a crossing. Imboden, with his 
own and McCausland's cavalry, resisted and repulsed one of 
these columns, which attempted to cross at Berry's Ferry, with 
considerable loss to the enemy. I'he horses of Vaughan's 
cavahy having been brought from South-western Virginia, his 
small force had been now mounted. On this day I received 
information that a column under Averill was moving from 
Martinsburg towards Winchester, and, as the position I held 
near Berrjwille left my trains exposed to expeditions in. the 
rear from Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, I determined to 
concentrate my force near Strasburg, so as to enable me to put 
the trains in safety, and then move out and attack the enemy. 
This movement wa»* commenced on the night of the 19th ; 
Ramseur's division, with a battery of artillery, being sent to 
Winchester, to cover that place against Averill, while the stores, 
and the sick and wounded were being removed, and the other 
divisions moving through Millwood and White Post to the 
A^alley Pike at Xewtown and Middletow^n. 

Yaughan's and Jackson's cavalry had been watching Averill, 
and, on the afternoon of the 20th, it was reported to General 



64 OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY. 

Ramseiir, by General Yaughan, that Averill was at Stephen- 
son's depot, with an inferior force, which could be captured, 
and Kamseur moved out from Winchester to attack him ; but, 
relying on the accuracy of the information he had received. 
General liamseur did not take the proper precautions in ad- 
vancing, and his division, while moving by the flank, was sud- 
denly met by a larger force, under Averill, advancing in line 
of battle, and the result was that Ramseur's force was thrown 
Into confusion, and compelled to retire, with the loss of four 
pieces of artillery, and a number in killed and wounded — 
Brigadier-Generals Lewis and Lilly being among the wounded, 
and Col. Board, of the 58th Virginia Regiment, among the 
killed. Colonel Jackson made a vigorous charge with his 
cavalry, which enabled Ramseurto rally his men, restore order, 
and arrest the progress of Averill before he reached Winches- 
ter. The error committed, on this occasion, by this most gal- 
lant officer, was nobly retrieved in the subsequent part of the 
campaign. I received, at J^ewtown, the news of Ramseur's 
misfortune, and immediately moved to his assistance with 
Rodes' division ; but, on arriving at Winchester, I found that the 
enemy, after being checked, had fallen back a short distance ; 
and, as another and much larger column was moving through 
Berryville, I did not go after Averill, but moved the whole 
command to Xewtown — the stores, and such of the wounded 
and sick as could be transported, having been gotten off. 

On the 21st, my whole infantry force was concentrated near 
Middletown ; and, on the 22nd, it was moved across Cedar 
Creek, towards Htrasburg, and so posted as to cover all the 
roads from the direction of Winchester. 

X report having been sent to me from Mt. Jackson, that a 
force of the enemy was moving from the Valley of the South 
Branch of the Potomac to that place, Imboclen was sent to 
ascertain its truth, and it proved to be false. We rested on 
the 23rd, while waiting to ascertain the movements of the 
enemy, and during the clay a report was received from tlie 
cavalry in front, that a large portion of the force sent after us 
from Washington, was returning, and that Crook and Averill 
had united, and were at Kernstown, near Winchester. 



BATTLE OF KERlS^STOWK. 

On the reception of the foregoing information, I determined 
to attack the enemy at once ; and, early on the morning of the 
24th, my whole force was put in motion for Winchester. The 
enemy, under Crook, consisting of the " Army of "West Vir- 
ginia," and including Hunter's and Sigel's forces, and Averill's 
cavalry, was found in position at Kernstown, on the same 
ground occupied by Shields, at the time of General Jackson's 
tight with him, on the 23rd of March, 1862. Ramseur's divi- 
sion was sent to the left, at Bartonsville, to get around the 
enemy's right flank, Avhile the other divisions moved along the 
Valley Pike, and formed on each side of it. Ransom's cavalry 
was ordered to move in two columns; one on the right along 
the road from Front Royal to Winchester ; and the other on 
the left, and west of Winchester, so as to unite in rear of the 
latter place, and cut oif the enemy's retreat. After the ene- 
my's skirmishers were driven in, it was discovered that his 
left flank, extending through Kernstown, was exposed, and 
General Breckenridge was ordered to move Echols' division, 
now under Brig.-Gen. Wharton, under cover of some ravines 
on our right, and attack that flank. This movement, which 
was made under Gen. Breckenridge's personal superinten- 
dence, was handsomely executed, and the attacking division 
struck the enemy's left flank in open ground, doubling it up 
and throwing his whole line into great confusion. The other 
divisions then advanced, and the rout of the enemy became 
complete. He was pursued, by the infantry and artillery, 
through and beyond Winchester; and the pursuit was con- 
tinued by Rodes' division to Stephenson's depot, six miles from 
Winchester — this division then having marched twenty-seven 
miles from its position west of Strasburg. The cavalry had 
not been moved according to my orders ; and the enemy, hav- 
ing the advantage of an open country and a wide macadamized 
road, was enabled to make his escape with his artillery and 
t 



66 BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN. 

most of his waggons. General Ransom had been in very bad 
health since he reported to me at Lynchburg, and unable to 
take the active command in the field; and all my operations 
had been impeded for the want of an efficient aud energetic 
cavalry commander. I think, if I had had one on this occa- 
sion, the greater part of the enemy's force would have been 
captured or destroyed, for the rout was thorough. Our loss, 
in this action, was very light. The enemy's loss in killed and 
wounded was severe, and two or three hundred prisoners fell 
into our hands; and, among them. Colonel Mulligan, in com- 
mand of a division, mortally wounded. The infantry was too 
much exhausted to continue the pursuit on tlie 25th, and onl}- 
moved to Banker Hill, twelve miles from Winchester. The 
pursuit was continued by our cavalry, and the enemy's rear 
guard of cavalry was encountered at Martinsburg: but, after 
slight skirmishing, it evacuated the place. The whole de- 
feated force drossed the Potomac, and took refuge at Maryland 
Heights and Harper's Ferry. The road from Winchester, via 
Martinsburg, to Williamsport, was strewed with debris of the 
rapid retreat — twelve caissons and seventy-two waggons hav- 
ing been abandoned, and most of them hurned.* 



KXPEDITIOX INTO MARYLAXD AND PEXNSYL- 
\'AXI A— BURNING OF CHAMP>ERSBU]iG. 

On the 26th we moved to Martinsburg, the cavalry going to 
tlic Potomac. The 27th and 28th were employed in destroy- 
ing the railroad, it having been re}»aired since Ave passed over 
it at tlie begin ni no; of the month. AVhile at Martinsburg, it 
was ascertained, beyond all doubt, that Hunter had been again 
indulging in his favourite mode of warfare, and that, after his 



* Grant, in liis report, entirely ignores tliis battle, in which the enemy's forces were supe- 
rior to mine, and merely says : "About the 2:>th it became evident that the enemy was again 
advancing upon :Mar>-laiid and rennsylvania, aud the t;th corps, which was at Washington, 
was ordered ba^>k to the vicinity of Harper s Ferrj-." 



EXPEDITION INTO MARYLAND AND. PENNSYLVANIA. 67 

return to the Valley, while we were near Washington, among 
other outrages, the private residences of Mr. Andrew Hunter, 
a member of the Virginia Senate, Mr. Alexander E. Boteler, 
an ex-member of the Confederate Congress, as well as of the 
United States Congress, and Edmund I. Lee, a distant relative 
of General Lee, all in Jefferson County, with their contents, 
had been burned by his orders, only time enough being given 
for the ladies to get out of the houses. A number of towns 
in the South, as well as private country houses, had been 
burned by the Federal troops, and the accounts had been her- 
alded forth in some of the !N'orthern papers in terms of exul- 
tation, and gloated over by their readers, while they were re- 
ceived with apathy by others. I now came to the conclusion 
that we had stood this mode of warfare long enough, and that 
it was time to open the eyes of the people of the Korth to its 
enormity, by an example in the way of retaliation. I did not 
select the cases mentioned, as having more merit or greater 
claims for retaliation than others, but because they had occur- 
red within the limits of the country covered by my command, 
and were brought more immediately to my attention.* 

The town of Chambersburg in Pennsylvania was selected as 
the one on which retaliation should be made, and McCausland 
was ordered to proceed with his brigade and that of Johnson 
and a battery of artillery to that place, and demand of the 
municipal authorities the sum of $100,000 in gold, or $500,000 
in United States currency, as a compensation for the destruc- 
tion of the houses named and their contents; and, in default 
of payment, to lay the town in ashes, in retaliation for the 



* I had often seen delicate ladies, wlio had been plundered, insulted and rendered deso- 
late by the acts of our most atrocious enemies, and while they did not call for it, yet in the 
anguished expressions of their features while narrating their misfortunes, there was annut* 
appeal to every manly sentiment of my bosom for retribution which I could no longer with- 
stand. On my passage through the lower Valley into Maryland, a lady had said to me, with 
tears in her eyes, "Our lot is a hard one and we see no peace ; but there are a few green 
spots in our lives, and they are, when the Confederate soldiers come along and we can do 
something for them."' May God defend and bless those noble women of the Valley, who ho 
often ministered to the wounded, sick and dying Confederate soldiers, and gave their last 
morsel of bread to the hungry ! They bore with heroic courage the privations, sutierings, 
persecutions and dangers, to which the war which was constantly waged in their midst ex- 
posed them, and upon no portion of the Southern people did the disasters which finally bo- 
fell our army and countrj", fall with more crushing effect than upon them. 



08 EXPEDITION INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA. 

burning of those liouses and others in Virginia, as well as for 
the towns which liad been burned in other Southern States. 
A written demand to that eifect was sent to the municipal 
authorities, and they Avere informed what would be the result 
of a failure or refusal to comply with it. I desired to give the 
people of Chambersburg an opportunity of saving their town, 
by making compensation for part of the injury done, and 
hoped that the payment of such a sum would have the desired 
effect, and open the eyes of the people of other towns at the 
Xorth, to the necessity of urging upon their government the 
adoption of a dilferent policy. McCausland was also directed 
to proceed from Chambersburg towards Cumberland in Mary- 
land, and levy contributions in money upon that and other 
towns able to bear them, and if possible destroy the machinery 
at the coal pits near Cumberland, and the machine shops, de- 
pots, and bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad as far as 
practicable. 

On the 29th, McCausland crossed the Potomac near Clear 
Spring, above Williamsport, and I moved with Rodes' and 
Kamseur's divisions and A'^aughan's cavalry to the latter place, 
while Imboden demonstrated with his and Jackson's cavalry 
towards Harper's Ferry, in order to withdraw attention from 
McCausland. Breckenridge remained at Martinsburg and 
continued the destruction of the railroad. A'aughan drove a 
force of cavalry from Williamsport, and went into Hagerstown, 
where he captured and destroyed a train of cars loaded with 
supplies. One of Kodes' brigades was crossed over at AVil- 
liamsport and subsequently withdrawn. On the 30th, Mc- 
Causland being well under way, I mo\'ed back to Martinsburg, 
and on the 31st the whole infantry force was moved to Bunker 
Hill, where we i-emained on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of August. 

On the 4th, in order to enable McCausland to retire from 
Pennsylvania and Maryland, and to keep Hunter, who had 
been reinforced by the 6th and 19th Corps, and had been oscil- 
lating between Harper's Ferry and Monocacy Junction, in a 
state of uncertainty, I again moved to the Potomac with the 
infantry and A^aughan's and Jackson's cavalry, while Imboden 
demonstrated towards Harper's Ferry. On the 5th Rodes' and 



EXPEDITION IXTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA. 69 

Ramseur's divisions crossed at "Williamsport and took position 
near St. James' College, and Vaughan's cavalry went into 
Hagerstown. Breckenridge, with his command, and Jackson's 
cavalry, crossed at Shepherdstown, and took position at Sharps- 
Inirg. This position is in full view from Maryland Heights, 
and a cavalry force was sent out by the enemy to reconnoitre, 
which, after skirmishing with Jackson's cavalry, was driven 
off by the sharpshooters of Gordon's division. On the 6th, 
the whole force recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and 
moved towards Martinsburg ; and on the 7th we returned to 
Bunker Hill.* 

■'•■• AVhile at Sharpsburg on this occasion, I rode over the ground on which the battle of 
Sharpsburg, or Antietani as it is called by the enemy, was fought, and I was surprised to see 
liow few traces remained of that great battle. In the woods at the famous Dunkard or 
Tunker Church, where, from personal observation at the battle, I expected to find the trees 
terribly broken and shattered, a stranger would find difficulty in identifying the marks of 
the bfillets and shells. 

I will take occasion here to say that the public. North or Sottth, has never known how 
small was the force with which General Lee fought that battle. McClellan's estimate is very 
wide of the mark. From personal observation and conversation with other officers engaged, 
including Gen. Lee himself, I am satisfied that the latter was not able to carry 30,000 men 
into action. The exhaustion of our men in the battles around Richmond, the subsequent bat- 
tles near Manassas, and on the march to Maryland, when they were for days without anything 
to eat except green corn, was so great that the straggling was frightfitl before we crossed the 
Potomac. As an instance of our weakness, and a reminiscence worthy ot being recorded, 
which was brought very forcibly to my mind while riding over the ground, I will state the 
following facts : In the early part of the day, all of Gen. Jackson's troops on the field except 
my brigade (A. P. Hill had not then arrived from Harper's Ferry) were driven from the field 
in great disorder, and Hood had taken their place with his division. My brigade, which 
was on the extreme left supporting some artillery with which Stuart was operating, and had 
not been engaged, was sent for by General Jackson and posted in the left of tlie woods at 
the Dunkard Church. Hood was also forced back, and then the enemy advanced to this 
woods — Sumner's Corps, which was fresh, advancing on our left flank. My brigade, then 
numbering about 1000 men for duty, with two or three hundred men of Jackson's own di- 
vision, who had been rallied by Colonels Grigsby and Stafford, and when there was an inter- 
val of at least one halt a mile between us and any other part of our line, held Sumner'.s 
corps in check for some time, until Green's division of Mansfield's Corps penetrated into 
the interval in the woods between us and the rest of our line, when I was compelled to move 
by the flank and attack it. That division was driven out of the woods by my brigade, while 
Grigsby and Stafford skirmished with Sumner's advancing force, when we turned on it, and, 
with the aid of three brigades — to wit : Anderson's, Semmes', and Barksdale's — which had 
just arrived to our assistance, drove it from the woods in great confusion and with heavy 
loss. So great was the disparity in the forces at this point that the wounded officers who 
were captured were greatly mortified, and commenced making excuses by stating that the 
troops in their front were raw troops, who stampeded and produced confusion in their 
ranks. McClellan, in his report, says that Sumner's corps and Green's division encoun- 
tered, ill this woods, "overwhelming numbers behind breastworks," and he assigns the 
heavy losses and consequent demoralization in Sumner's Corps as one of the reasons for 
not renewing the fight on the ISth. We had no breastworks nor anything like them in that 
woods on the 17th, and, on our part, it was a stand-up fight there altogether. The slight 
breastworks subsequently seen by McClellan were made on the 18th, when we were expect- 
ing a renewal of the battle. 



70 BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG. 

On the 30th of July McCauslaud reached Chambei-Bbiirg, 
and made the demand as directed, reading to such of the au- 
thorities as presented themselves the paper sent by me. The 
demand was not complied with, the people stating that they 
were not afraid of having their town burned, and that a Fede- 
ral force was approaching. The policy pursued by our army 
on former occasions had been so lenient, that the}' did not sup- 
pose the threat was in earnest this time, and they hoped for 
speedy relief. McCausland, however, proceeded to carry out 
his orders, and the greater part of the town was laid in ashes.* 
He then moved in the direction of Cumberland, but, on ap- 
proaching that town, he found it defended by a force under 
Kelly too strong for him to attack, and he withdrew towards 
Hampshire County in Virginia, and crossed the Potomac near 
the mouth of the South Branch, capturing the garrison at that 
place and partially destroying the railroad bridge. He then 
invested the post on the railroad at New Creek, but finding it 
too strongly fortified to take b}' assault, he moved to Moore- 
field in Hardy County, near which place he halted to rest and 
recruit his men and horses, as the command was now consid- 
ered safe from pursuit. Averill, however, had been pursuing 
from Chambersburg with a body of cavalry, and Johnson's 
brigade was surprised in camp, before day, on the morning of 
the 7th of August, and routed by Averill's force. This re- 
sulted also in the rout of McCausland's brigade, and the loss 
of the artillery (4 pieces) and about 300 prisoners from the 
whole command. The balance of the command made its way 
to Mount Jackson in great disorder, and much weakened. 
This aiFair had a very damaging efiect upon my cavalry for the 
rest of the campaign.f 



* For this act I, alone, am responsible, as the officers engaged in it were simply executing 
my orders, and had no discretion left them. Notwithstanding the lapse of time which has 
occurred, and the result of the war, I am perfectly satisfied with my conduct on this occa- 
sion, and see no reason to regret it. 

t Grant says, in reference to this expedition under McCausland : " They were rnet and de- 
feated by General Kelly ; and, with diminished numbers, escaped into the mountains of 
West Virginia ;" and he makes no allusion whatever to Averill's affair. There was no de- 
feat by Kelly, but there was one by Averill, as I have stated. This shows how loose Grant is 
as to his facts. So far as we were concerned, the defeat by Averill was worse than it could 
have been by Kelly. 



RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL, AKl) SUBSEQUENT 

OPERATIONS, UNTIL THE BATTLE OE 

WINCHESTER. 

On the 9th, Imbodeii reported that a large force had been 
concentrated at Harper's Ferry, consisting of the 6th, 19th, 
and Crook's Corps, under a new commander, and that it was 
moving towards Berry ville, to our right. The new comman- 
der proved to be Major-General Sheridan, from Grant's army. 
On the 10th, we moved from Bunker Hill to the east of Win- 
chester, to cover the roads from Charlestown and Berryville to 
that place ; and Ramseur's division w^as moved to Winches.ter, 
to cover that place against a force reported to be advancing 
from the west ; but, this report proving untrue, it was sub- 
sequently moved to the junction of the Millwood and Front 
Royal roads. On the morning of the 11th, it was discovered 
that the enemy was moving to our right, on the east of the 
Opequon, and my troops, which had been formed in line of 
battle covering Winchester, were moved to the right, towards 
Newtown, keeping between the enemy and the Valley Pike. 
Ramseur had a brisk skirmish with a body of the enemy's 
cavalry on the Millwood Road, and drove it back. Imboden's 
and Yaughan's brigades had a severe tight with another body 
of cavalry at the double toll-gate, at the intersection of the 
Front Royal road Avith the road from White Post to Newtown; 
and it was discovered that there had been a considerable acces- 
sion to that arm from Grant's army. Just before night, Gor- 
don had heavy skirmishing ]iear Newtown, with a large force 
of cavalry, which advanced on the road from the double toll- 
gate, and drove it off. We encamped near Newtown ; and, on 
the morning of the 12th, moved to Hupp's Hill, between Stras- 
burg and Cedar Creek. Finding that the enemy was advaiic- 
ing in much heavier force than I had yet encountered, I de- 
termined to take position at Fisher's Hill, above Strasburg, 



72 RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL. 

and await his attack tliere. Imboden, with his brigade, was 
seint to Luray Valley, to watch that route ; and, in the after- 
noon, we moved to Fisher's Hill. I had received information 
a few days before, from General Lee, that General Anderson 
had moved with Kershaw's division of infantry and Fitz Lee's 
division of cavalry to Culpeper C. H. ; and I sent a dispatch 
to Anderson, informing him of the state of things, and re- 
questing him to move to Front Eoyal, so as to guard the Luray 
Valley. 

Sheridan's advance appeared on the banks of Cedar Creek, 
on the 12tli, and there was some skirmishing with it. My 
troops were posted at Fisher's Hill, with the right resting on 
the i^orth Fork of the Shenandoali, and the left extending to- 
wards Little Xorth ]\Iountain : and we awaited the advance of 
the enemy. General Anderson moved to Front Royal, in com- 
phance witli my request, and took position to prevent an ad- 
vance of the enemy on that route. Shortly after I took posi- 
tion at Fisher's Llill, Major-General Lomax reported to me to 
relieve Ransom, in command of the cavalry, and McCausland 
and Johnson joined us with the remnants of their brigades. 
Sheridan demonstrated at Hupp's Hill, within our view, for 
several days, and some severe skirmishing ensued. 

LTpon taking position at Fisher's Hill, I had established a 
signal-station on the end of Three Top Mountain, a branch of 
Massanutten Mountain, near Strasburg, wliich overlooked both 
camps and enabled me to communicate readily with General 
Anderson, in the Luray Valley. A small force from Shei'i- 
dan's army ascended the mountain and drove oft' our signal- 
men, and possession was taken of the station by the eneni}', 
who was in turn driven away; when several small but severe 
tights ensued over the station, possession of it being linallj' 
gained and held by a force of one hundred men under Cap- 
tain Keller of Gordon's division. 

On the morning of the 17th, it was discovered that tlie ene- 
my was falling back, and I immediately moved forward in 
pursuit, requesting General Anderson, by signal, to cross the 
river at Front Royal, and move towards Winchester. Just 



OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 7S 

l>efore night, tlie enemy's cavalry and a body of infantry, 
reported to be a division, was encountered between Kernstown 
and Winchester, and driven through the latter place, after a 
sharp engagement, in which Wharton's division moved to the 
left, and attacked the enemy's infantry, and drove it from a 
strong position on Bower's Hill, south of ^^inchester, while 
Ramseur engaged it in front, and Gordon advanced against the 
cavalry on the right.* 

On the 18th we took position to cover Winchester, and Gen. 
vVnderson came up with Kershaw's division of infantry, Cut- 
shaw's battalion of Artillery, and two brigades of cavalry 
under Fitz Lee. General Anderson ranked me, but he 
declined to take command, and offered to co-operate in any 
movement I might suggest. We had now discovered that Tor- 
1)ert's and Wilson's divisions of cavalry from Grant's army, had 
joined Sheridan's force, and that the latter was very laro-e. 

On the 19th, my main force moved to Bunker Hill and 
Lomax's cavalry made reconnoissances to Martinsburg and 
Shepherdstown, while Anderson's whole force remained near 
\Vinchester. 

On the 20th, our cavalry had some skirmishing with the 
enemy's on the Opequon, and on the 21st, by concert, there 

* Wlien Hunter was relieved I had hoped that an end was put to his mode of warfare, but 
I had now to learn how the new commander proposed to carry on tiie war in behalf of " the 
best government the world ever s-aw," (so called). Sheridan liad commenced burning baru.s 
mills and stacks of small grain and hay, and the whole country was smoking. Among manv 
otliers, the barn of a respectable farmer near Is'ewiown, « hose name was Chrisman, had been 
burned within a few steps of his house, and the latter saved with great difheulty, notwitli- 
sianding tlte fact tliat Mr. Chrisman had received from G-eneral Torbert, in command of the 
I'ederal civalry. a written protection stating that for some weeks he had taken care of and 
showed great kindness to, a badly womuled Federal soldier. Tu passing through Middle- 
town, I was informed that one of my soldiers had been tried and hung as a spy. The grave 
nl the foot of the gallows was opened, and the Ijody was recognizei.l by his brother and the 
(liTicers of his company as a private of the o4tli North Carolina regiment. This man had 
lieen found by the enemy in Middletown, in attendauce on u Confederate soldier whose leg 
was amputated, and he had claimed to be a citizen, but a paper was found on his person 
-iiowiitg that he Jiadbeeu formerly detailed as a niu'se in the hospital. On this state of 
facts lie was hung as a spy. He was not employed m any such capacity, and he was so illit- 
e;'ate, not being able to read or write, that his appearance and e-^ideut want of intelligence 
precluded the idea of his being so employed. 1 would liave retaliated at once by hanging a 
commissioned ottieer, but tlie enquiry whicli I niade iuruishcd some reason for believin." 
that the man had remained behind, and endeavored to pass for a citizen to avoid service in 
oLU- army; and I did not therefore wish to risk the lives of my officers atid men who were in 
tlic enemy's liauds, by making his a case for retaliation. His execution by the enemy, how- 
over, was none the less wanton and barbarous. 
K 



■74 OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY,. 

was a general movement towards Harper's Ferry — my com- 
mand, moving through Smithfield towards Charlestown, and 
Anderson's on the direct road by Summit Point. A body of 
the enemy's cavahw was driven from the Opequon, and was 
pursued by part of our cavahy towards Summit Point. I en- 
countered Sheridan's main force near Cameron's depot, about 
three miles from Charlestown, in a position which he com- 
menced fortifying at once. Kodes' and Eamseur's divisions 
were advanced to the front, and very heavy skirmishing en- 
sued and was continued until night, but I waited for General 
Anderson to arrive before making a general attack. He 
encountered Wilson's division of cavalry at Summit Point, an.d, 
after driving it otl", went into camp at that place. At light 
next morning, it was discovered that the enemy had retired 
durina: the nia-ht, and his rear ffuard of cavalrv was driven 
tlirough Charlestown towards Hall-town, where Sheridan had 
taken a strong position under the protection of the heavy guns 
on Maryland Heights. I demonstrated on the enemy's front 
on the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, and there was some skirmishing. 
General Anderson then consented to take my position in front 
of Charlestown and amuse the enemy with Kershaw's division 
of infantry, supported by McCausland's brigade of cavahy on 
tlie left and a regiment of Fitz Lee's cavalry on the right, 
while I moved with my infantry and artillery to She})herds- 
town, and Fitz Lee with the rest of the cavalry to Williams- 
port, as if to cross into Maryland, in order to keep up the fear 
of an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. 

On the 25th Fitz Lee started hy the way of Leetown and 
Martinsburg to Williamsport, and I moved through Leetown 
and crossed the railroad at Ivearneysville to Shepherdstowji. 
After Fitz Lee had passed on, I encountered a very large force 
of the enemy's cavalry between Leetown and Kearneysville, 
which was moving out with several days forage and rations for 
a raid in our rear. After a sharp engagement with small arms 
and artillery, this force was driven back through Shepherds- 
town, where we came very near surrounding and capturing a 
considerable portion of it, but it succeeded in making its 
escape across the Potomac. Gordon's division, which was 



OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 75 

moved around to intercept tlie enemy, became heavily engaged, 
and cut ott" the retreat of part of liis force by one road, but it 
made its way down the river to the ford by another and thus 
escaped. In this affair, a vahiable officer, Colonel Monaghau 
of the 6th Louisiana Regiment, was killed. Fitz Lee reached 
Williamsport, and had some skirmishing across the river at 
that place, and then moved to Shepherdstown. 

On the 26tli I moved to Leetown, and on the 27th I moved 
l)ack to Bunker Hill; while Anderson who had confronted 
Sheridan, during the two days of my absence, with but a di- 
vision of infantry and a brigade and a regiment of cavalry, 
moved to Stephenson's Depot. 

On the 28th, our cavahy, which had been left holding a line 
from Charlestown to Shepherdstown, was compelled to retire 
across the Opequon, after having had a brisk engagement with 
the enemy's cavalry at Smithfield. On the 29th, the enemj^'s 
cavalry crossed the Opequon near Smithfield, driving in our 
cavalry pickets, when I advanced to the front with a part of. 
my infantry, and drove the enemy across the stream again, and 
after a very sharp artillery duel, a portion of my command was 
crossed over and pursued the enemy through Smithfield towards 
Charlestown. We then retired, leaving a command of cavalry 
at Smithfield, but it was compelled to recross the Opequon, on 
the advance of a heavy force from the direction of Charlestown. 

Quiet prevailed on the 30th, but on the 31st there were some 
demonstrations of cavalry by the enemy on the Opequon, 
which were met by ours. On this day, (31st), Anderson moved 
to Winchester, and Rodes with his division went to Martins- 
burg on a reconnoissance, drove a force of the enemy's cavalry 
from that place, interrupted the preparations for repairing the 
railroad, and then returned. 

There was quiet on the 1st of September, but, on the 2nd, I 
broke up my camp at Bunker Hill, and moved with three 
divisions of infantry and part of McCausland's cavalry under 
Col. Ferguson, across the country towards Summit Point, on a 
reconnoissance, while the trains under the protection of Rodes' 
division were moved to Stephenson's depot. After I had 



76 OPERATTONB IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 

crossed the Opequon and Avas moving towards Summit Point, 
Averill's cavaliy attacked and drove back in some confusion, 
first Yauglian's, and then Johnson's cavahy, which were on 
the Martinshurg road, and the Opequon, but Eodes returned 
towards Bunker Hill and drove the enemy back in turn. This 
affair arrested my march, and I recrossed the Opequon and 
moved to Stephenson's de])ot, where T estabhshed my camp. 

On the 3d Eodes moved to J3unker Hill in support of Lo- 
max's cavalry, ami drove tlie enemy's cavalry from and be- 
yond that place. 

A letter had been received from General Lee requesting 
that Kersliaw's division should be returned to him, as he was 
very much in need of troops, and, after consultation with me, 
General Anderson determined to recross the Blue Ridge with 
that division and Fitz Lee's cavahy. On the 3rd he moved 
towards Berryville for the purpose of crossing the mountain 
at Ashby's Gap, and I was to have moved towards Charles- 
town next day, to occupy the enemy's attention during An- 
derson's movement. Sheridan, however, had started two di- 
visions of cavalry through Berryville and White Post, on a 
raid to our rear, and his main force had moved towards Ber- 
ryville. Anderson encountered Crook's corps at the latter 
place, and, after a sharp engagement, drove it back on the 
main body. Receiving information of this aftair, I moved at 
daylight next morning, with three divisions, to Anderson's as- 
sistance, Gordon's division being left to cover Winchester. T 
found Kershaw's division extended out in a strong skirmish 
line confronting Sheridan's main force, which had taken posi- 
tion in rear of Berryville, across the road from Charlestown to 
that place, and was busily fortifying, while the cavalry force 
which had started on the raid was returning and passing be- 
tween Berryville and the river to Sheridan's rear. As may be 
supposed, Anderson's position was one of great peril, if the en- 
emy had possessed any enterprise, and it presented the appear- 
ance of the most extreme audacity for him thus to confront a 
force so vastly superior to his own, while, too, his trains were 
at the mercy of the enemy's cavalry, had the latter known it. 
l^lacing one of my divisions in line on Kershaw's left, I moved 



OPERATIONS IN- THE LOWER VALLEY. 77 

with the other two along the enemy's front towards his right, 
for the purjiose of reconnoitring and attacking that flank, if a 
snitahle opportunity offered. After moving in this way for 
two miles, I reached an elevated position from which the ene- 
my's line was visible, and within artillery range of it. I at 
lirst thought that I had reached his right flank, and was about 
making arrangements to attack it, when casting my eye to my 
left, I discovered, as far as the eye could reach with the aid of 
field glasses, a line extending towards Summit Point. The 
position the enemy occupied was a strong one, and he was 
busily engaged fortifying it, having already made considera- 
ble progress. It was not until I had had this view that I real- 
ized the size of the enemy's force, and as I discovered that his 
line was too long for me to get around his flank, and the posi- 
tion was too strong to attack in front, I returned and informed 
General Anderson of the condition of things. After consul- 
tation with him, we thought it not advisable to attack the en- 
emy in his intrenched lines, and we determined to move our 
forces back to the west side of the Opequon, and see if he 
would not move out of his works. The waggon trains were 
sent back early next morning (the 5th) towards Winchester, 
and about an hour by sun Kershaw's division, whose place had 
been taken b}^ one of my divisions, moved towards the same 
point. About two o'clock in the afternoon my troops v/ere 
withdrawn, and moved back to Stephenson's depot. This 
withdrawal was made w^hile the skirmishers were in close 
proximity and firing at each other ; yet there was no effort on 
the part of the enemy to molest us. Just as my front division 
(Rodes') reached Stephenson's depot, it met, and drove back, 
and pursued for some distance, Averill's cavalry, Vv^hich was 
forcing towards Winchester that part of our cavalry which 
had been watching the Martinsburg road. 

It was quiet on the Gth, but on the 7th the enemy's cavalry 
made demonstrations on the Martinsburg road and the Ope- 
quon at several points, and was repulsed. 

On the 8th it was quiet again, but on the 9th a detachment 
of the enemy's cavalry came to the Opequon below Brucetown, 



28 OPEEATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 

burned some mills, and retreated before a division of infantry 
sent out to meet it. 

On the lOtb, my infantry moved by Bunker Hill to Darkes- 
ville and encountered a considerable force of tlie enemy's cav- 
alry, wliich was driven ofi', and then pursued by Lomax 
through Martinsburg across the Opequon. We then returned 
to Bunker Hill, and the next day to Stephenson's depot, and 
there was quiet on the 12th. 

On the 13th a large force of the enemy's cavalry^, reported to 
be supported by infantry, advanced on the road from Summit 
Point and drove in our pickets from the Opequon, when two 
divisions of infantry were advanced to the front, driving the 
enemy across the Opequon again. A very sharp artillery duel 
across the creek then took place, and some of my infantry 
crossed over, when the enemy retired. 

On the 14th General Anderson again started, with Ker- 
shaw's division and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery, to cross 
the Blue Ridge by the way of Front Royal, and was not mo- 
lested. Fitz Lee's cavalry w^as left with me, and Ramseur's 
division was moved to Winchester to occupy Kershaw's 
position. 

There was an affair between one of Kershaw's brigades and 
a division of the enemy's cavalry, while I was at Fisher's Hill 
and Anderson at Front Royal, in Avhich some prisoners were 
lost ; and, subsequently, there were two affairs, in which the 
outposts from Kershaw's command were attacked and cap- 
tured by the enemy's cavalry, one in front of Winchester and 
the other in front of Charlestown, which I have not underta- 
ken to detail, as they occurred when General Anderson was 
controlling the operations of that division, but it is proper to 
refer to them here as part of the operations in the Yalley. 

On the 15th and 16th my troops remained in camp 
undisturbed. 

The positions of the opposing forces were now as follows : 
Ramseur's division and JSTelson's battalion of artillery were on 
the road from Berry ville to Winchester, one mile from the 
latter place. Rodes', Gordon's and Wharton's divisions, (the 



POSITION,^ AND STRENtlTH OF THE TWO ARMIES. 79 

last two being under Breekenriclge,) and Braxton's and King's 
battalions of artillery were at Stephenson's depot on the Win- 
chester and Potomac railroad, which is six miles from Win- 
chester, Lomax's cavalry picketed in my front on the Ope- 
([uon, and on m}^ left from that stream to jSTorth Mountain, 
Avhile Fitz Lee's cavalry watched the right, having small pick- 
ets across to the Shenandoah. Four principal roads, from po- 
sitions held by the enemy, centered at Stephenson's depot, to 
■wit : the Martinsburg road, the road from Chariestown via 
Smithfield, the road from the same place via Summit Point, 
and the road from Berryvilie via Jordan's Springs. Sheridan's 
main force was near Berryville, at the intrenched position 
which has been mentioned, while Averill was at Martinsburg 
witli a division of cavalry. Berryville is ten miles from Win- 
chester, nearly east, and Martinsburg twent37--two miles nearly 
north. The crossing of the Opequon on the Berryville road is 
four or five miles from Winchester. From Berrj^ville there 
are two good roads to Front Royal, via Miliw^ood and White 
Post, and from Millwood there is a macadamized road to A¥in- 
chester, and also good roads via White Post to the Valley pike 
at N'ewtown and Middletown, the last two roads running east 
of the Opequon. The whole country is very open, being a 
limestone country, which is thickly settled and well cleared, 
and affords great facilities for the movement of troops and the 
operations of cavalry. From the enemy's fortilications on 
Maryland Heights, the country north and east of Winchester, 
and the main roads through it, are exposed to view. 

The relative positions which we occupied rendered my com- 
munications to the rear very much exposed, but I could nut 
avoid it without giving up the lower Valley. The object of my 
jtresence there was to keep up a threatening attitude towards 
Marjdand and Pennsylv^ania, and prevent the use of the Balti- 
more and Ohio railroad, and the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, 
as Avell as to keep as large a force as possible from Grant's 
army to defend the Federal Capital. Had Sheridan, by a 
prompt movement, thrown his whole force on the line of my 
communications, I would have been compelled to attempt to 
cut my way through, as there was no escape for me to the right 



80 POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARi\IIE3. 

or left, and my force was too weak to cross the Potomac w^hile 
lie wag in my rear. I knew my danger, but I could occupy 
no otker position that would have enabled me to accomplish 
the desired object. If I had moved up the Valley at all, I 
could not have stopped short of jSTew Market, for between that 
place and the country in which I was there was no forage for 
my horses ; and this would have enabled the enemy to resume 
the use of the railroad and canal, and return all the troops from 
Grant's army to him. .Being compelled to occupy the position 
where I was, and beiDg aware of its danger as well as apprized 
of the fact that very great odds were opposed to me, my only 
resource was to use n\y forces so as to display them at differ- 
ent points with great rapidity, and thereby keep u]) the im- 
pression that they were much larger than they really were. 
'The events of the last month jiad satisfied me tliat the com- 
mander opposed to me was without enterprise, and possessed 
an excessive caution which amounted to timidity. If it was 
his policy to produce the impression that his force was too 
weak to tight me, he did not succeed, but if it was to convince 
me that he was not an able or energetic commander, his strat- 
egy was a complete success, and subsequeiit events^^have not 
changed my opinion. 

My infantry force at this time consisted of the three divisio)is 
of the 2nd Corps of the Army of ISTorthern Virginia, and 
Wharton's division of Breckenridge's command. The 2nd 
Corps numbered a little over 8,000 muskets when it was de- 
tached in pursuit of Hunter, and it had now been reduced to 
about 7,000 muskets, by long and rapid marches and the vari- 
ous engagements and skirmishes in which it had participated. 
Wharton's division liad been reduced to about 1,700 muskets 
by the same causes. Making a small allowance for details 
and those unlit for duty, I had about 8,500 muskets for duty. 
When I returned from Maryland, my cavalry consisted of the 
remnants of tive small brigades, to wit : Imboden's, McCans- 
land's, Johnson's Jackson's, and Vaughan's. Vaughan's had 
now bee]i ordered to South-Western Virgiida, most of the men 
having left without permission. Tlie surprise and rout of 
McCausland's and Johnson.'s brigades by Averill at Mooretield, 



POSITIONS AND STEENGTII OF THE TWO AEMIES. 81 

hud resulted in the loss of a considerable number of horses 
and men, and such had been the loss in all the brigades, in the 
various fights and skirmishes in which they had been engaged, 
that the whole of this cavalry, now under Lomax, numbered 
only about 1,700 mounted men. Fitz Lee had brought with nim 
two brigades, to-wit : Wickham's, and Lomax's old brigade (now 
under Colonel Payne), numbering about 1,200 mounted men. 
I had the three battalions of artillery which had been with me 
near Washington, and Fitz Lee had brought a few pieces of 
horse artillery. When I speak of divisions and brigades of 
my troops, it must be understood that they were mere skele- 
tons of those organizations. 

Since my return from Maryland, my supplies had been 
obtained principally from the lower Yalley and the counties 
west of it, and the money which was obtained by contributions 
in Maryland was used for that purpose. Nearly the whole of 
our bread was obtained by threshing the wheat and then hav- 
ing it ground, by details from my command, and it sometimes 
liappened that while my troops were fighting, the very flour 
which was to furnish them with bread for their next meal was 
l)eing ground under the protection of their guns. Latterly 
our flour had been obtained from the upper Valley, but also 
by details sent for that purpose. The horses and mules, in- 
cluding the cavalry horses, were sustained almost entirely by 
grazing. 

I have no means of stating with accuracy Sheridan's force, 
and can only form an estimate from such data as I have been 
able to procure. Citizens who had seen his force, stated that 
it was the largest which they had ever seen in the Valley on 
either side, and some estimated it as high as 60,000 or 70,000, 
but of course I made allowance for the usual exas-o^eration of 
inexperienced men. My estimate is from the following data: 
In G-raut's letter to Hunter, dated at Monocacy, August 5th, 
1864, and contained in the report of the former, is the follow- 
ing statement : " In detailing such a force, the brigade of cav- 
alry now en route from Washington via Rockville, may be taken 
into account. There are now on their way to join you three 
other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least 5,000 

L 



82 POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES. 

men and horses." Sheridan relieved Hunter on the 6th, and 
Grant says in his report, " On the 7th of August, the Middle 
])epartment and the Departments of West Virginia, Washing- 
ton, and the Susquehanna were constituted into the Middle 
Military division, and Major-General Sheridan was assigned to 
the temporary command of the same. Two divisions of cav- 
alry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson were sent 
to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached 
him at Harper's Ferry on the 11th of August." Before this 
cavalry was sent to the Yalley, there was already a division 
there commanded hy Averill, besides some detachments which 
belonged to the department of West Virginia. A book con- 
taining the official reports of the cliief surgeon of the cavalry 
corps of Sheridan's army, which was subsequently captured at 
Cedar Creek on the 19th of October, showed that there were 
]>resent for duty in that Corps, during the first week in Sep- 
tember, over 11,000 men, and present for duty during the week 
ending the 17th day of September, 10,100 men. The extracts 
from Grant's report go to confirm this statement, as, if three 
brigades numhered at least 5,000 men and horses, the two 
divisions, when the whole of them arrived, -with Averill's 
cavalry, must have numbered over 10,000. I think, therefore, 
that I can safely estimate Sheridan's cavalry at the battle of 
Winchester, on the 19th of September, at 10,000. His infantry 
consisted of the 6th, 19th, and Crook's Corps, the latter beiiig 
composed of the "Army of West Virginia," and one division 
of the 8th Corps. The ra;)ort of Secretary Stanton shows that 
there was in the department of which the " Middle Military 
division" was composed, the following "available force present 
lor duty May 1st, 1864," to-wit : 

" Department of Washington 42,124." 

" Department of West Virginia 30,782." 

" Department of the Susquehanna 2,970." 

" Middle Department 5,627." 

making an aggregate of 81,503; but, as the Federal Secretary 
of War in the same report says, " In order to repair the losses 
of the Army of the Potomac, the chief part of the force 
designed to guard the Middle Department and the Department 



POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO AEMIES. 83 

of Wasliiugtou was called forward to the front," we may 
assume that 40,000 men were used for that purpose, which 
would leave 41,503, minus the losses in battle before Sheridan 
relieved Hunter, in the Middle Military division, exclusive of 
the 6th and 19th Corps, and the cavalry from Grant's army. 
The infantry of the Army of the Potomac was composed of 
the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps, on the 1st of May, 1864, and 
Stanton says the " available force present for duty " in that 
army on that day, was 120,386 men. Allowing 30,000 for the 
artillery and cavalry of that army, which would be a very 
liberal allowance, and there would still be left 90,385 infantry; 
and it is fair to assume that the 6th Corps numbered one-third 
of the infantry, that is, 30,000 men on the 1st of May, 1864. 
If the losses of the Army of the Potomac had been such as to 
reduce the 6th Corps to less than 10,000 men, notwithstanding 
the reinforcements and recruits received, the carnage in Grant's 
army must have been frightful indeed. The 19th Corps was 
just from the Department of the Gulf and had not gone through 
a bloody campaign. A communication which was among the 
papers captured at Cedar Creek, in noticing some statement of 
a newspaper correspondent in regard to the conduct of that 
corps at Winchester, designated it as " a vile slander on 12,000 
of the best soldiers in the Union army." In view of the fore- 
going data, without counting the troops in the Middle Depart- 
ment and the Departments of Washington and the Susque- 
hanna, and making liberal allowances for losses in battle, and 
for trooj^s detained on post and garrison duty in the Depart- 
ment of West Virginia, I think that I may assume that Sheri- 
dan had at least 35,000 infantry against me. The troops of 
the 6th Corps and of the Department of West Virginia, alone, 
without counting the 19tli Corps, numbered on the 1st of May, 
1864, 60,782. If with the 19th Corps, Sheridan did not have 
35,000 infantry remaining from this force, what had become 
of the balance ? Sheridan's artillery very greatly outnum- 
bered mine, both in men and guns. 

Havinggbeen informed that a force was at work on the rail- 
road at Martinsburg, I moved on the afternoon of the 17th of 
September, with Eodes' and Gordon's division, and llraxtoif s 



84 EXPEDITION TO I\I AETINSBURH . 

artillery to Bunker Hill, and, on tlie morning of the IStli, witli 
Gordon's division and a part of the artillery to Martinsburg, 
preceded by a part of Lomax's cavalry. Averill's division of 
cavalry was driven from the town across the Opequon in the 
direction of Charlestown, and we then returned to Bunker 
Hill. Gordon was left at Bunker Hill, with orders to move to 
Stephenson's depot by sunrise next morning, and Rodes' divi- 
sion moved to the latter place that night, to which I also 
returned. At Martinsburg, where the enemy had a telegraph 
office, I learned that Grant was with Sheridan that day, and 
I expected an early move. 



• BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 

At light on the morning of the 19th, our cavalry pickets at 
the crossing of the Opequon on the Berryville road were driven 
in, and information having been sent me of that fact, I imme- 
diately ordered all the troops at Stephenson's depot to be in 
readiness to move, directions being given for Gordon, who 
had arrived from Bunker Hill, to move at once; but, by some 
mistake on the part of my stafl' ofiicer, the latter order was 
not delivered to General Breckenridge or Gordon. I rode at 
once to Ramseur's position, and found his troops in line across 
the Berryville road skirmishing with the enemy. Before 
reaching this point, I had ascertained that Gordon was not 
moving, and sent back for him, and now discovering that the 
enemy's advance was a real one and in heavy force, I sent 
orders for Breckenridge and Rodes to move up as rapidly as 
possible. The position occupied by Ramseur was about one 
mile and a half out from Winchester, on an elevated plateau 
between Abraham's Creek and Red Bud Run. Abraham's 
Creek crosses the Valley Pike one mile south of Winchester, 
and then crosses the Front Royal road about the same distance 
south-east of the town, and, running eastwardly, on the south- 
ern side of the Berryville road, crosses that road a short dis- 
tance before it empties into the Opequon. Red Bud Run 



BATTLE OF WINCHESTEE. 85 

crosses the Martinsburg road about a mile and a half north of 
Winchester, and runs eastwardly, on the northern side of the 
Berryville road, to the Opequon. Ramseur was therefore in 
the obtuse angle formed by the Martinsburg and Front Royal 
roads. In front of and to the right of him, for some distance, 
the country was open. Abraham's Creek runs through a deep 
valley, and beyond it, on the right, is high 0]Den ground, at the 
intersection of the Front Royal and Millwood roads. To 
Ramseur's left, the country sloped off" to the Red Bud, and 
there were some patches of woods which afforded cover for 
troops. To the north of the Red Bud, the country is very 
open, affording facilities for the movement of any kind of 
troops. Towards the Opequon, on the front, the Berryville 
road runs through a ravine, with hills and woods on each side, 
which enabled the enemy to move his troops under cover, and 
mask them out of range of artillery. I^Telson's artillery was 
posted on Ramseur's line, covering the approaches as far as 
practicable ; and Lomax, with Jackson's cavalry and part of 
Johnson's, was on the right, watching the valley of Abraham's 
Creek and the Front Royal road beyond, while Fitz Lee was 
on the left, across the Red Bud, with his cavalry and a battery 
of horse-artillery, and a detachment of Johnson's cavalry 
watched the interval between Ramseur's left and the Red Bud. 
These troops held the enemy's main force in cheek until Gor- 
don's and Rodes' divisions arrived from Stephenson's depot. 
Gordon's division arrived first, a little after ten o'clock, A. M., 
and was placed under cover in rear of a piece of woods behind 
the interval between Ramseur's line and the Red Bud, the de- 
tachment of Johnson's cavalry having been removed to the 
right. Knowing that it would not do for us to await the shock 
of the enemy's attack, Gordon was directed to examine the 
ground on the left, with a view to attacking a force of the enemy 
which had taken position in a piece of wood in front of him, 
and while he was so engaged Rodes arrived with three of his 
brigades, and was directed to form on Gordon's right, in rear of 
another piece of woods. While this movement was being exe- 
cuted, we discovered very heavy columns of the enemy, which 
had been massed under cover between the Red Bud and the 



86 BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 

Berry ville road, moving to attack Ramseur on Ms left iiank, 
\yhile another force pressed him iu front. It was a moment of 
imminent and thrilling danger, as it was impossible for Eani- 
seur's division, which numbered only about 1,700 muskets, to 
withstand the immense force advancing against it. The only 
chance for us was to hurl Rodes and Gordon upon the iiank of 
the advancing columns, and they were ordered forward at 
once to the attack. They advanced in most gallant style 
through the woods into the open ground, and attacked with 
great vigor, while Kelson's artillery on the right, and Braxton's 
on the left, opened a destructive fire. But Evans' brigade ©f 
Grordon's division, which was on the extreme left of our 
infantry, received a check from a column of the enemy, and 
was forced back through the woods from behind which it had 
advanced, the enemy following to the very rear of the woods, 
and to within musket range of seven pieces of Braxton's artil- 
lery which were without support. This caused a pause in our 
advance, and the position was most critical, for it was apparent 
that unless this force was driven back the day was lost. Brax- 
ton's guns, in which now was our only hope, resolutely stood 
their ground, and, under the personal superintendence of 
Lieutenant Colonel Braxton and Colonel T. H. Carter, my 
then Chief of Artillery, opened with canister on the enemy. 
This fire^was so rapid and well-directed that the enemy stag- 
gered, halted, and commenced falling back, leaving a battle- 
flag on the ground, whose bearer was cut down by a canister 
shot. Just then. Battle's brigade of Rodes' division, which 
had arrived and been formed in line for the purpose of advan- 
cing to the support of the rest of the division, moved forward 
and swept through the woods, driving the enemy before it, 
Avhile Evans' brigade was rallied and brought back to the 
charge. Our advance, which had been suspended for a mo- 
ment, was resumed, and the enemy's attacking columns were 
thrown into great confusion and driven from the field. This 
attacking force of the enemy proved to be the Sixth and Mne- 
teenth corps, and it was a grand sight to see this immense body 
hurled back in utter disorder before my two divisions, num- 
bering a very little over 6000 muskets. Ramseur's division 



BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 87 

had received the shock of the enemy's attack, and been forced 
back a little, but soon recovered itself. Lomax, on the right, 
had held the enemy's cavalry in check, and, with a part of his 
force, had made a gallant charge against a body of infantry, 
when Ramseur's line was being forced back, thus aiding the 
latter in recovering from the momentary disorder. Fitz Lee 
on the left, from across the Red Bud, had poured a galling tire 
into the enemy's columns with his sharpshooters and horse- 
artillery, while J^elson's and Braxton's battalions had per- 
formed wonders. This affair occurred about 11 A. M., and 
a splendid victory had been gained. The ground in front 
was strewn with the enemy's dead and wounded, and some 
prisoners had been taken. But on our side. Major General 
Rodes had been killed, in the very moment of triumph, 
while > conducting the attack of his division with great gal- 
lantry and skill, and this was a heavy blow to me. Briga- 
dier-General Godwin, of Ramseur's division, had been killed, 
and Brigadier-General York, of Gordon's division, had lost 
an arm. Other brave men and otiicers had fallen, and we 
could illy bear the loss of any of them. Had I then had 
a body of fresh troops to push our victory, the day would 
have been ours, but in this action, in the early part of the 
day, I had present only about 7000 muskets, about 2000 cav- 
alry, and two battalions of artillery with about 30 guns ; and 
they had all been engaged. Wharton's di\dsion and King's 
artillery had not arrived, and Imboden's cavalry under Colonel 
Smith, and McCausland's under Colonel Ferguson, were 
watchine' the enemv's cavalrv on the lett, on the Mar- 
tinsburg road and the Opequon. The enemy had a fresh corps 
which had not been engaged,, and there remained his heavy 
force of cavalry. Our lines were now formed across from 
Abraham's Creek to Red Bud and were very attenuated. The 
enemy was still to be seen in front in formidable force, and 
away to our right, across Abraham's Creek, at the junction of 
the Front Royal and Millwood roads, he had massed a division 
of cavalry with some artillery, overlapping us at least a mile, 
while the country was open between this force and the Valley 
Pike, and the Cedar Creek Pike back of the latter ; which 



-88 BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 

roads furnished my only means of retreat in the event of dis- 
aster. My line did not reach the Front Royal road on the 
right, or the Martinsburg road on the left. 

When the order was sent for the troops to move from Ste- 
phenson's depot, General Breckenridge had moved to the front, 
with Wharton's division and King's artillery, to meet a cavalry 
force|which had driven our pickets from the Opequon on the 
Charlestown road, and that division had become heavily en- 
gaged with the enemy, and sustained and repulsed several 
determined charges of his cavalry, while its own flanks were 
in great danger from the enemy's main force on the right, and 
a column of his cavalry moving up the Martinsburg road on 
the left. After much difficulty and some liard lighting. Gen. 
Breckenridge succeeded in extricating his force and moving 
up the Martinsburg road to join me, but he did not reach the 
held until about two o'clock in the afternoon. 

In the meantime there had been heavy skirmishing along 
the line, and the reports from the front were that the enemy 
was massing for another attack, but it was iropossible to tell 
where it would fall. As the danger from the enemy's cavalry 
on the right was very great and Lomax's force very weak, 
Wickham's brigade of Fitz Lee's cavalry had been sent from 
the left to Lomax's assistance. When Wharton's division 
arrived, Patton's brigade of that division was left to aid Fitz 
Lee in guarding the Martinsburg road, against the force of 
cavahy which was advancing on that road watched by Lomax's 
two small brigades; and the rest of the division was formed in 
rear of Rodes' division in the centre, in order to be moved to 
any point that might be attacked. Late in the afternoon, two 
divisions of the enemy's cavalry drove in the small force which 
had been watching it on the Martinsburg road, and Crook's 
corps, which had not been engaged, advanced at the same time 
on that flank, on the north side of Red Bud, and, before 
this overwhelming force, l^atton's brigade of infantry and 
Payne's brigade of cavalry under Fitz Lee were forced back. 
A considerable force of the enemy's cavalry then swept along 
the Martinsburg road to the very skirts of Winchester, thus 
getting in the rear of our left flank. Wharton's two other 



BATTLE OF AVINGHfiSTER. 89 

brigades were moved in double quick time to the left and rear, 
and, making a gallant charge on the enemy's cavalry, with the 
aid of King's artillery, and some of Braxton's guns which 
were turned to the rear, succeeded in driving it back. The 
division was then thrown into line by General Breckenridge, 
in rear of our left and at right angles with the Martiusburg 
road, and another charge of the enemy's cavalry was hand- 
somely repulsed. But many of the men on our front line, 
liearing the tire in the rear, and thinking they were ilanked 
and about to be cut off, commenced falling back, thus produ- 
cing great confusion. At the same time. Crook advanced 
against our left, and Gordon threw Evans' brigade into line to 
meet him, but the disorder in the front line became so great 
that, after an obstinate resistance, that brigade was compelled 
to retire also. The whole front line had now given way, but 
a large portion of the men were rallied and formed behind an 
indifterent line of breastworks, which had been made just out- 
side of Winchester during the tirst year of the war, and, with 
the aid of the artillery which was brought back to this posi- 
tion, the progress of the enemy's infantry was arrested. 
Wharton's division maintained its organization on the left, 
and Kamseur fell back in good order on the right. Wick- 
ham's brigade of cavalry had been brought from the right, and 
was in position on Fort Hill, just outside of Winchester on the 
west. Just after the advance of the enemy's infantry was 
checked by our artillery, it was reported to me that the enemy 
liad got around our right flank, and as I knew this was per- 
fectly practicable, and was expecting such a movement from 
the cavalry on the Front Royal road, I gave the order to re- 
tire, but instantly discovering that the supposed force of the 
enemy was Ramseur's division, which had merely moved back 
to keep in line with the other troops, I gave the order for the 
latter to return to the works before they had moved twenty 
]>aces. This order was obeyed by Wharton's division, but not 
so well by the others. The enemy's cavalry force, however, 
was too large for us, and having the advantage of open ground, 
it again succeeded in getting around our left, producing great 
confusion, for which there was no remedy. Nothing was now 



90 BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 

left for us but to retire through*^ Winchester, and Ramseur's 
division, wliicli maintained its organization, was moved on the 
east of the town to the south side of it, and put in position, 
forming the basis for a new hne, while the other troops moved 
back through the town. Wickham's brigade, with some 
pieces of horse artiller}^ on Fort Hill, covered this movement 
and checked the pursuit of the enemy's cavalry. When the 
new line was formed, the enemy's advance was checked until 
night-fall, and we then retired to Xewtown without serious 
molestation, Lomax liad held the enemy's cavalry on the 
Front Eoyal road in check, and a feeble attempt at pursuit 
was repulsed by liamseur near Xernstowu. 

As soon as our reverse began, ortlers had been sent for the 
removal of the trains, stores, and sick and wounded in the 
hospitals, to Fisher's Hill, over the Cedar Creek Pike and the 
Back Road. This was done with safety, and all the wounded, 
except such as were not in a condition to be moved, and those 
which had not been brought from the held, wei-e cai'ried to 
the rear. 

Thisbattle,beginuingv\iththe skirmishing in Ramseur's front, 
had lasted from daylight until dark, and, at the close of it, we 
had been forced back two miles, after having i-epulsed the 
enemy's tirst attack with great slaughter to him, and subse- 
quently contested every inch of ground with unsurpassed 
obstinacy. We deserved the victory, and would have had it, 
hut for the enemy's immense superiority in cavalry, whieh 
alone gave it to him. 

Three pieces of King's artillery, from wliieh the hoi-ses were 
shot, and whicli therefore could not be brought oii*, were lost, 
hut the enemy claimed five, and, if he captured that nuniljer, 
two were lost by the cavalry and Tiot reported to me. My hjss 
in killed, wounded and prisoners was severe for tlie size of my 
fon^e, but it Avas only a fraction of that claimed by tlie enemy. 
Owing to its obedience to orders in returning to the works, the 
heaviest loss of prisoners was in Wharton's division. Among 
the killed were Major General Rodes and Brigadier General 
(lodwin. Colonel G. W. Patton, commanding a brigade, was 



BATTLE OP WINCHESTEP.. 91 

mortally wounded, and fell into the hands of the enemy. 
Major General Fitz Lee was severely wounded, and Brigadier 
(general York lost an arm. In Major General Rodes I had to 
regret the loss not only of a most accomplished, skillful and 
gallant officer, upon whom I placed great reliance, but also of 
a personal friend, whose counsels had been of great service to 
me in the trying circumstances with which I had found my- 
self surrounded. He fell at his post, doing a soldier's and 
patriot's duty to his country, and his memory will long be 
cherished by his comrades. General Godwin and Colonel 
Patton were both most gallant and efficient officers, and their 
loss was deeply felt, as was that of all the brave officei-s and 
men who fell in this battle. The enemy's loss in killed and 
wounded was very heavy, and some prisoners fell into our 
hands. 

A skillful and energetic commander of the enemy's forces 
would have crushed Ramseur before any assistance could have 
reached him, and thus ensured the destruction of my whole 
force ; and, later in the day, when the battle had turned 
against us, with the immense superiority in cavalry which 
Sheridan had, and the advantage of the open country, would 
have destroyed my whole force and captured everything I had. 
As it was, considering the immense disparity iu numbers and 
equipment, the enemy had very little to boast of. I had lost 
a few pieces of artillery and some very valuable officers and 
men, but the main part of my force and all my trains had 
been saved, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was 
far greater than mine. When I look back to this battle, I can 
but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to the incapa- 
city of my opponent.* 

*The enemy has called this battle, "The Battle of the Opequon,'' but I know no claim it 
has to that title, unless it be in the fact that, after his repulse in the fore part of the Jay, 
some of his troops ran back across that stream. I have always thought that instead of bein.ic 
promoted, Sheridan ought to have been cashiered for this battle. He seems to be a sort of 
jiot of Grant's, and I give the following extracts from the report of the latter, to show tin; 
strange inconsistency of which he is guilty to magnify Sheridan's services. In his Monuu- 
acy letter to Hunter, Grant says: " From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy Ija.-. 
moved north of the Potomac m large force, push north, following him and attacking him 
wherever found; follow him if driven south of the Potomac as long as it is safe to do so. 
If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, th^'u pti^h 
south with the main force, detaching, under si competent eomniander, a sntiicient fi-r'-o to 



xVFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL. 

At light on the morning of the 20th, my troops moved to 
Fisher's Hill without molestation from the enemy, and again 
took position at that point on the old line — Wharton's division 
being on the right, then Gordon's, Ramsenr's, and Rodes', in 
the order in which they are mentioned. Fitz Lee's cavalry, 
now under Brigadier-General Wickham, was sent up the Luray 
Valley to a narrow pass at Millford, to try and hold that val- 
ley against the enemy's cavalry. General Ramseur was trans- 



look after the raidei-s aud drivi! them to their homes." And further on in the same letter 
he says : " Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south, and to do this, you want to 
keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes." When Sher- 
idan relieved Hunter, this letter of instructions was ordered to be turned over to him, and 
two divisions of cavalry subsequently joined him; yet Grant says in regard to Sheridan's 
operations: "His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September 
were both of an offensive and delensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, 
principally by the cavalry, m which we w^ere generally successful, but no general engage- 
ment took place. The two armies lay in such a position, the enemy on the west bank of the 
Opequon creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville, that either could 
bring on a'battle at any time. Defeat to us would open to the enemy the States of Maryland 
and Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. 
TJnder these circumstances, I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally 
the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Kailroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which 
were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably neces.sary to us, and the im- 
portance ot relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion 
so great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order 
for an attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's feelings as to what 
would be the probable result, I left City Point on the 1!M\ of September to visit him at his 
head-quarters, to decide after conference with him what should be done. I met him at 
Charlestowu, and he pointed out .•^o directly how each army lay, what he n-outd do the moment 
he xDcis authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but two 
words of instruction necessary — go in."' In the letter to Hunter there is no hesitation abotit 
tlie initiative, and yet, notwithstanding this letter was turned over to Sheridan for his 
guidance, and two divisions of cavalry subsequently sent to him, and the further fact that he 
had been operating both on the offensive and defensive during August and the fore part ol 
September, the impression is sought to be made that his ardor was restrained by some sort 
of orders, of which no mention is made in Grant's report. Really this is very curiotis, and 
Grant's admission of his hesitation in allowing the initiative to be taken, and the statement 
that the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal were so 
obstructed, and the invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland so constantly threatened, as to 
compel Idm to throw off that hesitation, convey a great compliment to the efficiencj' of my 
small force. The railroad is twenty-two miles from Winchester at the nearest point, and the 
canal over thirty and north of the Potomac, while Sheridan was much nearer to both. That 
Grant did find it necessary to say to Sheridan, " go in 1 " I can well believe, but that the lat- 
ter was panting for the utterance of that classic phrase, I must be allowed to regard as 
apocryphaL 



AFFAIR AT FISHEE'S HILL. 93 

ferred to the command of Rodes' division, and Brigadier- 
General Pegram who had reported for duty about the 1st of 
August, and been in command of his brigade since that time, 
was left in command of the division previously commanded by 
Ramseur. My infantry was not able to occupy the whole line 
at Fisher's Hill, notwithstanding it was extended out in an 
attenuated line, with considerable intervals. The greater part 
of Lomax's cavalry was therefore dismounted, and placed on 
Ramseur's left, near Little ISTorth Mountain, but the line could 
not then be fully occupied. 

This was the only position in the whole Valley where a 
defensive line could be taken against an enemy moving up the 
Yalley, and it had several weak points. To have retired beyond 
this point, would have rendered it necessary for me to fall 
back to some of the gaps of the Blue Ridge, at the upper part 
of the Yalley, and I determined therefore to make a show of 
a stand here, with the hope that the enemy would be deter- 
red from attacking me in this position, as had been the case in 
August. 

On the second day after our arrival at this place, General 
Breckenridge received orders from Richmond, by telegraph, 
to return to South-Western Virginia, and I lost the benefit of 
his services. He had ably co-operated with me, and our per- 
sonal relations had been of the most pleasant character. 

In the afternoon of the 20th, Sheridan's forces appeared on 
the banks of Cedar Creek, about four miles from Fisher's 
Hill, and the 21st, and the greater part of the 22nd, were 
consumed by him in reconnoitring and gradually moving his 
forces to my front under cover of breast works. After some 
skirmishing, he attained a strong position immediately in my 
front and fortified it, and I began to think he was satisfied with 
the advantage he had gained and would not probably press it 
further ; but on the afternoon of the 22nd, I discovered that 
another attack was contemplated, and orders were given for 
my troops to retire, after dark, as I knew my force was not 
strong enough to resist a determined assault. Just before sun- 
set, however. Crook's corps, which had moved to our left on 
the side of Little iforth Mountain, and under cover of the 



94 AFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL. 

woods, forced back Lomax's dismounted cavalry, and advan- 
ced against Ramseiir's left. Ramseur made an attempt to meet 
this movement by throwing his brigades successfully into line 
to the left, and Wharton's division was sent for from the right 
but it did not arrive. Pegram's brigades were also thrown 
into line in the same manner as Ramseur's, but the movement 
produced some disorder in both divisions, and as soon as it was 
observed by the enemy, he advanced along his whole line, and 
the mischief could not be remedied. After a very brief con- 
test, my whole force retired in considerable confusion, but the 
men and of&cers of the artillery behaved with great coolness, 
fighting to the very last, and I had to ride to some of the ofii- 
cers and order them to withdraw their guns, before they would 
move. In some cases, they had held out so long, and the roads 
leading from their positions into the Pike were so rugged, that 
eleven guns fell into the hands of the enemy. Vigorous pur- 
suit was not made, and my force fell back through Woodstock 
to a place called the Narrow Passage, all the trains being car- 
ried off in safety. 

Our loss in killed and wounded in this affair was slight, but 
some prisoners were taken by the enemy, the most of whom 
were captured while attempting to make their way across the 
iSTorth Fork to Massanutten Mountain, under the impression 
that the enemy had possession of the Valley Pike in our rear. 
I had the misfortune to lose my Adjutant General, Lieutenant 
Colonel A. S. Pendleton, a gallant and efficient young officer, 
who had served on General Jackson's staff" during his Valley 
campaign, and subsequently to the time of the latter's death. 
Colonel Pendleton fell mortally wounded about dark, while 
posting a force across the Pike, a little in rear of Fisher's Hill, 
to check the enemy. He was acting with his accustomed gal- 
lantry, and his loss was deeply felt and regretted.* 

* In his aecouut of the battle of Wlucliester, Griiut says : " The enemy rallied and made a 
stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked and again defeated witlt 
heavj' loss on the 20th." This makes Sheridan pursue and attack with great promptness 
and energy, if it were true, but it will be seen that the attack was not made until late on tho 
afternoon of the 3rd day after the battle at Winchester, and that the movement on my left 
flank was again made by Crook. If Sheridan had not had subordinates of more ability and 
energy than himself, I should probably have had to write a different history of my Valley 
campaign. 



JIETEEAT IIP THE VALLEY, AM,) OPEEATIOXS 
UNTIL THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 

On the morning of the '2'Svd, I moved back to Mount Jack- 
sou, where I halted to enable the sick and wounded, and the 
liospital stores at that place to be carried off. In the afternoon 
Averill's division of cavalry came up in pursuit, and after some 
heavy skirmishing was driven back. I then moved to Rude's 
Hill between Mount Jackson and Kew Market. 

On the morning of the 24th, a body of the enemy's cavalry 
crossed the is'orth Fork below Mount Jackson, and attempted 
to get around my right flank, but was held in check. The 
enem^^'s infantry soon appeared at Mount Jackson, and com- 
menced moving around my left flank, on the opposite side of 
the river from that on which my left rested. As the country 
was entirely open, and Rude'sHill an elevated position, I could 
see the whole movement of the enemy, and as soon as it was 
fully developed, I commenced retiring in line of battle, and in 
that manner retired through New Market to a point at which 
the road to Port Republic leaves the Valley Pike, nine miles 
from Rude's Hill. This movement was made throuo'h an 
entirely open country, and at every mile or two a halt was 
made, and artillery opened on the enemy, who was pursuing, 
which compelled him to commence deploying into line, when 
the retreat would be resumed. In this retreat, under fire in 
line, which is so trying to a retiring force, and tests the best 
<)ualities of the soldier,, the conduct of my troops was most 
admirable, and they preserved perfect order and their line 
iTitact, notwithstanding their diminished numbers, and the fact 
tliMt the enemy was pursuing in. full force, and, every now and 
then, dashing up with horse artillery under the support of 
cavalry, and opening on the retiring lines. At the last halt, 
which was at a place called "Tenth Legion," near where the 
I*ort Republic road leaves the Pike, and was a little before sun- 



96 HETBEAT tip THE VALLEY. 

set, I determined to resist any further advance, so as to enable 
my trains to get on the Port Republic road; and skirmishers 
were sent out and artillery opened on the advancing enemy, 
but, after some skirmishing, he went into camp in our view, 
and beyond the reach of our guns. At this point, a gallant 
officer of artillery. Captain Massie, was killed by a shell. As 
soon as it was dark, we retired five miles on the Port Re- 
public road and bivouacked. In the morning Lomax's cavalry 
had been posted to our left, on the Middle and Back roads 
from Mount Jackson to Harrisonburg, but it was forced back 
by a superior force of the enemy's cavalry, and retired to the 
latter place in considerable disorder. Wickham's brigade had 
been sent for from the Luray Valley to join me through the 
]^ew-Market Gap, but it arrived at that gap just as we were 
retiring through i!^ew-Market, and orders were sent for it to 
return to the Luray Valley and join me at Port Republic. In 
the meantime, Palme's small brigade had been driven from 
Millford by two divisions of cavalry under I'orbert, which had 
moved up the Luray Valley and subsequently joined Sheridan 
through the ]^ew-Market Gap. This cavalry had been 
detained by Wickharn with his and Payne's brigades, at 
Millford, a sufficient time t(j enaljle us to pass ISTew-Market 
in safety. If, however, it had moved up the Luray Valley by 
(Jonrad's store, we would have ])een in a critical condition. 

(Jn the morning of the '26t\i, we moved towards Port Repub- 
lic, which is in the fork of the South Fork and South River, 
and where the road through Brown's Gap in tlie Blue Ridge 
crosses those rivers, in order to unite with Kershaw's division, 
which had been ordered to join me from Culpepper C. II. 
We crossed the river below the junction, and took position 
between Port Republic and Brown's Gap. Fitz Lee:f< and 
Lomax's cavalry joined us here, and on the 26th, Kershaw's 
division with Cutshaw's battalion of artillery came up, after 
having crossed through Swift Run Gap, and encountered and 
repulsed, below Port Republic, a body of the enemy's cavalry. 
There w^as likewise heavy skirmishing on my front on the 2(3 th 
with the enemy's cavalry, which made two etforts to advance 
towards Brown's Gap, both of which were repulsed after brisk 
fighting in which artillery was used. 



OPERATIONS IN THE UPPER VALLEY. 9? 

Having ascertained that the enemy's infantry had halted at 
Harrisonburg, on the morning of the 27th I moved out and 
drove a division of his cavalry from Port Republic, and then 
encamped in the fork of the rivers. I here learned that two 
divisions of cavalry under Torbert had been sent through 
Staunton to Waynesboro, and were engaged in destroying the 
railroad bridge at the latter place, and the tunnel through the 
Blue Ridge at Rockfish Gap, and, on the 28th, I moved for 
those points. In making this movement I had the whole of 
the enemy's infantry on my right, while one division of cav- 
alry was in my rear and two in my front, and on the left was 
the Blue Ridge. I had therefore to move with great circum- 
spection. Wickham's brigade of cavalry was sent up South 
River, near the mountain, to get between the enemy and 
Rockiish Gap, while the infantry moved in two columns, one 
up South River with the trains guarded in front by Pegram's 
and Wharton's divisions, and in rear by Ramseur's division, 
and the other, composed of Kershaw's and Gordon's divisions, 
with the artillery, on the right through Mount Meridian, Pied- 
mont and I^ew Hope. McCausland's cavalry, under Colonel 
Ferguson, was left to blockade and hold Brown's Gap, while 
r^omax, with the rest of his cavalry and Payne's brigade, 
watched the right flank and rear. Wickham's brigade having 
got between Rockfish Gap and Waynesboro, drove the enemy's 
working parties from the latter place, and took position on a 
ridge in front of it, when a sharp artillery fight ensued, 
l^egram's division, driving a small body of cavalry before it, 
arrived just at night and advanced upon the enemy, when he 
retired in great haste, taking the roads through Staunton and 
west of the Valley Pike, back to the main body. A company 
of reserves, composed of boys under 18 years of age, which 
had been employed on special duty at Staunton, had moved to 
Rockfish Gap, and another company of reserves from Char- 
lottesville, with two pieces of artillery, had moved to the same 
point, and when the enemy advanced towards the tunnel and 
before he got in range of the guns, they were opened, and he 
retired to Waynesboro. 

On the 29th and 30th, we rested at Waynesboro, and an 



98 OPERATIONS IN THE UPPER VALLEY. 

engineer party was put to work repairing the bridge, which 
had been but partially destroyed. 

On the 1st of October, I moved my whole force across th<^ 
country to Mount Sidney on the Valley Pike, and took posi- 
tion between that place and Xorth Elver, the enemy's forces 
having been concentrated around Harrisonburg, and on the 
north bank of the river. In this position we remained until 
the 6th, awaiting the arrival of Rosser's brigade of cavalry 
which was on its way from General Lee's army. In the 
meantime there was some skirmishing with the enemy's cav- 
alry on the IS'orth River, at the bridge near Mount Crawford 
and at Bridgewater above.* 

On the 5th, Rosser's brigade arrived and was temporarily 
attached to Fitz Lee's division, of which Rosser was given the 
command, as Brigadier-General Wickham had resigned. The 
iiorses of Rosser's brigade liad been so much reduced by pre- 
vions Ijurd service and the long march from Richmond, tbtit 
the brigade did not exceed six hundred mo anted men fordnty 
when it joined nie. Kershaw's division numbered 2700 mns- 
kets for duty, and he had brought with him Oitshaw's bat- 
talion of artillery. These reinforcements about made up my 
losses at Winchester and Fislier's Hill, and I determined to 
attack tlie enemy in his position at Harrisonburg, and for thar 
purpose made a reconnoissance on the ;3th, but on the morn- 
ing of the 6th, it was discovered that he had retired during 
the night down the Valley.f 



*.(Tvam says that, after the fight at Fisher's Hill, " Sheridan pur.sued him witli great energy 
111 rough Harrisonburg, Staunton, and tlie gaps of the Bhie Ridge." Witli liow mueh energy 
the pursuit was made, and how much truth tliere is in the statement that I was driven 
through "Harrisonburg, Staunton, and tlie gaps of the Blue Ridge," will be seen from tlu- 
foregoing account. A portion of my cavalry passed tl\rough Harrisonburg, but none of my 
other troops, and none of tliem through Staunton, and I did not leave the Valley at sill. 
Had Sheridan moved his infantry to Port Republic, I would have been compelled to retire 
tlirough Brown's Gap, to get provisions and forage, and it would have been impossilih' lor 
me to return to the Valley until he evaouatedthe upper part of it. 

t While Sheridan's forces were near Hari-isonburg, and mine were watching them, three of 
our cavalry scouts, in their uniforms and with arms, got around his lines near a little town 
'■•ailed Dayton, and encountered Lieutenant Bleigs, a Federal engineer officer, with two sol- 
diers. These parties came upon each other suddenly, and Lieutenant Meigs was ordered to 
surrender by one of our scouts, to which -he replied by shooting and wounding the scon i. 
who in ills turn tired and killed the Lieutenant. One of the men with Lieutenant Meigs 
was captured and the other escapeiL For this act Sheridan ordered the town of Dayton to 



MOVEMENT DOWN THE VALLEY. 99 

When it was discovered that the enemy was retiring, I 
moved forward at once and arrived at iSTew-Market with mv 
infantry on the 7th. Rosser pushed forward on the Back and 
Middle Boads in pursuit of the enemy's cavahy, which wan 
engaged in burning hounes, mills, barns and stacks of wheat 
and hay, and had several skirmishes with it, while Lomax also 
moved forward on the Valley Pike and the roads east of it. I 
halted at Is^ew-Market with the infantry, but Rosser and Lomax 
moved down the Valley in pursuit, and skirmished successfally 
with the enemy's cavalry on the 8th ; but on the 9th they en- 
countered his whole cavalry force at Tom's Brook, in rear of 
Fisher's Hill, and both of their commands were driven back in 
considerable confusion, with a loss of some pieces of artillery ; 
nine were reported to me as the number lost, but Grant claim:^ 
eleven. Rosser rallied his command on the Back Road, at 
Columbia Furnace, opposite Edinburg, but a part of the ene- 
my's cavalry swept along the Pike to Mount Jackson, and then 
retired on the approach of a part of my infantry. On the 10th, 
Rosser established his line of pickets across the Valley from 
Columbia Furnace to Edinburg, and on the 11th Lomax was 
sent to the Luray Valley to take position at Millford. 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK OR BELLE GROVE. 

Having heard that Sheridan was preparing to send part of 
his troops to Grant, I moved down the Valley again on the 
12th. On the morning of the loth we reached Fisher's Hill, 
and I moved with part of my command to Hupp's Hill, between 
Strasburg and Cedar Creek, for the purpose of reconnoitring. 
The enemy was found posted on the iSTorth bank of Cedar 
Creek in strong force, and, while we were observing him, with- 
out displaying any of my force except a small body of cavalry, 
a division of his infantry was moved out to his left and stacked 

be burned, but for some reason that order was countermanded, and another subsrituted ji.ir 
burning a large number of private houses in the neigliborhood, which was executed, thu.< 
inflicting on non-combatants and women and children a rnost wanton and cruel i)UjjiKhui>.'fn 
for a justifiable act of war. 



100 BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 

arms in an open field, when a battery of artillery was run out 
suddenly and opened on this division, scattering it in great 
confusion. The enemy then displayed a large force, and sent 
a division across the creek to capture the guns which had 
opened on him, but, when it had advanced near enough, Con- 
ner's brigade of Kershaw's division was sent forward to meet 
this division, and, after a sharp contest, drove it back in con- 
siderable confusion and with severe loss. Conner's brigade 
behaved very handsomely indeed, but unfortunately, after the 
enemy had been entirely repulsed, Brigadier-General Conner, 
a most accomplished and gallant othcer, lost his leg by a shell 
from the opposite side of the creek. Some prisoners were 
taken from the enemy in this aifair, and Colonel Wells, the 
division commander, fell into our hands mortally wounded. 
The object of the reconnoissance having been accomplished, I 
moved back to Fisher's Hill, and I subsequently learned that 
the 6th Corps had started for Grant's army but was brought 
back after this affair. 

I remained at Fisher's Hill until the 16th observing the 
enemy, with the hope that he would move back from his very 
strong position on the north of Cedar Creek, and that we 
would be able to get at him in a different position; but he did 
not give any indications of an intention to move, nor did he 
evince any purpose of attacking us, though the two positions 
were in sight of each other. In the meantime there was some 
skirmishing at Hupp's Hill, and some v.^ith the cavalry at 
Cedar Creek on the Back Road. On the 16th Rosser's scouts 
reported a brigade of the enemy's cavalry encamped on the 
Back Road, and detached from the rest of his force, and Rosser 
was permitted to go that night, with a brigade of infantry 
mounted behind the same number of cavalry, to attempt the 
surprise and capture of the camp. He succeeded in surround- 
ing and surprising the camp, but it proved to be that of only 
a strong picket, the whole of which was captured — the brigade 
having moved its location. 

At light on the morning of the 17th, the whole of my troops 
were moved out in front of our lines, for the purpose of cover- 
ing Rosser's return in case of difficulty,^nd, after he had 



BATTLE OP CEDAR CREEK. 101 

returned, General Gordon was sent with a brigade of his divi- 
sion to Hupp's Hill, for tlie purpose of ascertaining by close 
inspection whether the enemy's position was fortified, and he 
returned with the information that it was. I was now com- 
pelled to move back for want of provisions and forage, or attack 
the enemy in his position with the hope of driving him froni 
it, and I determined to attack. As I was not strong enough to 
attack the fortified position in front, I determined to get around 
one of the enemy's flanks and attack him by surprise if I could. 
After General Gordon's return from Hupp's Hill, he and Cap- 
tain Hotchkiss, my topographical engineer, were sent to the 
signal station on the end of Massanutten Mountain, which had 
been re-established, for the purpose of examining the enemy's 
position from that point, and General Pegram was ordered to 
go as near as he could to Cedar Creek on the enemy's right 
flank, and see whether it was practicable to surprise him on 
that flank. Captain Hotchkiss returned to my headquarters 
after dark, and reported the result of his and General Gordon's 
examination, and he gave me a sketch of the enemy's position 
and camps. He informed me that the enemy's left flank, which 
rested near Cedar Creek, a short distance above its mouth, was 
lightly picketed, and that there was but a small cavalry picket 
on the ]!!Torth Fork of the Shenandoah, below the mouth of the 
creek, and he stated that, from information he had received, he 
thought it was practicable to move a column of infantry between 
the base of the mountain and the river, to a ford below the 
mouth of the creek. He also informed me that the main body 
of the enemy's cavalry was on his right flank on the Back 
Road to "Winchester. The sketch made by Captain Hotchkiss, 
which proved to be correct, designated the roads in the enemy's 
rear, and the house of a Mr. Cooley at a favourable point for 
forming an attacking column, after it crossed the river, in 
order to move against the enemy and strike him on the Valley 
Pike in rear of his works. Upon this information, I deter- 
mined to attack the enemy by moving over the ground desig- 
nated by Captain Hotchkiss, if it should prove practicable to 
move a column between the base of the mountain and the 
river. ^N'ext morning, General Gordon confirmed the report 



102 BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 

of Captain Hotchkiss, expressing confidence that the attack 
could be successfully made on the enemy's left and rear, and 
General Pegram reported that a movement on the enemy's 
right flank would he attended with great difficulty, as the 
banks of Cedar Creek on that flank were high and precipitous 
and were well guarded. General Gordon and Captain Hotch- 
kiss were then serj,t to examine and ascertain the practicability 
of the route at the base of the mountain, and General Pegram, 
at his request, was permitted to go to the signal station on the 
niQuntain to examine the enemy's position himself from that 
point. Directions were given, in the meantime, for everything 
to be in readiness to move that night (the 18th), and the divi- 
sion commanders were requested to be at my quarters at two 
o'clock in the afternoon, to receive their final instructions. 

The river makes a circuit to the left in front of the right of 
the position at Fisher's Hill and around by Strasburg, leaving 
a considerable body of land between it and the mountain, on 
which are several farms. Whenever Fisher's Hill had been 
occupied by us, this bend of the river had been occupied by a 
portion of our cavalry, to prevent the enemy from turning the 
right of the position, and it was now occupied by Colonel 
Payne with his cavalry numbering about 800. In order to 
make the contemplated movement, it was necessary to cross 
the river into this bend, and then pass between the foot of the 
mountain and the river below Strasburg, where the passage 
was very narrow, and cross the river again below the mouth of 
Cedar Creek. The enemy's camps and positions were visible 
from a signal station on Round Hill in rear of Fisher's Hill, 
and had been examined by me from that point, but the dis- 
tance was too great to see with distinctness. From the station 
on the mountain, which immediately overlooked the enemy's 
left, the view was very distinct, but I could not go to that point 
myself, as the ascent was very rugged, and it required several 
hours to go and come, and I could not leave my command for 
that time. I had therefore, necessarily, to rely on the reports 
of my officers. 

General Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss, on their return, 
reported the route between the mountain and river, which 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 103 

was a blind path, to be practicable for infantry but not for 
artillery, and a temporary bridge was constructed under Cap- 
tain Hotclikiss's superintendence, at the first crossing of the 
river on our right. The plan of attack on which I determined 
was to send the three divisions of the 2nd Corps, to-wit : Gor- 
don's, Ramsear's, and Pegram's, under General Gordon, over 
the route which has been specified to the enemy's rear, to 
make the attack at 5 ox-lock in the morning, which would be 
a little before day-break — to move myself with Kershaw's and 
Wharton's divisions, and all the artillery, along the Pike 
through Strasburg, and attack the enemy on the front and left 
fiank as soon as Gordon should become engaged, and for Ros- 
ser to move with his own and Wickham's brigade, on the 
Back Road across Cedar Creek, and attack the enemy's cav- 
alry simultaneously ^vith Gordon's attack, while Lomax should 
move by Front Royal, cross the river, and come to the Valley 
Pike, so as to strike the enemy wherever he might be, of which, 
he was to judge by the sound of the firing. 

At two o'clock, P. M., all the division commanders, except 
Pegram, who had not returned from the mountain, came to 
my headquarters, and I gave them their instructions. Gor- 
don was directed to cross over into the bend of the river im- 
mediately after dark, and move to the foot of tlie mountain, 
where he would rest his troops, and move from there in time 
to cross the river again and get in position at Cooley's house, 
in the enemy's rear, so as to make the attack at the designated 
hour, and he was instructed, in advancing to the attack, to 
move for a house on the west side of the Vallej^ Pike called 
the "Belle Grove House," at whicli it Avas known that Sheri- 
dan's headquarters \\'ere located. A guide who kneAV the 
country and the roads was ordered to be sent to General Gor- 
don, and Colonel Payne Avas ordered to accompany him with 
his force of cavalry, and endeavor to ca]>ture Sheridan him- 
self. Rosser was ordered to move before day, in time to 
attack at 5 o'clock next morning, and to endeavor to surprise 
the enemy's cavalry in camp. Kershaw and ^Vliarton were 
ordered to move, at 1 o'clock in the morning, towards Stras- 
burg iinder my personal superintendence, and the artillery 



104 BATTLE OF CEDAR CEEEK. 

was ordered to couceutrate where the Pike passed through the 
lines at Fisher's Hill, and, at the hour appointed for the 
attack, to move at a gallop to Hupp's Hill — the movement 
of the artillery being thus delayed for fear of attracting 
the attention of the enemy by the rumbling of the wheels 
over the macadamized road. Swords and canteens were 
directed to be left in camp, so as to make as little noise 
as possible. The division commanders were particularly 
admonished as to the necessity for promptness and energy in 
all their movements, and they were instructed to press the 
enemy with vigour after he was encountered, and to allow him 
no time to form, but to continue the pursuit until his forces should 
be completely routed. They were also admonished of the 
danger to be apprehended from a disposition to plunder the 
enemy's camps by their men, and they were enjoined to take 
every possible precaution against it. 

Gordon moved at the appointed time, and, after he had 
started. General Pegram reported to me that he had discov- 
ered, from the signal station on the mountain, what he sup- 
posed to be an intrenchment thrown up across the road over 
which Gordon would have to advance after crossing the river 
the second time, and that the signal operators had informed 
liim that it had been thrown up since Gordon and Hotchkiss 
made their examination; and he suggested the propriety of 
attacking the enemy's left flank at tlie same time Gordon made 
liis attack, as he would probably have more difficulty than had 
been anticipated. I adopted this suggestion, and determined 
to cross Kershaw's division over Cedar Creek, at Bowman's 
Mill, a little above its mouth, and strike the enemy's left Hank 
simultaneously with the other attacks, of which purpose notice 
was sent to General Gordon by General Pegram. At one 
o'clock on tlie morning of the 19th, Kersliaw and Wharton 
moved, and I accompanied then). xVt Strasburg, Kershaw 
moved to the right on the road to P)Owman's Mill, and Whar- 
ton moved along the Pike to Hupp's Hill, with instructions 
not to display his forces, but avoid the enemy's notice until 
the attack began, when he was to move forward, support the 
artillery when it came up, and send a force to get possession 



BA.TTLE OF CT^DAR CHEEK. 105 

of the bridge on tlie Pike over the creek. I accompanied 
Kershaw's divisiou, and we got in sight of the enemy's fires at 
half-past three o'clock. The moon was now shining and we 
could see the camps. The division was halted under cover to 
await the arrival of the proper time, and I pointed out to Ker- 
shaw, and the commander of his leading brigade, the enemy's 
position and described the nature of the ground, and directed 
them how the attack was to be made and followed up. Ker- 
shaw was directed to cross his division over the creek as 
quietly as possible, and to form it into column of brigades as 
he did so, and advance in that manner against the enemy's left 
breastwork, extending to the right or left as might be neces- 
sary. At half-past four he was ordered forward, and, a very 
short time after he started, the firing from Rosser on our left, 
and the picket firing at the ford at which Gordon was cross- 
ing were heard. Kershaw crossed the creek without molesta- 
tion and formed his division as directed, and precisely at five 
o'clock his leading brigade, with little opposition, swept over 
the enemy's left work, capturing seven guns, which were at 
once turned on the enemy. As soon as this attack was made, 
I rode as rapidly as possible to the position on IIupp's Hill to 
which Wharton and the artillery had been ordered. I found 
the artillery just arriving, and a very heavy fire of musketry 
was now heard in the enemy's rear from Gordon's column. 
"Wharton had advanced his skirmishers to the creek capturing 
some prisoners, but the enemy still held the works on our left 
of the Pike, commanding that road and the bridge, and opened 
with his artillery on us. Our artillery was immediately brought 
into action and opened on the enemy, but he soon evacuated 
his works, and our men from the other columns rushed into 
them. Just then the sun rose, and Wharton's division and the 
artiirfery were immediately ordered forward. I rode in advance 
of them across the creek, and met General Gordon on the op- 
posite hill. Kershaw's division had swept along the enemy's 
works on the right of the Pike, which were occupied by Crook's 
corps, and he and Gordon had united at the Pike, and their 
divisions had pushed across it in pursuit of the enemy. The 
rear division of Gordon's column (Pegrani's),was crossing the 



106 BATTLE OV CEDAE CREEK. 

river at tlie time Kersliaw's attack was made, and General 
Gordon moved rapidly to Cooley's liouse, formed liis troops 
and advanced against the enemy with his own division on the 
left, under Brigadier General Evans, and Kamseur's on the 
right, with Pegram's in the rear supporting them. There liad 
been a delay of an hour at the river before crossing it, either 
from a miscalculation of time in the dark, or because the cav- 
alry which was to precede his column had not gotten up, and 
the delay thus caused, for wdiich no blame is to be attached to 
General Gordon, enabled the enemy partially to form his lines 
after the alarm produced by Kershaw's attack, and Gor- 
don's attack, which was after light, was therefore met with 
greater obstinacy by the eneni}^ than it would otherwise have 
encountered, and the fighting had been severe. Gordon, how- 
ever, pushed his attack with great energy, and tlie 19th and 
Crook's corps were in complete route, and their camps, with 
a number of pieces of artillery and a considerable quantity f>f 
small arms, aV)andoned. The 6th corps, which was on the ene- 
my's right, and some distance from the point attacked, liad 
had time to get under arms and take position so as to arrest 
our progress. General Gordon brietly informed me of tlie 
condition of things, and stated tliat Pegram's division, which 
had not been previously engaged, had been ordered in. He 
then rode to take command of his division, and I rode forwai'd 
on the Pike to ascertain the position of the enemy, in order to 
continue the attack. There was now a heavy fog, and that, 
with the smoke from tlie artillery and small arms, so obscured 
objects that the enemy's position could not be seen : but 1 soon 
<'.ame to Generals Kamseurand Pegram,wbo informed me thaf 
Pegram's division had encountered a division of the 6tli corps 
on the left of the Valley Pike, and, after a sharp engagement, 
had driven it back on the main body of that corps, which M'as 
in tlieir front in a strong position. 'J^hey further informed me 
that their divisio)is were in line confronting the 6th corps, but 
thiit tiiere was a vacaiiey in the line on their right which ouglit 
to Ik.' rilled. 1 ordered AVharton's division forward at once, 
and dii-ected Generals Kamseur and Pegram to put it where it 
was roquired. In aver^^flhort time, and while I was endeavor- 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, 107 

ing to discover the enemy's line through the obscurity, Whar- 
ton's division came back in some confusion, and General 
Wharton informed me that, in advancing to the position 
pointed out to him by Generals Ramseur and Pegram, his 
division had been driven back by the 6th corps, which, he 
said, was advancing. He pointed out the direction from which 
he said the enemy was advancing, and some pieces of artillery 
which had come up were brought into action. The fog soon 
rose sufficiently for us to see the enem^^'s position on a ridge 
to the west of Middletowu, and it was discovered to be a strong- 
one. After driving back "Wharton's division, he had not 
advanced, but opened on us with artillery, and orders were 
given for concentrating all our guns on him. In the mean 
time, a force of cavalry was advancing along the Pike, and 
through the fields to the right of Middletown, thus placing our 
right and rear in great danger, and Wharton was ordered to 
form his division at once, and take position to hold the ene- 
my's cavalry in check. Wojffbrd's brigade of Kershaw's 
division, which had become separated from the other brigades, 
was ordered up for the same purpose. Discovering that the 
6th corps could not be attacked with advantage on its left flank, 
because the approach in that direction was through an open 
flat and across a boggy stream with deep banks, I directed 
Captain Powell, serving on General Gordon's staft', w^ho rode 
up to me while the artillery was being placed in position, to 
tell the General to advance against the enemy's right flank, 
and attack it in conjunction with Kershaw, while a heavy fire 
of artillery was opened from our right ; but as Captain Pow- 
ell said he did not know where General Gordon was, and 
expressed some doubt about finding him, immediately after lie 
started, I sent Lieutenant Page, of my own stafl', with orders 
for both Generals Gordon and Kershaw to make the attack. 
in a short time Colonel Carter concentrated 18 or 20 guns on 
the enemy, and he was soon in retreat. Eamseur and Pegram 
advanced at once to the position from which the enemy vras 
driven, and just then his cavalry commenced pressing heavily 
on the right, and Pegram's division was ordered to move to 
the north of Middletown, and take position across the Piko 



108 BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 

against the cavalry. Lieutenant Page had returned and in- 
formed me that he delivered my order to General Kershaw, 
but the latter informed him that his division was not in a con- 
dition to make the attack, as it was very much scattered, and 
there was a cavalry force threatening him in front. Lieuten- 
ant Paare also stated that he had seen Gordon's division in 
Kershaw's rear reforming, and that it Avas also much scattered, 
and that he had not delivered the order to General Gordon, 
because he saw that neither his division nor Kershaw's was in 
a condition to execute it. As soon as Pegram moved, Kershaw 
was ordered from the left to supply his place. I then rode to 
Middletown to make provision against the enemy's cavalry, 
and discovered a large body of it seriously threatening that 
flank, which was very much exposed. Wharton's division 
and Woffbrd's brigade were put in position on Pegram's right, 
and several charges of the enemy's cavalry were repulsed. I 
had no cavalry on that flank except Payne's very small brig- 
ade, which had accompanied Gordon, and made some captures 
of prisoners and waggons. Lomax had not arrived, but I 
received a message from him, informing me that he had 
crossed the river after some delay from a cavalry force guard- 
ing it, and I sent a message to him requiring him to move to 
Middletown as quick as possible, but, as I subsequently ascer- 
tained, he did not receive that message. Rosser had attacked 
the enemy promptly at the appointed time, but he had not 
been able to surprise him, as he was found on the alert on that 
flank, doubtless owing to the attempt at a surprise on the night 
of the 16th. There was now one division of cavalry threaten- 
ing my right flank, and two were on the left, near the Back 
Road, held in check by Rosser. The force of the latter was 
too weak to make any impression on the enemy's cavalry, and 
all he could do was to watch it. As I passed across Cedar 
Greek after the enemy was driven from it, I had discovered a 
number of men in the enemy's camps plundering, and one of 
Wharton's battalions was ordered to clear the camps, and drive 
the men to their commands. It was reported to me subse- 
quently that a great number were at the same work, and I sent 
all my staff' ofiicers who could be spared, to stop it if possible, 



BATTLE OP CEDAR CREEK. 109 

and orders were sent to the division commanders to send for 
their men. 

After he was driven from his second position, the enemy had 
taken anew position about two miles north of Middletown, and, 
as soon as I had regulated matters on the right so as to prevent 
his cavalry from getting in rear of that flank, I rode to the left, 
for the purpose of ordering an advance. I found Ramseur and 
Kershaw in line with Pegram, but Gordon had not come up. 
In a short time, however, I found him coming up from the rear, 
and I ordered him to take position on Kershaw's left, and 
advance for the purpose of driving the enemy from his new 
position — Kershaw and Ramseur being ordered to advance at 
the same time. As the enemy's cavalry on our left was very 
strong, and had the benefit of an open country to the rear of 
that flank, a repulse at this time would have been disastrous, 
and I therefore directed General Gordon, if he found the 
enemy's line too strong to attack with success, not to make the 
assault. The advance was made for some distance, when Gor- 
don's skirmishers came back reporting a line of battle in front 
behind breast works, and General Gordon did not make the 
attack. It was now apparent that it would not do to press my 
troops further. They had been up all night and were much 
jaded. In passing over rough ground to attack the enemy in 
the early morning, their own ranks had been much disordered, 
and the men scattered, and it had required time to reform them. 
Their ranks, moreover, were much thinned by the absence of 
the men engaged in plundering the enemy's camps. The delay 
which had unavoidably occurred, had enabled the enemy to 
rally a portion of his routed troops, and his immense force of 
cavalry, which remained intact, was threatening both of our 
flanks in an open country, which of itself rendered an advance 
extremely hazardous. I determined, therefore, to try and hold 
what had been gained, and orders were given for carrying oflT 
the captured and abandoned artillery, smalls arms, and wag- 
gons. A number of bold attempts were made during the sub- 
sequent part of the day, by the enemy's cavalry, to break our 
line on the right, but they were invariably repulsed. Late in 
the afternoon, the enemy's infantry advanced against Ram- 



110 BATTLE OP CEDAR CREEK. 

seur's, Kersliaw's and Gordon's lines, and the attack on Ram- 
seur's and Kershaw's fronts was handsomely repulsed in my 
view, and I hoped that the day was tinally ours, but a portion 
of the enemy had penetrated an interval which was between 
Evans' brigade, on the extreme left, and the rest of the line, 
when that brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon 
followed. General Gordon made every possible efibrt to rally 
his men, and lead them back against the enemy, but without 
avail. The information of this aiiair, with exaggerations, 
passed rapidly along Kershaw's and Ramseur's lines, and their 
men, under the apprehension of being flanked, commenced 
falling back in disorder, though no enemy was pressing them, 
and this gave me the first intimation of Gordon's condition. 
At the same time the enemy's cavalry, observing the disorder 
in our ranks, made another charge on our right, but was again 
repulsed. Every effort was made to stop and rally Kershaw's 
and Ramseur's men, but the mass of them resisted all appeals, 
and continued to go to the rear without waiting for any effort 
to retrieve the partial disorder. Ramseur, however, succeeded 
in retaining with him two or three hundred men of his divi- 
sion, and Major Goggin of Kershaw's staff, who was in com- 
mand of Conner's brigade, about the same number from that 
brigade; and these men, aided by several pieces of artillery, 
held the enemy's whole force on our left in check for one hour 
and a half, until Ramseur was shot down mortally wounded, 
and the ammunition of those pieces of artillery was exhausted. 
While the latter were being replaced by other guns, the force 
that had remained with Ramseur and Goggin gave way also. 
Pegram's and Wharton's divisions, and Wofford's brigade had 
remained steadfast on the right, and resisted all efforts of the 
enemy's cavalry, but no portion of this force could be moved 
to the left without leaving the Pike open to the cavalry, which 
would have destroyed all hope at once. Every effort to rally 
the men in the rear having failed, I had now nothing left for 
me but to order thes^e troops to retire also. When they com- 
menced to move, the disorder soon extended to them, but Gen- 
eral Pegram succeeded in bringing back a portion of his com- 
mand across Cedar Creek in an organized condition, holding 



BATTLE OP CEDAR CREEK. Ill 

the enemy la check, but this small force soon dissolved. A 
part of Evans' brigade had been rallied in tlie rear, and held a 
ford above the bridge for a short time, but it followed the exam- 
ple of the rest. I tried to rally the men immediately after 
crossing Cedar Creek, and at Hupp's Hill, but without success. 
Could 500 men have been rallied, at either of these places, who 
would have stood by me, I am satisfied that all my artillery 
and waggons and the greater part of the captured artillery 
could have been saved, as the enemy's pursuit was very feeble. 
As it was, a bridge broke down on a very narrow part of the 
road between Strasburg and Fisher's Hill, just above Stras- 
burg, where there was no other passway, thereby blocking up 
all the artillery, ordnance and medical waggons, and ambu- 
lances which had not passed that point; and, as there was no 
force to defend them, they were lost, a very small body of the 
enemy's cavalry capturing them. 

The greater part of the infantry was halted at Fisher's Hill, 
and jRosser, whose command had retired in good order on the 
Back Road, was ordered to that point with his cavalry. The 
infantry moved back towards ^ew Market at three o'clocd 
next morning, and Rosser was left at Fisher's Hill to cover 
the retreat of the troops, and hold that position until they were 
beyond pursuit. He remained at Fisher's Hill until after ten 
o'clock on the 20th, and the enemy did not advance to that 
place while he was there. He then fell back without molesta- 
tion to his former position, and established his line on 8tony 
Creek, across from Columbia Furnace to Edinburg, seven miles 
below Mount Jackson. My other troops were halted at Kew 
Market, about seven miles from Mount Jackson, and tliere wa>? 
an entirely open country between the two places, they being 
very nearly in sight of each other.* 



-■ Graut says in his account of the battle of Cedar Creeli : " The enemy was defeated with 
j.'reat slaughter, and the loss of the most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had 
'•Mptured in the morning. The wreck of his army escaped during the night, and tied in tliv 
direction of Staunton and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson."' Stauton.whi) 
seems to think it his duty to improve on all Grant's statements, suys : ■' The routed forces vi' 
the enemy were pursued to Mount Jackson, where he arrived without an organized regi- 
ment of his army. All of his artillery and thousands of prisoners fell into Sheridan's hands. 
These successes closed military operations in the Shenandoah Valley, and a rebel force 
appeared there no more during the war." The recklessness of these statements, of both Grant 



112 BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 

Lomax had moved, on the day of the battle, on the Front 
Royal road towards Winchester, under the impression that the 
enemy was being forced back towards that place, and he did 
not reach me. When he ascertained the reverse which had 
taken place in the latter part of the day, he retired up the 
Luray Valley to his former position at Millford, without 
molestation. 

. My loss in the battle of Cedar Creek was twenty-three pieces 
of artillery, some ordnance and medical waggons and ambu- 
lances, which had been carried to the front for the use of the 
troops on the field; about 1860 in killed and wounded, and 
something over 1,000 prisoners. Major-General Eamseur fell 
into the hands of the enemy mortally wounded, and in him, 
not only my command, but the country sustained a heavy loss. 
He was a most gallant and energetic ofiicer whom no disaster 
appalled, but his courage and energy seemed to gain new 
strength in the midst of confusion and disorder. He fell at 
his post fighting like a lion at bay, and his native State has 
i*eason to be proud of his memory. Brigadier-General Battle 
was wounded at the beginning of the fight, and other valuable 
ofiicers were lost. Fifteen hundred prisoners were captured 
from the enemy and brought off, and his loss in killed and 
wounded in this action was very heavy. 

This was the case of a glorious victory given up by my own 
troops after they had won it, and it is to be accounted for, on 
the ground of the partial demoralization caused by the plun- 
der of the enemy's camps, and from the fact that the men 
undertook to judge for themselves when it was proper to retire. 
Had they but waited, the mischief on the left would have been 
remedied. I have never been able to satisfy myself that the 
enemy's attack, in the afternoon, was not a demonstration to 
cover his retreat during the night. It certainly w^as not a vig- 

and Stautoii, will appear from the above narrative, as well as from my s^ubsequeut operatious 
in the Shenandoah Valley. Would it be believed tiiat this wreck of my army, which fled in 
such wild dismay before its pursuers, carried from the battle-tield 1500 prisoners, who were 
sent to Richmond— subsequently confronted Sheridan's whole force north of Cedar Creek, 
lor two days, without his attacki ng it, and sent out expeditions which captured two impor- 
tant posts, with over 1000 prisoners and several pieces of artillery, in the limits of Sheridan's 
CO mmand 1 Yet such wa3 the ease. 



BATTLE 01^' CKDAIR CREEK. 113 

orous one, as is shown by the fact that the very small force 
with Ramseur and Goggin held him in check so long; and the 
loss in killed and wounded in the division which first gave 
way, was not heavy, and was the least in numbers of all but 
one, though it was the third in strength, and its relative loss 
was the least of all the divisions. I read a sharp lecture to 
my troops, in an address published to them a few days after 
the battle, but I have never attributed the result to a want of 
courage on their part, for I had seen them perform too many 
prodigies of valor to doubt that. There was an individuality 
about the Confederate soldier which caused him to act often in 
battle according to his own opinions,^and thereby impair his 
own efficiency; and the tempting bait ottered by the rich 
plunder of the camps of the enemy's well-fed and well-clothed 
troops, was frequently too great for our destitute soldiers, and 
caused them to pause in the career of victory. 

Had my cavalry been sufficient to contend with that of the 
enemy, the route in the morning would have been complete ; 
as it was, I had only about 1200 cavalry on the field under 
Rosser, and Lomax's force, M'^hicli numbered less than 1700, 
did not get up. My infantry and artillery was about the same 
strength as at Winchester. The reports of the ordnance offi- 
cers showed in the hands of my troops about 8,800 muskets, 
in round numbers as follows: in Iversliaw''s division 2,700, 
Ramseur's 2,100, Gordon's 1,700, Pegram's 1,200, and Whar- 
ton's 1,100. Making a moderate allowance for the men left to 
guard the camps and the signal station on the mountain, as 
well as for a few sick and wounded, I went into this battle 
with about 8,500 muskets and a little over forty pieces of 
artillery. 

The book containing the i-eports of the Chief Surgeon of 
Sheridan's cavalry corps, which has been mentioned as cap- 
tured at this battle, showed that Sheridan's cavalry numbered 
about 8,700 men for duty a few days previous, and from infor- 
mation which I had received of reinforcements sent him, in 
the way of recruits and returned convalescents, I am satisfied' 
that his infimtry force was fully as large as at Winchester, 
, p 



114 BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 

Sheridan was absent in the morning at the beginning of the 
fight, and had returned in the afternoon before the change in the 
fortunes of the day. Nevertheless, I saw no reason to change 
the estimate I had formed of him.* 

It may be asked, why with my small force I made the 
attack ? I can only say we had been fighting large odds 
during the whole war, and I knew there was no chance of les- 
sening them. It was of the utmost consequence that Sheridan 
should be prevented from sending troops to Grant, and Gene- 
ral Lee, in a letter received a day or two before, had expressed 
an earnest desire that a victory should be gained in the Valley 
if possible, and it could not be gained without fighting for it. 
I did hope to gain one by surprising the enemy in his camp, 
and then thought and still think I would have had it, if my 
directions had been strictly complied with, and my troops had 
awaited my orders to retire. f 



CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGI^. 

After the return from Cedar Creek, the main body of my 
troops remained in their camp for the rest of the month with- 
out disturbance, but on the 26th of October the enemy's cav- 
alry attacked Lomax at Millford and, after sharp fighting, was 

"The retreat of the main body of liis army had been arrested, and a new line formed 
behind breastworks of rails, before Sheridan arrived on the field : and lie still had immense 
odds against me when he made the attack in the afternoon. 

t A silly story was circulated and even published in the papers, that this battle was planned 
and conducted by one of my subordinates up to a certain point, when my arrival on the field 
stopped the pursuit and arrested the victory. No otRcer or soldier on that day received an 
order from me to halt, unless he was going to the rear. Mj' orders were to press the enemy 
from the beginning and give him no time to form, and when I found that my troops had 
halted, I endeavoured to advance again, but I discovered it would not do to press tliem fur- 
ther. Those who have known me from my youth, as well as those who came in contact witli 
me during the war, kuoM' that I was not likely to permit any other to plan a battle for me, or 
assume my duties in any particular. Yet I was alwaj's willing to receive and adopt valuable 
suggestions from any of my officers. 

There was another false report as to my personal habits during the Valley Campaign, whicli 
oiitained some circulation and credence, but which I would not notice, except for the fact 
that it was referred to on the floor of the Confederate Senate by two members of that body. 
The utter falsehood of this report was well known to all my staff and General officers, as well 
as to all others who associated with me. 



CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 115 

repulsed. Having heard that Sheridan was preparing to send 
troops to Grant, and that the Manassas Gap Raih'oad was 
being repaired, I moved down the Valley again on the 10th of 
November. I had received no reinforcements, except about 
350 cavalry under General Cosby from Breckenridge's depart- 
ment in Southwestern Virginia, some returned convalescents, 
and several hundred conscripts who had been on details which 
had been revoked. On the 11th, on our approach to Cedar 
Creek, it was found that the enemy had fallen back towards 
Winchester, after having fortified and occupied a position on 
Hupp's Hill subsequently to the battle of Cedar Creek. 
Colonel Payne drove a small body of cavalry through Middle- 
town to ISTewtown, and I followed him and took position south 
of the latter place and in view of it. Sheridan's main force 
was found posted north of l^ewtown, in a position which he 
was engaged in fortifying. I remained in front of him during 
the 11th and 12th, Eosser being on my left flank on the Back 
Road, and Lomax on my right between the Valley Pike and 
the Front Royal road, with one brigade (McCausland's) at Ce- 
darville on the latter road. Rosser had some skirmishing with 
the enemy's cavalry on the 11th, and on the 12th two divisions 
advanced against him, and after a heavy fight the enemy was 
repulsed and some prisoners captured. Colonel Payne, who 
was operating immediately in my front, likewise had a sharp 
engagement with a portion of the enemy's cavalry and defeated 
it. When Rosser was heavily engaged, Lomax was ordered 
to his assistance with a part of his command, and, during his 
absence, late in the afternoon, Powell's division of the ene- 
my's cavalry attacked McCausland at Cedarville, and, after a 
severe fis^ht, drove him back across the river with the loss ot 
two pieces of artillery. At the time of this afiEair, a blustering- 
wind was blowing and the firing could not be heard ; and 
nothing was known of McCausland's misfortune until after we 
commenced retiring that night. In these cavalry fights three 
valuable officers were killed, namely: Lieutenant Colonel 
Marshall of Rosser's brigade, Colonel Radford of McCausland's 
brigade, and Captain Harvie of McCausland's stafi". 

Discovering that the enemy continued to fortify his position. 



116 CLOSE OP THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN, 

and showed no disposition to come out of Ms lines with Lis 
infantry, and not T>eing willing to attack him in his intrench- 
ments, after the reverses I had met with, I determined to re- 
tire, as we were heyond the reach of supplies. After dark on 
the 12th, we moved to Fisher's Hill, and next day returned in 
the direction of ]!^ew-Market, where we arrived on the 14th, 
no effort at pursuit heing made. I discovered by this move- 
ment that no troops had been sent to Grant, and that the pro- 
ject of repairing the Manassas Gap Eailroad had been 
abandoned.* 

Shortly after our return to Xew-Market, Kershaw's division 
was returned to General Lee, and Cosby's cavalry to Brecken- 
ridge. On the 22nd of jSTovember two divisions of the enemy's 
cavalry advanced to Mount Jackson, after having driven in our 
cavalry pickets. A part of it crossed over the river into 
Meem's bottom at the foot of Eude's Hill, but was driven back 
by a portion of my infantry, and the whole retreated, being- 
pursued by AVickham's brigade, under Colonel Munford, to 
Woodstock. 

On the 27th, liosser crossed Great North Mountain into Har- 
dy County, with his own and Payne's brigade, and, about the 
29th, surprised and captured the fortified post at JSTew Creek, 
(.)n the Baltimore and Ohio rail-road. At this place, two regi- 
ments of cavalry with their arms and colours were captured, 
and eight pieces of artillery and a very large amount of ord- 
nance, quarter master, and commissary stores fell into our 
hands. The prisoners, numbering 800, four pieces of artillery, 
and some waggons and horses, were brought oif, the other 
guns, which were heavy siege pieces, being spiked, and their 
carriages and a greater part of the stores destroyed. Rosser 
also brought off several hundred cattle and a large number of 
sheep from Hampshire and Hardy counties. 

This expedition closed the material operations of the cam- 
paign of 1864 in the Shenandoah Yalley, and, at that time, the 

*Prom Grant's account of the battle of Cedar Creek, it would be supposed that the Gth 
Corps was returned to the army of the Potomac immediately after that battla, but the truth 
is that no troops were sent from Sheridan's army until in December, when the cold weather 
had put an end to all operations in the field by infantry. 



- / ■ 

CLOSE OP THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 117 

enemy held precisely the same portion of that valley, which 
he held before the opening of the campaign in the spring, and 
no more, and the headquarters of his troops were at the same 
place, to-wit: Winchester. There was this difference how- 
ever : at the beginning of the campaign, he held it with com- 
paratively a small force, and at the close, he was compelled to 
employ three corps of infantry and one of cavalry, for that 
purpose, and to guard the approaches to Washington, Mary- 
land, and Pennsylvania. When I was detached from General 
Lee's army, Hunter was advancing on Lynchburg, 170 miles 
south of Winchester, with a very considerable force, and 
threatening all of General Lee's communications with a very 
serious danger. By a rapid movement, my force had been 
thrown to Lynchburg, just in time to arrest Hunter's march 
into that place, and he had been driven back and forced to 
escape into the mountains of Western Virginia, with a loss of 
ten pieces of artillery, and subsequent terrible suft'ering to his 
troops. Maryland and Pennsylvania had been invaded, Wash- 
ington threatened and thrown into a state of frantic alarm, and 
Grant had been compelled to detach two corps of infantry and 
two divisions of cavalry from his army. Five or six thousand 
prisoners had been captured from the enemy and sent to Rich- 
mond, and, according to a published statement by Sheridan, 
his army had lost 13,831, in killed and wounded, after he took 
command of it. Heavy losses had been inflicted on that army 
by my command, before Sheridan went to the Valley, and the 
whole loss could not have been far from double my entire 
force. The enemy moreover had been deprived of the use of 
the Baltimore and Ohio rail-road, and the Chesapeake and 
Ohio canal, for three months. It is true that I had lost many 
v^aluable officers and men, and about 60 pieces of artillery, 
counting those lost by Ramseur and McCausland, and not de- 
ducting the 19 pieces captured from the enemy ; but I think I 
may safely state that the fall of Lynchburg with its foundries 
and factories, and the consequent destruction of General Lee's 
communications, would have rendered necessary the evacua- 
tion of Richmond, and that, therefore, the fall of the latter 
place had been prevented; and, by my subsequent operations, 



118 CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 

Grant's operations against Lee's army had been materially 
impeded, and for some time substantially suspended. 

My loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, at Winchester and 
Fisher's Hill, had been less than 4,000, and, at Cedar Creek, 
about 3,000, but the enemy has attempted to magnify it to a 
much larger figure, claiming as prisoners several thousand 
more than my entire loss. How he makes out his estimate is 
not for me to explain. He was never scrupulous as to the 
kinds of persons of whom he made prisoners, and the state- 
ments of the Federal officers were not always confined to the 
truth, as the world has probably learned. I know that a num- 
ber of prisoners fell into the enemy's hands, who did not be- 
long to my command: such as cavalry men on details to get 
fresh horses, soldiers on leave of absence, conscripts on special 
details, citizens not in the service, men employed in getting 
supplies for the departments, and stragglers and deserters from 
other commands. 

My army during the entire campaign had been self sustain- 
ing, so far as provisions and forage were concerned, and a con- 
siderable number of beef cattle had been sent to General Lee's 
army ; and when the difficulties under which I laboured are 
considered, I think I may confidently assert that I had done as 
well as it was possible for me to do.* 



*Some attempts have been made to compare my campaign in the Valley with that of Gen- 
eral Jackson in the same district, in order to cast censure on me; but such comparison is not 
necessary for the vindication of the fame of that great leader, and it is most unjust to me, 
as the circumstances under which we operated were so entirely dissimilar. It was my for- 
tune to serve under General Jackson, after his Valley campaign until his death, and I have 
the satisfaction of knowing that I enjoyed his confidence, which was signally shown in his 
last official act towards me : and no one admires his character and reveres his memory more 
than I do. It is not therefore with any view to detract Irom his merits, that I mention the fol- 
lowing facts, but to show how improper it is to compare our campaigns, with a view of con- 
trasting their merits. 1st. General Jackson did not have the odds opposed to him which I 
had, and his troops were composed entirely of the very best material which entered into the 
composition of our armies, that is, the men who came out voluntarily in the beginning of the 
war; while my command, though comprising all the principal organizations which were with 
him did not contain 1,500 of the men who had participated in the first Valley campaign, and 
there was a like falling off in the other organizations with me, which had not been with Gen. 
Jackson in that campaign. This was owing to the losses in killed and disabled, and prisoners 
who were not exchanged. Besides the old^ soldiers whose numbers were so reduced, my 
command was composed of recruits and conscripts. 2nd. General Jackson's cavalry was 
not outnumbered by the enemy, and it was far superior in efficiency — Ashby being a host in 
himself; while my cavalry was more than trebled in numbers, and far excelled in arms, 
equipments, and horse.s, by that of the enemy. 3rd. The Valley, at the time of his cam- 



CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 119 

Shortly after Rosser's return from the New Creek expedi- 
tion, Colonel Munford was sent with Wickham's brigade to the 
counties of Hardy and Pendleton, to procure forage for his 
horses, and, cold weather having now set in so as to prevent 
material operations in the field, the three divisions of the 2nd 
Corps were sent, in succession, to General Lee, — "Wharton's 
division, the cavalry, and most of the artillery being retained 
with me. 

On the 16th of December, I broke up the camp at l!^ew-Mar- 
ket, and moved back towards Staunton, for the purpose of 
establishing my troops on or near the Central railroad — 
Lomax's cavalry, except one brigade left to watch the Luray 
Valley, having previously moved across the Blue Ridge, so as 
to be able to procure forage. Cavalry pickets were left in front 
of Kew-Market, and telegraphic communications kept up with 
that place, from which there was communication with the 
lower Valley, by means of signal stations on the northern end 
of Massanutten Mountain, and at Ashby's Gap in the Blue 
Ridge, which overlooked the enemy's camps and the surround- 
ing country. 

The troops had barely arrived at their new camps, when 
infoi'mation Avas received that the enemy's cavalry was in 
motion. On the 19th, Custar's division moved from Winches- 
ter towards Staunton, and, at the same time, two other divi- 
sions of cavalry, under Torbert or Merrit, moved across by 
Front Royal and Chester Gap towards Gordonsville. This 
information having been sent me by signal and telegraph, 
Wharton's division was moved, on the 20th, through a hail- 



paign, was teeming with provisions and forage from one end to the otlier ; while my eom- 
inand had very great difficulty in obtaining provisions for the men, and had to rely almost 
entirely on the grass in the open fields for forage. 4th. When General Jackson was pressed 
and had to retire, as well when he fell back before Banks in the spring of 1862, as, later, when 
he retired before Fremont to prevent Shields from getting in his rear, the condition of liie 
water courses was such as to enable him to stop the advance of one column, by burning the 
bridges, and then fall upon and defeat another column: and, when hard pressed, place his 
troops in a position of security, until a favorable opportunity offered for attacking the 
enemy; while all the water courses were low and fordable, and the whole country was open 
in my front, on my flanks, and in my rear, during my entire campaign. These facts do not 
detract from the merits of General Jackson's campaign in the slightest degree, and far be it 
from me to attempt to obscure hi.s well earned and richly deserved fame. They only show 
that I ought not to be condemned for not doing what he did. 



120 CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 

storm, towards Harrisonburg, and Rosser ordered to the front 
with all the cavalry he could collect. Custar's division reached 
Lacj's Spring, nine miles north of Harrisonburg, on the 
evening of the 20th, and, next morning before day, Rosser, 
with about 600 men of liis own and PajTie's brigades, attacked 
it in camp, and drove it back down the Yalley in some con- 
fusion. Lomax had been advised of the movement towards 
Gordonsville, and, as soon as Custer was disposed of, Whar- 
ton's division was moved back, and on the 23rd a portion of it 
was run on the railroad to Charlottesville — Munford, who had 
now returned from across the great Korth Mountain, being 
ordered to the same place. On my arrival at Charlottesville 
on the 23rd, I found that tlie enemy's two divisions of cavalry, 
which had crossed the Blue Ridge had been held in check 
near Gordonsville by Lomax, until the arrival of a brigade of 
infantry from Richmond, when they retired precipitately. I 
returned to the Yalley and established my headquarters at 
Staunton — Wharton's division and the artillery being en- 
camped east of that place, and Rosser's cavalry west of it; 
and thus closed the operations of 1864 with me.* 



* At the close of the year 1S64, Grant's plana for the ca:-npaign in Virginia had been baffled, 
and he had merely attained a position on James River, which he might have occupied at the 
beginning of the campaign without opposition. So far as the two armies, vvith which the 
campaign was opened, were concerned, he had sustained a defeat, and, if the contest had 
been between those two armies alone, his would have been destroyed. But, unfortunately, 
he had the means of reinforcing and recruiting his army to an almost unlimited extent, and 
there were no means of reeruiimg General Lee'.<. Four years of an unexampled struggle 
had destroyed the finances of the Confederate Government, and exhausted the material out 
of which an armj' could be raised. General Lee had performed his task as a military com- 
mander, but tho Government was unable to furnish him the means of properly continuing 
the war ; and he had therefore to begin the campaign of 186.5 with the remnant of his army 
of the previous year, while a new draft and heavy reinforcements from otlier quarters had 
furnished his opponent with a new army and largely increased numbers. The few detailed 
men sent to General Lee, after the revocation of their details, added nothing to tlie strength 
<->f his army, but were a positive injury to it. The mass of them had desired to keep out of 
the service, because they had no stomach for the fight, and when forced into it, they but 
served to disseminate dissatisfaction in the ranks of the army. Some writers who never 
•exposed their own precious per.sons to the bullets of the enemy, have written very glibly 
about the desertions from the army. Now, God forbid that I should say one word in justifi- 
cation of desertion under any circumstances. I hsid no toleration for it during the war, and 
never failed to sanction and order the execution of sentences for the extreme penalty for 
tliat offence, when submitted to me ; but some palliation was to be found for the conduct of 
many of those who did desert, m the fact that they did so to go to the aid of their 
families, who they knew were suffering for the necessaries of life, while many able-bodied 
young men remained at home, in peace and plenty, under exemptions and details. The 
duty to defend one's country exists independently of any law, and the latter is made to 
enforce, not create, the obligation. By the law, or the unwise administi'ation of it, a.man 



OPERATIONS IN 186 5 



Oil the 2nd of January, 1865, 1 had a consultation with Gen, 
Lee at Richmond, about the difficulties of my position in the 
Valley, and he told me that he had left me there with the small 
command which still remained, in order to produce the impres- 
sion that the force was much larger than it really was, and he 
instructed me to do the best I could. 

Before I returned from liichmond, liosser started, with 
between 300 and 400 picked cavalry, for the post of Beverly 
in "Western Virginia, and, on the 11th, surprised and caj)tured 
the place, securing over live hundred prisoners and some stores. 
This expedition was made over a very mountainous country, 
amid the snows of an unusually severe winter. Rosser's loss 
was very light, but Lieutenant-Colonel Cook of the 8th Vir- 
ginia cavalry, a most gallant and efficient officer, lost his leg 
in the attack, and had to be left behind. 

The great drought during the summer of 1864, had made 
the corn crop in the Valley a very short one, and, as Sheridan 
had. destroyed a considerable quantity of small grain and hay, 
I found it impossible to sustain the horses of my cavalry and 

may be exempted from enforced service, but he cannot be released from the sacred duty 
of defending his country against invasion. Those able-bodied men who flocked abroad to 
avoid service, and were so blatant in their patriotism when beyond the reach of danger, as I 
have had occasion to leani in my wanderings, as well as those wiio sought exemptions and 
details under the law, with a view to avoid the dangers and hardships of the war, were to all 
intents and purposes deserters, and morally more criminal than the poor soldier, who, in the 
agony of his distress for the sufferings of his wife and little ones at home, yielded to t)ie 
temptation to abandon his colours. There were some cases of exemptions and details, 
where the persons obtaining them could be more useful at home than in the field, and those 
who sought them honestly on that account are not subject to the above strictures, but thero 
were many cases where the motives were very ditferent. The men whose names foi'm the 
roll of honor for the armies of the Confederate States, are those who voluntarily entered th« 
service in the beginning ^of the war, or as soon as they were able to bear arms, and served 
faithfully to the end, or until killed or disabled: and I would advise the unmarried among 
my fair countrywomen to choose their husbands from among the survivors of this class, and 
not from among the skulkers. By following this advice, they may not obtain as much pelf, 
but they may rest assured that they will not be the mothers of cowards, and their posterity 
T^'ill have no cause to blush for the conduct of their progeaitors. 
Q 



122 OPERATIONS IN 1863. 

artillery where they were, and forage could not be obtained 
from elsewhere. I was therefore compelled to send Fitz Lee's 
two brigades to General Lee, and Lomax's cavalry was brought 
from across the Blue Eidge, where the country was exhausted 
of forage, and sent west into the counties of Pendleton, High- 
land, Bath, Alleghany, and Greenbrier, where hay could be 
obtained. Rosser's brigade had to be temporarily disbanded, 
and the men allowed to go to their homes with their horses, to 
sustain them, with orders to report when called on. — One or 
two companies, whose homes were down the Valley, being 
required to picket and scout in front of 'New Market. The 
men and horses of Lieutenant-Colonel King's artillery were 
sent to South-Western Virginia to be wintered, and most of 
the horses of the other battalions were sent off, under care of 
some of the men, who undertook to forage them until spring. 
Xelson's battalion, with some pieces of artillery with their 
horses, was retained with me, and the remaining othcers and 
men of the other battalions were sent, under the charge of 
Colonel Carter, to General Lee, to man stationary batteries on 
his lines. Brigadier-General Long, who had been absent on 
sick leave for some time and had returned, remained with me, 
and most of the guns which were without horses were sent to 
Lynchburg by railroad. This was a deplorable state of things, 
but it could not be avoided, as the horses of the cavalry and 
artillery would have perished had they been kept in the Valley. 
Echols' brigade of Wharton's division was subsequently sent 
to South-Western Virginia, to report to General Echols for 
special duty, and McNeil's company of partizan rangers and 
Woodson's company of unattached Missouri cavalry were sent 
to the County of Hardy — Major Harry Gilmor being likewise 
ordered to that County, with the remnant of his battalion, to 
take charge of the whole, and operate against the Baltimore 
and Ohio railroad ; but lie was surprised and captured there, 
at a private house, soon alter his arrival . Two very small bri- 
gades of Wharton's division, and i^elson's battalion with the 
few pieces of artillery w-'hich had been retained, were left as 
n\y whole available force, and these were in winter quarters 
near Fisherville, on the Central railroad between Staunton and 



OPERATIONS IN 1865. 123 

Waynesboro. The telegraph, to New Market and the signal 
stations from there to the lower Valley were kept up, and a few 
scouts sent to the rear of the enemy, and in this way was ray 
front principally picketed, and I kept advised of the enemy's 
movements. Henceforth my efficient and energetic signal offi- 
cer, Captain Wilbourn, was the commander of my advance 
picket line. 

The winter was a severe one, and all material operations 
were suspended until its close. Late in February, Lieutenant 
Jesse MclSTeil, who was in command of his father's old com- 
pany, with forty or fifty men of that company and "Woodson's, 
made a dash into Cumberland, Maryland, at night, and cap- 
tured and brought oft' Major-Generals Cxook and Kelly with a 
staft' officer of the latter, though there were at the time several 
thousand troops in and around Cumberland. The father of 
this gallant young officer had performed many daring exploits 
during the war, and had accompanied me into Maryland, doing 
good service. When Sheridan was at Harrisonburg, in Octo- 
ber, 1864, Captain McN^eil had burned the bridge at Edinburg 
in his rear, and had attacked and captured the guard at the 
bridge at Mount Jackson, but in this affair he received a very 
severe wound from which he subsequently died. Lieutenant 
Baylor of Rosser's brigade, who was in Jefferson County with 
his company, made one or two dashes on the enemy's outposts 
during the winter, and, on one occasion, captured a train loaded 
with supplies, on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. 

On the 20th of February, an order was issued by General 
Lee, extending my command over the Department of South- 
western Virginia and East Tennessee, previously commanded 
by General Breckenridge — the latter having been made Secre- 
tary of War. 

On the 27th, Sheridan started from Winchester up the Val- 
ley with a heavy force, consisting, according to the statement 
of Grant, in his report, of " two divisions of cavalry, number- 
ing about 5,000 each." I had been informed of the prepar- 
ations for a movement of some kind, some days previous, and 
the information had been telegraphed to General Lee. As 



ISi OPERATIONS IN 1805. 

soon as Sheridau started, I was informed of the fact by signa^ 
and telegraph, and orders were immediately sent by telegraph 
to Lomax, whose headquarters were at Millboro, on the Cen- 
tral raih'oad, forty miles west of Staunton, to get together all 
of his cavalry as soon as possible. Rosser was also directed to 
collect all of his men that he could, and an order was sent by 
telegraph to General Echols, in 8outh- Western Virginia, to 
send his brigade l)y rail to Lynchburg. My own headquarters 
were at Staunton, but there were no troops at that place except 
a local provost guard, and a company of reserves, coijaposcd 
of boys under IS years of age, which was acting under orders 
of the Conscript Bureau. Orders were therefore given for the 
immediate removal of all stores from that place. Eosser suc- 
ceeded in collecting a little over 100 men, and with these he 
attempted to check the enemy at ]^orth River, near Mount 
Crawford, on the 1st of March, but was unable to do so. 
On the afternoon of that day, the enemy approached to within 
three or four miles of Staunton, and I then telegraphed to 
Lomax to concentrate his cavalry at Pond Gap, in Augusta 
County, southwest of Staunton, and to follow and annoy the 
enemy should he move towards Lynchburg, and rode out of 
town towards Waynesboro, after all the stores had been 
removed. 

Wharton and ^Nelson were ordered to move to Waynesboro 
by light next morning, and on that morning the (2nd) their 
commands were put in position on a ridge covering Waynes- 
boro on the west and just outside of the town. My object, in 
taking this position was to secure the removal of five pieces 
of artillery for which there were no horses, and some stores 
still in Waynesboro, as well as to present a bold front to the 
enemy, and ascertain the object of his movement, which I 
could not do very well if I took refuge at once in the moun- 
tain. The last report for ^V barton's command showed 1,200 
men for duty ; but, as it was exceedingly inclement, and rain- 
ing and freezing, there were not more than 1,000 muskets on 
the line, and ISTelson had six pieces of artillerj-. I did not 
intend making my final stand on this ground, yet I was satis- 
fied tliat if my^^men would fight, which I had no reason to 



OPERATIONS IN 1866. 125 

doubt, I could hold the enemy in check until night, and then 
cross the river and take position in Rockfish Gap; for I had 
done more difficult things than that during the war. About 
12 o'clock in the day, it was reported to me that the enemy 
was advancing, and I rode out at once on the lines, and soon 
discovered about a brigade of cavalry coming up, on the road 
from Staunton, on which the artillery opened, when it retired 
out of range. The enemy manoeuvred for some time in our 
front keeping out of reach of our guns until late in the after- 
noon, when I discovered a force moving to our left. I imme- 
diately sent a messenger with notice of this fact to General 
Wharton, who was on that flank, and Avith orders for him to 
look out and provide for the enemy's advance; and another 
messenger, with notice to the guns on the left, and directions 
for them to fire towards the advancing force, which could not 
be seen from where they were. The enemy soon made an 
attack on our left flank, and I discovered the men on that flank 
giving back. Just then. General Wharton, who had not 
received my message, rode up to me and I pointed out to him 
the disorder in his lino, and ordered him to ride immediately 
to that point and rectify it. Before he got back, the troops 
gave way on the left, after making very slight resistance, and 
soon everything was in a state ot confusion and the men com- 
menced crossing the river. I rode across it myself to try and 
stop them at the bridge and check the enemy, but they could 
not be rallied, and the eneni}^ forded the river above and got 
in bur rear. I now saw that everything was lost, and, after 
the enemy had got between the mountain and the position 
where I was, and retreat was thus cut ofl^", I rode aside into the 
woods, and in that way escaped capture. I went to the top of 
a hill to reconnoitre, and had the mortiiication of seeing the 
greater part of my command being carried off as prisoners, 
and a force of the enemy moving rapidly towards Rockfish 
Gap. I then rode with the greater part of my stafl'and 15 or 
20 others, including General Long, across the mountain, north 
of the Gap, with the hope of arriving at Greenwood depot, to 
which the stores had been removed, before the enemy reached 
that place ; but, on getting near it, about dark, we discovered 



12S6 OPERATIONS IN 1865. 

the enemy in possession. Wc then rode to Jarman's Gap, 
about three miles from the depot, and remained there all night, 
as the night was exceedingly dark, and the ice rendered it 
impossible for us to travel over the rugged roads. 

The only solution of this aiFair which I can give, is that 
my men did not tight as I had expected them to do. Had 
they done so, I am satisfied tLat the enemy could have been 
repulsed ; and I was and still am of opinion that the attack at 
Waynesboro was a mere demonstration to cover a movement 
to the south towards Lynchburg. Yet some excuse is to be 
made for my men, as they knew that they were weak and the 
enem}^ very strong. 

The greater part of ray command was captured, as was also 
the artillery, which, with five guns on the cars at Greenwood, 
made eleven pieces. Very few were killed or wounded on 
either side. The only person killed on our side that I have 
ever heard of was Colonel William H. Harmon, who had for- 
merly been in the army, but then held a civil appointment; 
and he was shot in the streets of Waynesboro, either after he 
had been made prisoner, as some said, or while he was 
attempting to make his escape after everything was over. My 
aide. Lieutenant William G. Calloway, who had been sent to 
the left with one of the messages, and my medical director, 
Surgeon H. McGuire, had the misfortune to fall into the 
hands of the enem3\ All the waggons of Wharton's command 
were absent getting supplies : but those we had with us, inclu- 
ding the ordnance and medical waggons, and my own baggage 
waggon, fell into the hands of the enemy.* 

* Grant, in speaking of this affair, says : " He (Sheridan) entered Staunton on the 2nd, tho 
enemy having retreated on Waynesboro. Thence he pushed on to Waynesboro, where he 
found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under General Early. Without stop- 
ping to make a reeonnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, 
i)nd l.GOO prisoners, II pieces ot artillery, with horses and caissons complete, 200 waggons 
and teams loaded with subsistence, and 17 battle-flags were captured." This is all very 
brilliant ; bat, unfortunately for its truth, Sheridan was not at Waynesboro, but was at Staun- 
ton, where he had stopped with a part of his force; while the affair at Waynesboro was eon- 
ducted bj' one of his subordinates. The strength of my force has already been stated, and 
it was not in an intrenched position. I am not able to say liow many prisoners were taken, 
but I know that they were more than my command numbered, as a very considerable num- 
ber of recently exchanged and paroled prisoners were at the time in the Valley, on leave of 
.ibsenee from General Lee's army. I not only did not have 200 waggons or anything like it, 
but had no use for them. Where the 17 battle-flags could have been gotten, I cannot 
imagine. 



OPERATIONS IN 18.65. 127 

On the Srd, I rode, with tlie party that was with me, towards 
Charlottesville ; but, on getting near that place, we found the 
enemy entering it. We had then to turn back and go by a 
circuitous route under the mountains to Gordonsville, as the 
Rivanna River and other streams were very much swollen. 
On arriving at Gordonsville I found General Wharton, who 
had made his escape to Charlottesville on the night of the af- 
fair at Waynesboro, and he was ordered to Lynchburg, by the 
way of the Central and Southside Railroads, to take command 
of Echols' brigade, and aid in the defence of the city. General 
Long was ordered to report to General Lee at Petersburg. 

The affair at Waynesboro diverted Sheridan from Lynch- 
burg, which he could have captured without difficulty, had he 
followed Hunter's ronte, and not jumped at the bait unwilling- 
ly offered him, by the capture of my force at the former place. 
His defection from the direct route to the one by Charlottes- 
ville, was without adequate object, and resulted in the abandon- 
ment of the effort to capture Lynchburg, or to cross the James 
River to the south side. He halted at Charlottesville for two 
or three days, and then moved towards James River below 
Lynchburg, when, being unable to cross that river, he crossed 
over the Rivanna at its mouth, and then moved by the way of 
Frederick's Hall on the Central Railroad, and Ashland on the 
R. Fi & P. Railroad, across the South and ^orth Annas, and 
down the Pamunkey to the White House. 

At Gordonsville about 200 cavalrj> were collected under 
Colonel Morgan, of the 1st Virginia Cavalry, and, with this 
force, I watched the enemy for several days while he was at 
Charlottesville, and when he was endeavoring to cross the 
James River. When Sheridan had abandoned this effort, and 
on the day he reached the vicinity of Ashland, while I was 
riding on the Louisa Court House and Richmond road, 
towards the bridge over the South Anna, with about 20 cav- 
alry, I came very near being captured by a body of 300 cav- 
alry sent after me, but I succeeded in eluding the enemy with 
most of those who were with me, and reached Richmond at 
two o'clock next morning, after passing twice between the 



12S OPERATIONS IN 1865. 

enemy's camps and his pickets. My Adjutant General, Cap- 
tain Moore, however, was captured, but made his escape. 

Lomax had succeeded in collecting a portion of his cavalry 
and reaching Lynchburg, where he took position on the north 
bank of the river, but the enemy avoided that place. Rosser 
had collected a part of his brigade and made an attack, near 
ISTew-Market, on the guard which was carrying back the pris- 
oners captured at Waynesboro, with the view of releasing them, 
but he did not succeed in that object, though he captured a piece 
of artillery; the guard was compelled to retire in great haste. 
He then moved towards Richmond on Sheridan's track. 

After consultation with General Lee, at his headquarters 
near Petersburg, Rosser's and McCausland's brigades were 
ordered to report to him under the command of General Ros- 
ser, and I started for the Valley, by the way of Lynchburg, to 
reorganize what was left of my command. At Lynchburg a 
dispatch was received from General Echols, stating that 
Thomas was moving in East Tennessee, and threatening South- 
western Virginia with a heavy force, and I immediately went 
on the cars to W^'theviile. From that place I went with Gen- 
eral Echols to Bristol, on the state line between Virginia and 
Tennessee, and it was ascertained beyond doubt that some 
important movement by the enemy was on foot. We then 
returned to Abingdon, and while I was engaged in endeavor- 
ing to organize the small force in that section, so as to meet 
the enemy in the best way we could, I received, on the 80th. of 
March, a telegraphic dispatch from General Lee, directing me 
to turn over the command in Southwestern, Virginia to Gene- 
ral Echols, and in the Valley to General Lomax, and inform- 
ing me that he would address a letter to me at my home. I 
complied at once with this order, and thus terminated ray mil- 
itary (iareer. 



COKCLITSIOK 

In tlie afternoon of the 30th of March, after^having turned 
over the command to General Echols, I rode to Marion in 
Smythe county, and was taken that night with a coldjand 
coughj so jViolent as to produce hemorrhage fromHliG lungs, 
and prostrate me for several days in a very dangerous condi- 
tion. While I was in this situation, a heavy cavalry force 
under Stoneman, from Thomas' army in Tennessee, moved 
through Xorth Carolina to the east, and a part of it came into 
Virginia from the main column, and struck the Virginia and 
Tennessee Railroad at IvTew Kiver, east of Wytheville ; whence, 
after destroying the bridge, it moved east, cutting off all com- 
munication with Hichmond, and then crossed over into !N'orth 
Carolina. As soon as I was in a condition to be moved, I was 
c:irried on the ]'aiiroad to AVytheville, and was proceeding 
thence to my home, in an ambulance under the charge of a 
surgeon, when I received, most unexpectedly, the news of the 
surrender of General Lee's arm}-. Without the slightest feel- 
ing of irreverence, I will say, that the sound of the last trump 
would not have been more unwelcome to my ears. 

Under the disheartening influence of tlie sad news I had 
received, I proceeded to my home, and I subsequently 
received a letter from General Lee, dated on the 30th of 
March, explaining the reasons for relieving me from command. 
..is a copy of that letter has been published in Virginia, witlt- 
out any knowledge or agency on my part, it is appended to 
this narrative. The letter itself, which ^\'as ^\Titten on the 
very day of the commencement of the attack on General Lee's 
lines which resulted in the evacuation of Kichmond, and just 
ten days before the surrender of the Army of i^orthern Vir- 
ginia, has a 'historical interest; for it shows that our great 
commander, even at that late day, was anxiously and earnesr- 
ly contemplating the continuation of the struggle with uuaba- 
fced vigor, and a full determination to make available every 
element of success. 
SI 



130 CONCLUSION. 

Immediately after the battle of Cedar Creek, I had written 
a letter to General Lee, stating my willingness to be relieved 
from command, if he deemed it necessary for the public inter- 
ests, and I should have been content with the course pursued 
towards me, had h^s letter not contained the expressions of 
personal confidence in me which it does; for I knew that, in 
everything he did as commander of our armies, General Lee 
was actuated solely by an earnest and ardent desire for the 
success of the cause of his country. As to those among my 
countrymen who judged me harshly, I have not a word of 
reproach. "VVheii there was so much at stake, it was not un- 
natural that persons entirely ignorant of the facts, and forming 
their opinions from the many false reports set afloat in a time 
of terrible war and public suffering, should pass erroneous and 
severe judgments on those commanders who met with 
reverses. 

I was not embraced in the terms of General Lee's surrender 
or that of General Johnston, and, as the order relieving me 
from command had also relieved me from all embarrassment 
as to the troops which had been under me, as soon as I was in 
a condition to travel, I started on horseback to the Trans-Mis- 
sissippi Department, to join the army of General Kirby Smith, 
should it hold out ; with the hope of at least meeting an hon- 
orable death while fighting under the flag of my country. 
Before I reached that Department, Smith's army had also been 
surrendered, and, without giving a parole or incurring any 
obligation whatever to the United States authorities, after a 
long, weary and dangerous ride from Virginia, through the 
States of jSTorth Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, 
Mississippi, Arkansas and Texas, I finally succeeded in leaving 
the country ; a voluntary exile rather than submit to the rule 
of our enemies. J. A. EARLY. 



APPENDIX. 



LETTER FROM GENERAL LEE. 

"Hd.-Qe3., C. S. Aemies, 

"30th March, 1865. 
"Lt.-Qeheeal J. A. Eaely, i'mjiMn Co.., Va. 

"General, — My telegram will have informed you that I deom a change of 
Commanders in j'our Department necessary ; but it is due to your zealous and 
patriotic services that I should explain the reasons that prompted my action. The 
situation of affairs is such that we can neglect no means calculated to develop tho 
resources we possess to the greatest extent, and make them as efficient as possible. 
To this end, it is essential that we should have the cheerful and hearty support of 
the people, and the full confidence of the soldiers, without which our efforts would 
be embarrassed and our means of resistance weakened. I have reluctantly arrived 
at the conclusion that you cannot command the united and willing co-operation 
which is so essential to success. Your reverses in the Valley, of which the public 
and the army judge chiefly by the results, have, I fear, impaired your influence 
both with the people and the soldiers, and would add greatly to the difficulties 
which will, under any circumstances, attend our military operations in S. W. Vir- 
ginia. While my own confldence in your abilitj'', zeal, and devotion to the causa 
ia unimpaired, I have nevertheless felt that I could not oppose what seems to bo 
the current of opinion, without injustice to your reputation and injury to the ser- 
vice. I therefore felt constrained to endeavor to find a commander who would be 
more likely to develop the strength and resources of the country, and inspire the 
soldiers with confidence ; and, to accomplish this purpose, I thought it proper to 
yield my own opinion, and to defer to that of those to whom alone v/e can look 
for support. 

I am sure that you will understand and appreciate my motives, and no one will 
be more ready than yourself to acquiesce in any measures which the interests of 
the country may seem to require, regardless of all personal considerations. 

Thanking you for the fidelity and energy with which you have always supported 
my efforts, and for the courage and devotion jj-ou have ever manifested in the ser- 
vice of the country, 

I am, very respectfully and truly. 

Your ob't serv't, 

R. E. LEE, Gm'ir 

Since the foregoing narrative was written, I have seen, in a newspa,pcir pab- 
lished in the United States, the following communication : — 



132 APPENDIX. 

"Hc.-Qrs., Battalion U. S. Ini-antey, 
"Camp near Lynchburg, Va., 
"Feb. 7, 1S68. 
"C. Yv'. BuTTOx, Esq., Ediior Lynclihurg Virginian. 

" Sir, — I have received a commnnication from the War Department, Adjutant- 
General's Office, relative to a newspaper slip, containing a copy of General Lee's 
_ letter to General Early, on removing him from command. The letter is dated 
"Headquarters C. S. Armie.s, March 30, addressed to Lieut.-Gen. Early, Franklin 
<^. H., Virginia, and is said to be in your possession, it having appeared in your 
paper. The Secretary ^'f V/ar considers that the original letter properly belongs 
to the Archive oftice. 

"I am directed by Major-General Terry, commanding this Department, to pro- 
cure said letter, and I therefore call j'^our attention to the matter, and request that 
you deliver to me tlie original letter in your possession, in compliance with rny 
instructions. 

I am, viiry respectfully, your obedient servant, 

A. E. LATIMEB,, 
Brevet Major and Captain 11th U. S. Infantry, 

Commanding Post." 

This demand for General Lee's private letter to me, and the attempt to enforce 
it by military power, shovi' how wide has been the departure from the original 
principles of the United States Government, and to what petty and contemptible 
measures that Government, as at present administered, resorts in domineering 
over a disarmed and helpless people. I have the pleasure of informing the 
Hon. Secretary of Yv'ar, and the keeper of the "Archive Office," that the original 
letter is in my possession, beyond the reach of provost marshals and agents of the 
Freedraen's Bureau, or oven Holt with ]ii.=i Bureau of Military Justice and his 
suborners of perjury. 



STATISTICS SHOWING THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE TWO 
SECTIONS DURING THE WAR. 

The census of the United States for 18(50 showed an aggregate free population 
of 27,185,109 ; of this, 488,28-5 were free blacks, of which the larger proportion 
were in the Southern States ; but it is not necessary to consider tliat element in 
this estimate, though to do so would make it more favorable for the Confederate 
States. Of the above 27,185,109 of free popi;lation, there were in the States form- 
ing the Southern Confederacy, as follows : 

Alabama 529 1G4 

Arkansas 30^ 323 



Florida. 

Georgia., 



78, 68G 
695, 097 



Kentunky cjsq 223 

Louisiana 3^6 913 

Miij-sissippi Z^ifm 



APPENDIX. 133 

Missouri 1,058,352 

North Carolina 661,580 

Soutii Carolina 301,271 

Tennessee 834,063 

Texas 420,651 

Virginia 1,105,195 



Aggregate 7,570,221 

Kentucky undertook to assume a neutral position, but she was soon overrun by 
Federal troops, and her government and a very large proportion of her popula- 
tion took sides with the North. Those of her citizens who were not awed by Fed- 
eral bayonets, formed a State government and joined the Confederacy — many of 
her young men going into the Confederate army ; but, in fact, whatever may 
have been the sympathies of the people, her moral influence as well as the benefit 
of her physical strength were given to the Federal Government. The legitimate 
Government of Missouri sided with the South, as very probably did the majority 
of her people, but she was also overrun at a very early stage of the war by Fede- 
eral troops, and her legitimate Government subverted by force ; and the benefit of 
her resources and physical strength was likewise given to the United States, not- 
withstanding the fact that a large number of her men joined the Confederate 
army. Perhaps the number of men added to the strength of the Confederate army 
from Kentucky and Missouri did not exceed the accession to the Federal army 
from Western Virginia, Eastern Tennessee, and some other of the Southern States 
and that, in estimating the relative strength of the two parties at the beginning 
it would be proper to reject Kentucky and Missouri from the estimate of the Con- 
federate strength. The free population of these two States amounted to 1,988,575 
and without them there would be left on the Confederate side a free population o 
5,581,649 against a similar population of 21,603,460 on the Federal side, which 
would make the odds against us very nearly four to one. But I will divide the 
population of these States equally between the parties, and this will give a free 
population of 6,575,937 Confederates, against a similar population of 20,609,172 
Federals, which makes the odds more than three to one against us in the begin- 
ning, without considering the fact that the Northern people had possession of the 
Government, with the army and navy and all the resources of that Government, 
while the Confederate States had to organize a new government, and provide an 
army and the means of supplying it with arms as well as everything else. Not- 
withstanding this immense odds against us, I presume there is scarcely a Confed- 
erate, even now, who does not feel confident that if it had been "hands ofi" and a 
fair fight," we would have prevailed ; but an immense horde of foreign mercena- 
ries, incited by high bounties and the hope of plunder held out to them, flocked to 
the Federal army; and thus v/as its size continually growing, while the Confede- 
rate army had to .rely on the original population to keep up its strength. Any 
accession of troops from Marj'land was more than counterbalanced by those 
obtained from Western Virginia by the Federals, without counting East Tennes- 
see or other quarters. The Federal Government was not satisfied with recruiting 
its army from abroad, but, as the country was overrnn, the southern negroes were 
forced into its service, and thus, by the aid of its foreign mercenaries and the 
negro recruits, it was enabled finally to exhaust the Confederate army. 

To show the immense strength of the Federal army, the following extracts ara 



134 APFENBIX. 

taken from the report of the Federal Secretary of War, Stanton, which was sent 
to the Congress at its session beginning on the first Monday in December, 1865. 
In that report he says : 

" Official reports show that on the 1st of May, 1864, the aggregate national mil- 
itary force of all arms, officers and men, was nine hundred and seventy thousand 
seven hundred and ten, to-wit: 

Available force present for duty 662,3-15 

On detached service in the different military departments 109,348 

In field hospitals or unfit for duty 41,260 

In general hospitals or on sick leave at home 75,978 

Absent on furlough or as prisoners oi war 66,290 

Absent without leave 15, 48;» 

Grand aggregate....- - 970,710 

" The aggregate available force present for duty May 1st, 1864, was distributed 
in the different commands as follows : — 

Department of Washington 42,124 

Army of the Potomac 120,386 

Department of Virginia and North Carolina 59, 139 

Department of the South , 18, 165 

Department of the Gulf. 61, 806 

Department of Arkansas 23,600 

Department of the Tennessee 74,174 

Department of the Missouri 15, 770 

Department of the NorthAVest 5,295 

Department of Kansas 4,798 

Head-quarters Military Division of the Mississippi 476 

Department of the Cumberland 119,948 

Department of the Ohio - 35,416 

Northern Department 9,540 

Department of West Virginia 30,782 

Department of the East 2,828 

Department of the Susquehanna 2,970 

Middle Department 5,627 

Ninth Army Corps 20,780 

Department of New Mexico 3,454 

Department of the Pacific 5,141 

Total — 662,345" 

And again : — 

"Official reports show that on the 1st of March, 1865, the aggregate military 
force of all arms, officers and men, was nine hundred and sixty-five thousand five 
hundred and ninety-one, to-wit: — 

Available force present for duty 602,598 

On detached service in the different military departments 132, 538 

In field hospitals and unfit for duty 35,628 

In general hospitals or on sick leave 143,419 

Absent on furlough or as prisoners of war 31,695 

Absent without leave 19, 683 

Grand aggregate 966,691 

"This force was augmented on the 1st of May, 1865, by enlistments, to the 
number of one million five hundred and sixteen, of all arms, officers and men, 
(1,000,516)." 



APFEITDIX. 1S5 



And again lie says :- 



"The aggregate quotas charged against the several States under all 
calls made by the President of the United States, from the loth 
day of April, 1801, to the 14th day of April, 1865, at which time draft- 
ing and recruiting ceased, was 2, 759, 049 

"The aggregate number of men credited on the several calls, and put 
into service of the United States, in the army, navy, and marine 
corps, during the above period, was 2,656,6.33 

" Leaving a deficiency on all calls, when the war closed, of. 102, 596" 

This does not include that portion of the Federal forces consisting of the regular 
army, and the negro troops raised m the Southern States ; which were not raised 
by calls on the States. It is impossible for me to state the number of troops 
called into the service of the Confederate' Government during the war, as all its 
records fell into the hands of the United States authorities, or were destroyed, biit 
I think I can safely assert that the " available force present for duty " in the Fede- 
ral army, at the beginning or close of the last year of the war, exceeded the entire 
force called into the Confederate service during the whole war ; and when it is con- 
sidered that the troops called into the United States service during that time, num- 
bered more than one-third of the entire free population of the Confederate Statep, 
men, women, and children, the world can appreciate the profound ability of the 
leaders, and the great heroism of the soldiers, of that army which finally over- 
came the Confederate army, by the "mere attrition" of numbers, after a prolonged 
struggle of four years. They can be excelled only by the raagnanimity of the 
conquerors. 



C O STENTS. 



CAMPAIGN IN VIEGINIA FROM THE BAPIDAN TO JAMES KIVEK. 

• Page. 

Introduction 13 

Battles of the Wilderness— Operations of Early's Division 16 

Battles of Spotsj'-lvania Court House — Operations of Hill's Corps 22 

Hanover Junction — Operations of Early's Division 28 

Battles of Cold Harbour — Operations of Ewell's Corps 29 

CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND AND THE VALLEY OF A'IRGINIA. 

Introduction 35 

March to Lynchburg and Pursuit of Hunter 40 

March down the Valley and Operations in the Lower Valley and Maryland.. 48 

Battle of Monocacy 54 

Operations in front of Washington and recrossing the Potomac 56 

Return to the Valley and Operations there 62 

Battle of Kernstown 65 

Expedition into Maryland and Pennsylvania — Burning of Chambersburg 66 

Retreat to Fisher's Hill and subsequent Operations until the Battle of Win- 
chester 71 

Battle of Winchester 84 

Affair at Fisher's Hill 92 

Retreat up the Valley and Operations until the Battle of Cedar Creek 95 

Battle of Cedar Creek or Belle Grove 99 

Close of the Valley Campaign 114 

Operations in 1865 121 

Conclusion 129 

APPENDIX. 

A. Letter from General Lee 131 

B. Statistics showing the relative strength of the two Sections during the War.. 133 



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